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In both everyday morality and law it is generally assumed that individuals are able to 
waive rights by giving consent. However, a detailed understanding of why consent 
has normative significance is often lacking. On a popular view about rights, rights 
are grounded in the interests of agents. In this thesis I consider whether we can also 
appeal to the interests of agents in order to explain the normative significance of 
consent. Ultimately, I argue that we can. The central claim of the thesis is that 
consent has normative significance because it provides a means through which 
agents can interact whilst relating to one another in a morally decent and valuable 
way, by recognising one another as bearers of interests worthy of protection. 
Specifically, by relying on consent to manage their interactions, agents recognise one 
another as having significant interests in having control over the central aspects of 
their own lives. 
 
After addressing some preliminaries in Chapter 1, in Chapters 2 and 3 I consider and 
reject a number of interest-based theories of consent. In Chapter 4 I articulate a 
relational version of the interest theory of rights, according to which rights establish 
a normative framework that allows agents to recognise that they accord one 
another’s interests the appropriate role within their practical deliberations. In Chapter 
5 I argue for the relational theory of consent. According to the relational theory, 
consent allows agents to interact in valuable ways whilst recognising one another as 
having legitimate control over the spheres or domains protected by their rights. In 
Chapter 6 I show how this theory can be relied upon to provide useful insights into 
debates regarding the role that can be played by sexual consent in a world marked by 
entrenched gender injustice. 
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1.1 The Power of Consent 
 
In both everyday morality and the law it is generally assumed that individuals are 
able to waive rights by giving consent. In doing so agents make permissible forms of 
action that would previously have been impermissible. For example, by giving my 
consent, I can make it permissible for a surgeon to perform the life-saving operation 
that I desperately need. Or, by giving my consent, I can make it permissible for a 
colleague to borrow a book from my office. More dangerously, by giving my 
consent to partake in a boxing match, I can make it permissible for my opponent to 
hit me hard in the face. Finally, by giving my consent, I can make it permissible for 
my partner to have sex with me. 
These examples represent a small selection of cases in which an individual’s 
consent can make a previously impermissible action permissible. In all of these 
cases, the consentee would seriously wrong me by performing these acts without my 
consent.1 But of course, these are forms of interaction that we regularly wish to 
engage in: we want to have lifesaving surgery, to lend a colleague a book, to partake 
in sporting competition, and to have sexual relations. Thus, insofar as consent makes 
permissible valuable forms of interaction that would otherwise be impermissible, the 
power of consent plays an important role in our lives. 
Moreover, the significance of individual consent is a central tenet within the 
liberal tradition, and references to consent are littered throughout the history of 
liberal moral, political, and legal thought.2 In the Two Treatise John Locke famously 
claimed that, “Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and 
                                                
1 This is something of a simplification, since, as I make clear in later chapters, we can often affect the 
application of the same rights without giving consent.  
2 See, generally, Jeremy Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” The Philosophical 
Quarterly 37, no. 147, (1987). 
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independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power 
of another, without his own consent.”3 In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill wrote that, 
“There is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, 
has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person’s life 
and conduct which affects only himself, or if it also affects others, only with their 
free, voluntary, and undeceived consent.”4 More recently, Franklin Miller and Alan 
Wertheimer have claimed that, “It is difficult to conceive of a moral code, especially 
within a civilized society, without some recognition to the requirement and moral 
force of consent.”5 
 Despite the apparent importance of consent, however, philosophers have 
rarely taken up the question of just why it is that individual consent is normatively 
significant. Indeed, many have assumed that the power to waive rights by giving 
consent is simply an uncontroversial feature of autonomous agents. For instance, 
Seana Shiffrin claims that the power of consent flows “naturally from a plausible 
understanding of a meaningful right to autonomy.”6 This stands in stark contrast to 
the attention paid to related phenomena, including, for example, the nature and 
genesis of promissory obligations, questions about which have generated a rich and 
diverse philosophical literature.7 In part, this concern with promissory obligations 
arises because many seem to have found the idea that we could give ourselves a new 
moral obligation just by making a promise baffling. Most famous in this regard is 
Hume:  
 
[T]is one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible operations that 
can possibly be imagined, and may even be compared to 
transubstantiation or holy orders, where a certain form of words, along 
                                                
3 John Locke, “The Second Treatise,” in Two Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning 
Toleration, ed. Ian Schapiro (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 141 (§95). 
4 J. S. Mill, On Liberty, ed. David Bromwich and George Kateb (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2003), p. 82. 
5 Franklin G. Miller and Alan Wertheimer, ed., The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), p. ix. 
6 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism,” Philosophical 
Review 117, no. 4 (2008) p. 501. See also Heidi M. Hurd, “The Moral Magic of Consent,” Legal 
Theory 2, no. 2 (1996), p. 124. 
7 Some important recent contributions to this literature include, T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe To Each 
Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), Ch. 7; Shiffrin, “Promising, Intimate 
Relationships, and Conventionalism;” David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), esp. parts II and III. 
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with a certain intention, changes entirely the nature of an external object, 
and even of a human creature.8  
 
Yet, as Hume himself noted, consent shares in the mystery of promising.9 
Simply by communicating “a certain form of words, along with a certain intention,” 
we are able to waive our rights and make previously impermissible actions 
permissible. If the power to promise is so difficult to fathom, why have philosophers 
not been equally troubled by the power of consent?10 
Some might suggest that it is because the answer is relatively obvious. With 
Shiffrin, most philosophers have assumed that the power to waive rights by giving 
consent is to be explained by the value of autonomy.11 Yet the nature and value of 
autonomy are so widely contested that such a response is uninformative.  And as we 
will see, even adopting a widely accepted view about the value of autonomy, 
according to which autonomy is centrally concerned with living a life of one’s own 
creation (a view which is consistent with much of the existing literature on consent), 
there is no straightforward move that can be made from the value of autonomy to the 
power of consent.   
Why, though, should we want a theory of consent’s normative significance? 
We firmly believe that it is, for example, wrong to have sex with an agent without 
their consent, but that they can make sexual relations permissible by giving consent. 
What difference will it make if we can provide a deeper theoretical explanation for 
why this should be? There are, I think, at least three reasons. First, the question of 
just why it is that we can make an act permissible by giving our consent is 
intrinsically interesting. Second, since consent is implicated in a wide variety of 
practical contexts, a deeper understanding of why consent has the normative 
significance it is taken to have (assuming a coherent explanation is available) will 
have important implications for how we think about consent in these arenas, both at 
                                                
8 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 
p. 524 (Book 3, Part 2, Section 5). 
9 See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J. B. Schneewind 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), p. 31 (Section 3). 
10 Indeed, those seeking to explain promissory obligations often appeal to what they take to be the 
much less controversial case of consent. E.g. Shiffrin, “Promising, Intimate Relationships, and 
Conventionalism,” pp. 500-02. On this point see David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape, p. 
166, fn. 2 and accompanying text. 
11 For example, Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” p. 137; Hurd, “The Moral Magic 
of Consent;” Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), Ch. 6; Tom Beachamp, “Autonomy and Consent,” in The Ethics of Consent: Theory and 
Practice, eds. Franklin G. Miller and Alan Wertherimer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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an individual and institutional level. Indeed, most of the existing philosophical 
literature on consent has been concerned with consent’s significance in some 
particular context, for example, the sexual,12 or medical sphere,13 regarding the 
question of political authority,14 or concerning the role of consent in the law.15 But 
given its wide range of application, I believe it would be of great benefit to start the 
other way around, from a more general account of consent and its normative 
significance, which can then be relied upon as a theoretical backdrop against which 
to pursue questions in these specific domains.  
To take one example, questions about the appropriate standard of sexual 
consent clearly bear a relation to the question of why sexual consent is valuable. For 
instance, appropriate standards of sexual consent are likely to differ depending on 
whether we think that consent is valuable because it promotes individual choice, 
provides individuals with control over what happens to them, or for some other 
reason. However, pursuing the question of standards without recourse to a theory of 
consent means relying on a set of intuitions that may pull in different directions.16 
By contrast, with an account of consent’s normative significance available we will 
be better placed to pursue this question. If, as I will argue, the power of consent is 
ultimately grounded in our interests in having a sufficient measure of control over 
the central aspects of our own lives, and our further interests in being able to 
recognise that others respond appropriately to these control interests, then this 
provides us with an important starting point regarding the appropriate standards of 
sexual consent. Very roughly, those standards will only be deemed appropriate if 
they provide individuals with a sufficient measure of control over their sexual 
interactions, as well as means to recognise one another as possessing legitimate 
control.   
                                                
12 David Archard, Sexual Consent (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998); Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual 
Relations. 
13 There is a significant literature concerning consent in the medical context. For an overview, see Nir 
Eyal, “Informed Consent,” in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/informed-consent/>.  
14 A.J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979), Chs. 3 and 4; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Ch. 4. 
15 E.g. “Symposium on Consent in Sexual Relations,” Legal Theory 2, nos. 2 and 3 (1996). 
16 I am not here rejecting a reliance on intuitions in moral theory. I simply mean that without having 
constructed a theory that seeks to unify these intuitions, and bring out the connections between them, 
we will be worse placed to answer certain questions. For some remarks about methodology see 
Section 1.2.6 below. 
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A third motivation for developing a theory of consent’s normative 
significance derives from the central place that the power of consent plays (whether 
implicitly or explicitly) in the majority of contemporary moral and political theories. 
As I have said, the idea that certain courses of action are impermissible without the 
consent of affected agents is very widespread and might be thought of as playing a 
foundational role in an account of decent moral relations. More specifically, the 
power of consent will play a crucial role in particular parts of a general moral theory, 
including a full theory of rights, freedom, autonomy, authority, and so on. Plausibly, 
then, a better understanding of consent’s normative significance will shed light on 
general aspects of our moral practices and moral relations, provide a new perspective 
on questions in other areas, and further help to evaluate competing moral theories 
that need to be able to incorporate a sound theory of consent. 
For these reasons, in this thesis I set out to articulate and defend a positive 
theory of consent’s normative significance. Before giving a brief summary of the 
argument to be made (Section 1.3), in the next section I delimit more carefully the 
nature of the questions to be answered, give an account of the approach I will be 




1.2.1 The Normative Significance of Consent: Two Questions 
 
As I noted above, one of the questions that has been at the centre of the debate 
concerning the power to promise is how it is that an individual could generate a new 
moral obligation just by communicating an intention to do so. The reason this 
question has garnered so much attention is, I think, because of the apparent oddness 
of being able to morally bind oneself to acting in some way where previously there 
may have been very few, if any, moral reasons to so act. Furthermore, many have 
been concerned to explain why it is that, when it comes to the time of fulfilling the 
promise, the promisor is bound to do so even if nothing good will be achieved as a 
result.  
Whilst valid consent achieves different normative consequences, a similar 
question applies: how can an agent waive a right of theirs just by intending to do 
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so?17 This is what I will refer to as the question of consent’s normative force. Notice 
that, like promises, valid consent affects the structure of rights and duties that obtains 
just by the consenter’s intending to do so. Moreover, where an agent has the power 
of consent, their voluntary and informed consent will suffice to waive a right 
independently of the reasons that bear on the course of action in question (on which 
more below). 
 Importantly, however, the question of consent’s normative force is not the 
only thing that needs to be explained by a theory of consent’s normative 
significance. Indeed, a sole focus on the consenter’s ability to manipulate their 
normative environment obscures something important about consent, namely, the 
fact that the power of consent manages normative relationships between agents. That 
is to say, in many circumstances B owes it to A not to act in some without A’s 
consent, and A, by giving her consent, has the power to affect this directed reason. 
Moreover, it seems as if consent is precisely a tool for managing these directed, 
rather than non-directed, reasons. While there are many non-directed reasons bearing 
on B’s acting in some way with regard to A, A’s consent only affects directed 
reasons that specify B’s owing something to A. For example, there will be many 
reasons bearing on B’s performing experimental surgery upon A, such as the fact the 
surgery will increase medical knowledge, lead to benefits for other patients, secure a 
promotion for B, and so on, but these reasons cannot be affected by A’s consent 
because they do not concern what B owes to A. (A merely figures in the content of 
the non-directed reasons.) A theory of consent’s normative significance should be 
able to explain both why an agent’s power of consent affects directed rather than 
non-directed reasons, and why agents should rely on the power of consent in 
particular to manage these directed reasons, and thus as a means to shape their 
normative relationships. Call this the question of consent’s relational significance.  
I believe the question of consent’s relational significance is at least equally as 
important as the question of consent’s normative force, despite less attention having 
been paid to the issue. What is more, an autonomy-based response to this question 
has less immediate appeal. For one, it is not clear why the fact that A has the 
capacity to live an autonomous life means that B owes it to A not to act in certain 
                                                
17 I mean to leave open, at present, exactly what constitutes a token of consent, e.g., an intention, a 
communication of an intention, and so forth. For present purposes, instances of “intention” and the 
like in the text can be seen as placeholders for the best view about consent’s ontology. For further 
discussion see Section 1.2.4 and 5.3.3. 
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ways without her consent. Moreover, if A’s normative power is grounded in her 
autonomy, it is not obvious why A’s power should be limited to an ability to affect 
directed reasons. Surely A’s autonomy would be further fostered if she had the 
power to affect non-directed reasons as well (whether her own reasons or the reasons 
of others). As we will see, I will later argue that the answers to both the question of 
consent’s normative force and the question of consent’s relational significance are 
intimately connected.  
 Primarily I am interested in these two questions as moral questions, rather 
than legal questions. However, I take it that the correct moral account of consent’s 
normative significance will have important implications for the law, and should, 
ultimately, guide legal practice, even though other considerations will undoubtedly 
be relevant to the way in which consent should operate in the law. Moreover, I take 
existing legal practice as a repository of accumulated thought about consent’s 
general practical significance, and not just legal significance. Thus, legal practices 
may serve as a useful guide in thinking about the normative significance of consent, 
and whilst existing laws concerning consent are not justified simply in virtue of their 
existence, we should expect that an adequate theory of consent’s normative 
significance should be able to explain and accommodate significant parts of existing 
law.      
 
1.2.2 Interests and Rights  
 
According to one popular theory of rights to which I am sympathetic, the rights of 
agents are grounded in their interests.18 Since the power of consent is the power to 
waive rights, in this thesis I will consider whether we can also appeal to the interests 
of agents in order to explain the normative significance of consent. I will later argue 
that in order to do so we need to think carefully about the interest theory of rights 
itself. But before turning to these issues, let me give a brief account of what I mean 
by the term interests. 
                                                
18 The most widely cited modern champion of the interest theory is Joseph Raz. See, in particular, The 
Morality of Freedom, Ch. 7. For a good overview of some of the central issues between interest 
theorists and will theorists about rights see M. Kramer, N. E. Simmonds, and H. Steiner, A Debate 
Over Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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The interests of agents are aspects of their well-being. However, since the 
idea of well-being is heavily contested, this idea is only of limited use.19 Somewhat 
more specifically, we can say that what is in an agent’s interests concerns what is 
good for them. When an agent’s interests are served their life goes better; when their 
interests are set back their life goes worse.20 For example, I take it that agents 
typically have interests in sufficient nutrition, intellectual stimulation, special 
relationships such as friendship, bodily integrity, physical and psychological health, 
and so on. I assume that the content of a person’s interests can be broad and wide-
ranging. Indeed, as Joel Feinberg remarks, “The language of interests is useful 
because it allows us to acknowledge the complexity of a person’s good, how it 
contains various components, some of which may be flourishing while others 
languish.”21 I also assume an objective account of interests, according to which there 
are facts about what is and is not in a person’s interests independently of their 
attitudes, desires, aims, and the like. However, factors including an agent’s attitudes, 
desires, and aims clearly play an important role in determining what is, objectively, 
in a person’s interests. For example, if an agent has a desire for ϕ then ϕ is likely to 
be in their interests for this very reason.22 
Restricting our focus to interest-based theories of the normative significance 
of consent means setting aside an important family of moral theories that might be 
grouped together under the heading of status-based views. According to status-based 
views, our rational capacities, or nature as free and equal, or our status as self-
owners, or our possession of some other capacity or property, gives rise to a number 
of important moral rights.23 This explains, on many such views, both why agents 
have rights to and against certain forms of treatment, and why they are able to waive 
these rights by giving consent. Whilst there are many types of status-based view, one 
                                                
19 For an interesting discussion of the idea of well-being and its role in moral theory see, Scanlon, 
What We Owe to Each Other, Ch. 3. 
20 See Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape, p. 7; Joel Feinberg, “Wrongful Life and the 
Counterfactual Element in Harming,” Social Philosophy and Policy 4, no. 1 (1986), p. 146.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Whilst I adopt the objective view because I think it the most plausible, I suspect that a satisfactory 
subjective view of interests would be compatible with the central claims I make throughout the thesis.  
23 Note that I am not here concerned with the grounds of moral status, i.e., that in virtue of which an 
entity is morally considerable, and what this considerability amounts to. Rather I am concerned with 
those views that move directly from an entity’s having a certain moral status to specific moral 
conclusions about the rights and powers therefore possessed by that entity. To be sure, it is generally 
the case on status-based views that the capacity or property that grounds moral status (e.g. the 
capacity for practical reason) is also supposed to explain why an entity has particular rights and 
powers, but this is not an issue I can adequately address here.  
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prominent strand of thought is that individuals, in virtue of having a certain status, 
have a right (or rights) to freedom that endows them with a sphere over which they 
can exercise legitimate authority and control. By giving their consent, however, 
agent’s can waive these rights precisely because this power allows the (otherwise 
wrongful) actions of others to be consistent with the consenter’s freedom.24 
Status-based views are attractive partly because they provide a simple yet 
compelling explanation for the strong moral intuition that (competent adults) enjoy a 
sphere over which they are, to use H. L. A. Hart’s phrase, small-scale sovereigns.25 
To be sure, the idea that individuals have a kind of authority over their own lives 
which means that others can only act in certain ways with their consent is an 
attractive one, and status-based views might seem to offer a convincing account of 
why this is so. Indeed, one reason for considering the viability of an interest-based 
account of consent’s normative significance is precisely to see whether such a view 
can adequately account for what we might call the authoritative nature of 
consent. Consent is authoritative in two related senses. First, the fact that an agent 
gives (voluntary and informed consent) suffices to waive a right of hers, irrespective 
of the reasons for which consent is given, or what is consented to.26 Second, other 
agents are often not permitted to interfere in certain spheres (one’s body, or 
property) without one’s consent.27 Both aspects of consent’s authoritative nature 
might seem to fit more naturally within a status-based account because they seem 
more closely related to the freedom of an agent than the promotion or protection of 
what is in her interests. Thus, one challenge for an interest-based theory is to explain 
the authoritative nature of consent in terms of the interests of agents. If the only way 
an interest-based view can do so is by abandoning the idea that consent is 
authoritative in these ways, then this will, I think, count as a mark in favour of 
status-based views. 
                                                
24 See H. L. A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” in Theories of Rights, ed. Jeremy Waldron 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). For a recent explication of such a view in the context of 
Kant’s political philosophy see Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political 
Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), Ch. 5. 
25 H. L. A. Hart, “Legal Rights,” in his Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 183. 
26 To be clear, this is only true where an agent in fact has the power of consent. For further discussion 
see 1.2.4. 
27 Things are complicated by the fact that agents can affect whether or not they have certain rights in 
other ways than through the giving of consent. Thus, the point might be put better in the negative: if 
A has a right against B with regard to ϕ and A refuses to give B consent to ϕ then B will not be 
permitted to ϕ. 
10 
 
But why not simply accept a status-based view from the start? I do not intend 
to offer a knock down objection against all status-based views here, but let me 
highlight three reasons to help motivate the focus on interest-based views. First, as I 
have said, we should want to know whether an interest-based view can adequately 
explain our considered intuitions about the normative significance of consent, since 
whether it can do so will be relevant to our overall evaluation of competing moral 
theories (e.g. status-based views as compared to interest-based views). 
Second, there is, it seems to me, an intuitive connection between the fact that 
an agent has a right and its being good for them to have the right. Moreover, it seems 
equally intuitive to think that if an agent is able to waive her rights by giving 
consent, it must be good for her, in a sense to be specified, to be able to do so. This 
is something that status-based views do not easily accommodate.28 What is more, a 
sole reliance on status has important implications when it comes to specifying the 
precise contours of particular rights and powers. Whereas an interest-based view can 
point to the ways in which precise specifications of particular rights and powers will 
be more or less good for different agents, a status-based view needs to explain how 
the fact of agents’ rationality, autonomy, or equality alone can provide answers to 
such questions.29  
Third, and relatedly, status-based views offer a non-reductive explanation for 
why moral agents possess certain moral rights and powers. That is, what it is to be 
have a particular moral status is, on the status-based views, to have certain moral 
rights and powers. However, I am unconvinced that we can reach any substantive 
moral conclusions of this sort from the mere fact that agent’s possess certain 
capacities or properties (e.g. rationality, autonomy) in virtue of which they are 
supposed to have a particular status. For instance, why does the fact that I am able to 
assess reasons and make my own mind up about what to do endow me with moral 
                                                
28 One fascinating way of meeting this challenge, which we will discuss in Chapter 3, is to 
incorporate the importance of status within an interest-based view by claiming that agents sometimes 
have interests in the possession of a certain normative status – that it is good for them that they have 
this normative status. This view has recently been developed by David Owens, who relies on it to 
explain the normative significance of consent, by claiming that agents have interests in certain acts 
being wrong unless they consent to them. To be sure, Owens owes us an explanation for why agents 
would have such an interest, a burden I will argue he does not fully discharge. But Owens’s theory 
qualifies for discussion here because what is supposed to do the work on his view is the fact that that 
having the status of a consenter is good for the agent, meaning that it is something that makes their 
life go better. 
29 Cf. Andrea Sangiovanni, “Rights and Interests in Ripstein’s Kant,” in Freedom and Force: Essays 
on Kant’s Legal Philosophy, eds. Sari Kisilevsky and Martin Stone (forthcoming).   
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rights to authority over a certain sphere that I can waive by giving consent?30 In any 
case, I think a preferable account of consent would offer a reductive explanation, 
that is, would provide an argument for why agents have certain rights and powers in 
terms of some more foundational claim or claims. The foundational claim I rely on 
in this thesis is that those entities that have moral status (whatever in fact grounds 
that status) have interests that are morally considerable, or, put slightly differently, 
that we have reason to promote and protect the interests of those with moral status, 
to some greater or lesser extent.31 In contrast to status-based views, then, I do not 
move straight from the claim that an agent has interests to the claim that they have 
particular moral rights and powers. Rather, I aim to account for those rights and 
powers in terms of their interests. (I leave open, at present, what the precise nature of 
the connection between interests and rights is supposed to be.)  
 
1.2.3 Rights: The Hohfeldian System and Directed Duties 
 
In line with most contemporary moral, political, and legal philosophy, I will adopt 
the influential account of the structure of rights initially developed by Wesley 
Hohfeld.32 According to Hohfeld’s system, rights can be broken down into four basic 
“incidents.” Whilst a right may consist in just one of these incidents, many familiar 
rights (such as the right to life, or the right to free speech) are “cluster-rights,” that is, 
a complex of various incidents.33  
Hohfeld’s incidents can be divided into two pairs, first-order rights and 
second-order rights. First-order rights are either liberties or claims. An individual A 
has a liberty (or privilege) right to ϕ if and only if A has no duty not to ϕ. For 
example, if A has a liberty right to walk down the street, then she has no duty not to 
walk down the street. A has a claim-right against another agent B that B ϕ (or not ϕ) 
if and only if B has a duty to ϕ (or not ϕ). For instance, A has a claim-right against B 
                                                
30 See Sarah Buss, “Valuing Autonomy and Respecting Persons: Manipulation, Seduction, and the 
Basis of Moral Constraints,” Ethics 115, no. 2 (2005). 
31 This assumption underpins the interest-based theory of rights, which I am taking as a starting point. 
A sufficient defence of this claim would require more than a thesis in its own right, so here I simply 
hope the reader believes the claim has sufficient plausibility to serve as a starting assumption.   
32 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, ed. Walter Cook (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1919). For a useful exposition of Hohfeld’s account see Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), Ch. 1; and also, 
Leif Wenar, “Rights,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 edition), ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/>. 
33 Thomson, The Realm of Rights, pp. 55-6. 
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that B repay the money he borrowed if B is under a duty to repay the money. 
Liberties and claims are first-order rights in the sense that they directly concern 
whether or not A or B is permitted, or has a duty, to ϕ.  
Hohfeld’s second pair of incidents can be thought of as second-order rights 
insofar as they concern the ability or inability of an agent to affect the application of 
first-order rights (whether their own or others). The third incident, a power, is given 
the following definition by Judith Jarvis Thomson: “I will say that a power is an 
ability to cause, by an act of one’s own, an alteration in a person’s rights, either 
one’s own rights or those of another person or persons, or both.”34 The power of 
consent is one example of a Hohfeldian power, since it is an ability to cause by an 
act of one’s own an alteration in a person’s rights. For instance, if A consents to B’s 
punching her then A no longer has a claim-right against B that B not punch her. 
However, for reasons we will discuss below, this account of powers does not 
adequately capture the sense in which the power of consent is a normative power.35 
The final Hohfeldian incident is an immunity. A has an immunity against B if and 
only if B lacks the power to affect (some aspect of) A’s rights. For example, if A, the 
leader of a morally corrupt and unjust regime, purports to cancel B’s right to life (by 
passing a law) she will (we can assume) be morally unsuccessful, because B has an 
immunity against A’s exercising this power.  
In this thesis I will be primarily concerned with claim-rights and powers (as 
further specified below). Before moving on, however, it is worth noting another 
important feature about claim-rights, at least as I am using the term. As I said above, 
A has a claim-right against B that B not ϕ if and only if B has a duty not to ϕ. That 
means that, if A has a claim-right vis-à-vis B then A has a right against B, and B has 
a duty toward A, not to ϕ. Thus, if B violates A’s right then B will wrong A, since B 
owes it to A not to ϕ. In order to capture this idea we can say that where A has a 
claim-right against B, B has a directed duty toward A. For example, when B makes a 
promise to A to give her comments on her paper, then B has a directed duty toward 
A to give her comments on the paper. The right explanation for the directed nature of 
directed duties is a matter of debate,36 but whatever the right explanation, they play 
                                                
34 Ibid., p. 57.  
35 I leave aside whether Thomson’s definition adequately captures what Hohfeld intended by the use 
of the term power, and whether Hohfeld’s usage was, itself, a useful one.   
36 For one recent account see, Gopal Sreenivasan, “Duties and Their Direction,” Ethics 120, no. 3 
(2010). 
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an important role in the context of consent. This is because, as I noted above, by 
giving consent we affect directed reasons. We can now say, more specifically, that 
by giving consent we waive rights that give rise to directed duties.37 For instance, if 
A gives B consent not to fulfil his promise (i.e. A releases B from his promise), then 
A cancels the directed duty B owes A.38  
 
1.2.4 Defining Consent 
 
The power of consent is one example of what is usually referred to as a normative 
power. Joseph Raz defines normative powers as follows.   
 
An act is the exercise of a normative power if, and only if, it is 
recognized as effecting a normative change because, among other 
possible justifications, it is an act of a type such that, if recognized as 
effecting a normative change, acts of this type will be generally 
performed only if the persons concerned want to secure this normative 
change.39 
 
Some examples will help to clarify. Promising is one example of a normative 
power. On Raz’s definition, this is because acts of promising (e.g. saying “I 
promise”) will generally only be performed by agents who want to bring about the 
normative result that attaches to promising, viz. a promissory obligation.40 For 
another example, consider the normative power of sale. By selling something an 
agent can transfer their legal possession of some object to another agent. They do so 
by performing certain acts (e.g. exchanging an agreed sum for the goods in 
question), acts which, again, are generally only performed by those who wish to 
bring about the normative results of sale, i.e., the exchange of property. Likewise, 
                                                
37 Matters are complicated by the fact that we can consent to the power of others to impose duties, i.e., 
we can waive our immunities by giving others (e.g. the state, the coach, the boss) the power to impose 
new duties on us. See John Gardner, “Justifications under Authority,” Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 23, no. 1 (2010), p. 76. Thomson, The Realm of Rights, pp. 352-54. My focus in this 
thesis will be on cases in which consenter’s waive claim-rights and thus give other’s liberties, but I 
believe the theory I offer can account for both kinds of consent. 
38 Note that this is compatible with B still having reason to act in the way he had promised to act. I 
discuss these issues in Section 5.3.4. 
39 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 103. 
40 As I go on to say below, in order to justify our possession of such a power we will need some 




consent is a normative power because agents will generally only give consent (by 
saying “Go ahead” or signing a form, in the right context) if they want to bring about 
the normative result brought about by consent, namely, the waiving of a right.41 
Above I said that Thomson’s definition of a power was insufficient as an 
account of the normative power of consent (and of normative powers more 
generally) and we are now in a position to see why. According to Thomson, a power 
is the “ability to cause, by an act of one’s own, an alteration in a person’s rights, 
either one’s own rights or those of another person or persons, or both.”42 The reason 
Thomson’s definition is insufficient is that a person can cause an alteration in the 
application of rights and duties (whether their own or others) without exercising a 
normative power. For example, by moving to a new city I will change the taxes that I 
am legally obligated to pay, and the services that I have a right to.43 Alternatively, by 
stepping onto a crowded bus in order to get home after work I can make it the case 
that others do not violate my rights by awkwardly jostling against my shoulder, even 
though they would violate my rights if they jostled against me in the same manner in 
an uncrowded public park. Or, by violently waiving a knife in your face I can make 
it permissible for you to injure me in self-defence. In all of these cases, my actions 
affect the application of rights and duties without being the exercise of a normative 
power, since the justification for holding these acts as affecting normative changes 
does not involve the fact that people will only act in these ways in order to bring 
about the normative change in question.44  
                                                
41 For an alternative definition of normative powers see Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape, p. 
4, according to whom an agent exercises a normative power where they “change what someone is 
obliged to do by intentionally communicating the intention of hereby so doing.” Whilst I think this 
more directly captures the idea of a normative power, I prefer Raz’s definition because it remains 
neutral on whether an intention is always necessary for the exercise of a normative power (which Raz 
denies – see Practical Reason and Norms, p. 104), and whether an agent must communicate in some 
way in order to exercise a normative power. 
42 The Realm of Rights, p. 57.  
43 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, p. 102. As Raz notes, I may well be aware of these normative 
changes and move because of them without its being true that I exercise a normative power by 
moving, since the justification for the normative changes in question is not tied to the fact people will 
only perform such acts (viz., moving to a new city) when they wish to bring about these normative 
changes.  
44 In the cases discussed in this paragraph we might want to further distinguish between two ways of 
affecting the application of rights and duties. First, we can alter the normative situation by acting in 
certain ways, such as moving house, or getting on a crowded bus. Second, we can forfeit some right 
of ours, by, for example, threatening others with a knife. Of course, when we forfeit our rights we do 
so by acting in certain ways. Again, I take it that the distinction will rest on the justification for 
regarding certain actions as bringing about particular normative consequences. For instance we might 
say that we forfeit a right only through some fault or error of ours. See Joel Feinberg “Voluntary 
Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7, no. 2 (1978), p.111. 
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We can get a little clearer on this idea by distinguishing between the 
normative results of an act and the normative consequences of an act.45 The 
normative results of an act are the normative changes that stand in an intrinsic or 
direct relation to the act by definition. For example, to make a valid promise is to 
generate an obligation. To give valid consent is to waive a right. By contrast, the 
normative consequences of an act are brought about indirectly, by changing features 
of the world that have normative significance. For instance, whilst one’s place of 
residence or spatiotemporal location in relation to others has normative significance, 
nothing in the definition of “moving to San Francisco” or “getting on the bus” 
involves affecting a normative change. Thus, the normative changes brought about in 
these cases are the consequences of these acts, whereas the normative change 
brought about by the exercise of a normative power are the results of the act.46 
This distinction is important because it is a feature of the power of consent 
(and other normative powers) that we should want to be able to account for. That is, 
we want to be able to explain why consent has direct normative significance, as a 
matter of its normative result rather than its normative consequences. We generally 
believe that, as R. Jay Wallace has put it, “consent matters directly for the question 
of whether otherwise proscribed behaviour may be engaged in,” and this is 
something I believe we want to be able to retain in our account of consent’s 
normative significance.47 This will be important as we go on because, as we will see 
in Chapter 2, some interest-based accounts of consent suggest that consent’s 
normative significance is essentially indirect, and this will give us reason to reject 
such theories. 
To give consent then is to exercise a normative power, and exercising this 
normative power brings about certain normative results. Later I will discuss which 
particular acts constitute acts of consent. For the meantime I will precede on the 
assumption that consent must be given intentionally, in other words, that one 
consents only where one acts in a certain way with the intention of giving consent. (I 
                                                
45 See Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, p. 103. 
46 Part of the apparent mystery of normative powers is, I think, that they could have normative 
significance as a result rather than a consequence, i.e., directly rather than as a result of affecting 
objective features of the world. I do not fully feel the force of the mystery of this apparent “moral 
magic,” since I take it that an account of why normative powers have certain normative results is of 
just the same kind as an account of why objective features of the world have normative significance.   
47 R. Jay Wallace, “Reasons, Relations, and Commands: Reflections on Darwall,” Ethics 118, no. 1 
(2007), pp. 29-30. 
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will vindicate this assumption in Section 5.3.3). I also assume that the particular acts 
that constitute consent are at least partially determined by convention, e.g., a nod of 
the head, a signature, or a verbal communication, depending on the context (see 
Section 6.2).  
Thus far I have characterised the normative results achieved by consent by 
saying that consent serves to waive a right. By this I have meant that if A gives B 
consent then A waives a claim-right against B such that B is no longer under a 
directed duty toward A. Whilst this is correct, at this point it will help to distinguish 
between two slightly different normative results that A’s consent may have.48 We 
can say that A alienates her right by giving B her consent where her consent means 
that B will not be under a duty toward A at a later time. For instance, A may give 
her consent for B to use her car next month such that B is not under a duty not to use 
A’s car when the time comes around. We can say that A waives her right against B if 
she releases B from his duty at the present time only. For instance, A waives her 
right against B’s having sex with her when she makes it the case that B is not under a 
duty not to have sex with her now.49 Obviously this distinction raises questions about 
which rights we can alienate, and which we can only waive (as well as which (if any) 
we can neither alienate or waive). Whilst I do not comment directly on these 
questions in what follows, I believe the account of consent’s normative significance I 
develop provides a basis that will help to address such questions. 
 Not all purported acts of consent in fact constitute valid consent. By saying 
that consent is valid I simply mean that consent has the normative result it purports 
to have (of waiving a right). It is generally recognised that some purported acts of 
consent do not constitute valid consent for three main reasons. First, an agent may 
attempt to give consent when they do not in fact have the power of consent. Whether 
or not an agent has the power of consent in relation to a particular right of theirs50 
will depend on whether it can be shown that given the justification for the right, and 
given the justification for the power of consent, that power is something an agent has 
                                                
48 On the alienating/waiving distinction that follows see Feinberg, “Voluntary Euthanasia and the 
Inalienable Right to Life;” Johann Frick, “Contractualism and Social Risk,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 43, no. 3 (2015), p. 207, n. 34. 
49 For ease of exposition I will henceforth use the term “waived” to cover both waiving and alienating 
a right through consent, specifying between the two only where necessary.   
50 Generally, an agent will only have the power of consent over his or her own rights, but there are a 
significant number of interesting cases in which an agent can have that power with regard to a third-
party, e.g., parents with regard to their children. For present purposes I focus on the more 
straightforward self-regarding cases. 
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with regard to a particular right. There are many reasons why an agent might not 
have the power of consent with regard to certain rights. The two most commonly 
discussed cases are those in which an agent would usually have the power of 
consent, or will come to have the power of consent, but does not presently have that 
power. This may be because of the age of the agent (e.g. the age of sexual consent), 
or the competency of the agent (e.g. an agent who has a severe cognitive 
impairment). Furthermore, an agent may be unable to waive some right of hers 
because of the harm that would be caused by the consentee acting in the manner that 
has been consented to.51   
Second, consent is widely thought to need to meet a voluntariness condition. 
That is, consent is only valid where it is given voluntarily, however exactly the idea 
of voluntariness is understood. A clear case of involuntary (and so invalid) consent is 
sexual consent extracted at gunpoint. Third, consent is generally thought to need to 
meet an information condition to be valid, according to which individuals must have 
sufficient information about what they are consenting to. For instance, a patient who 
does not understand that her consent permits the doctor to remove a limb of hers will 
fail to meet the information condition and so be invalid.  
 All three of these conditions on consent’s normative efficacy are complex 
and give rise to difficult and interesting question in their own right. For the purposes 
of this thesis I will rely on what I take to be intuitive examples and assume that 
consent given in the cases discussed is valid consent unless otherwise stated. Once 
again, I do not comment directly on the ways in which we should understand these 
conditions, but I believe that the theory of consent I develop should provide a basis 
from which to approach these questions. 
 In some cases I will discuss the normative significance of an agent’s non-
consent. By this I just mean to refer to the normative state of affairs that obtains 
given an agent has not consented. In some other cases I will talk about an agent’s 
having dissented or revoked consent. An agent dissents either where she asserts the 
fact that she has not in fact consented (such that she has not waived any right of 
hers), or where she acts so to reinstate her right by removing consent. The usage will 
be made clear by the context. An agent revokes her consent just where she reinstates 
                                                
51 Whether there are any such rights is a heavily contested issue that I will comment on only obliquely 
in what follows. For some interesting discussion, see Victor Tadros, “Consent to Harm,” Current 
Legal Problems 64 (2011); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Harm and its Moral Significance,” Legal 
Theory 18, no. 3 (2012). 
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her right by removing her consent. The ability to revoke consent is in itself a 
normative power, although I assume that the explanation for this power is part and 
parcel of an account of consent’s normative significance.52 Having given consent, an 
agent may not always be able to revoke her consent. Whether this is so depends upon 
whether she has waived or alienated her right.53 
 Finally, it is worth noting that the normative power of consent is not, in my 
view, what might be called a fundamental normative power. A fundamental 
normative power would be the ability to create any reasons for action, rights, duties, 
and so forth, just by exercising that fundamental power. If I had a fundamental 
normative power then I could, for example, give all trees a right to life, or give every 
agent in the world a duty to give me five pounds per month, or give a passing 
stranger reasons to do a funny dance on the street. I doubt that any being has such a 
power (although if God exists he is an obvious candidate). However, I suspect that 
much of the mystery and suspicion concerning normative powers derives from the 
implicit assumption that the possession of a normative power (e.g. the power to 
consent or the power to promise) would be akin to the possession of a fundamental 
normative power. But that is far from true. Rather, whether agents have the ability to 
affect the application of rights and duties in the ways I have suggested depends upon 
whether there are pre-existing reasons why they should be able to do so. In other 
words, whether agents possess the power of consent, and what the contours or 
confines of that power consist in, depends upon why it would be valuable for them to 
possess that power. Raz puts this point the following way. 
 
Consent…is an act purporting to change the normative situation. Not ever 
act of consent succeeds in doing so, and those that succeed do so because 
they fall under reasons, not themselves created by consent, that show why 
acts of consent should, within certain limits, be a way of creating rights 
and duties. We cannot create reasons just by intending to do so and 
expressing that intention in action. Reasons precede the will. Though the 
                                                
52 See Section 5.3.2. 
53 In some cases in which we talk of consent, it may be that we also give another a claim against us by 
consenting, as well as a permission. For instance, if Alison consents to Bert’s borrowing her book so 
that he can finish his essay, then this will often imply that Bert now has a claim against Alison to 
borrow the book for some period of time (i.e. Alison would wrong Bert by revoking her consent). 
These cases are interesting, since they represent something like a hybrid power of consent and 
promise. My primary focus in the thesis, however, will be on straightforward cases of consent.  
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latter can, within limits, create reasons, it can do so only when there is a 
non-will-based reason why it should.54 
 
So in trying to explain and justify the normative significance of consent we are 
trying to give an account of the reasons why agents should, within certain limits, be 
able to waive rights of theirs by performing certain actions with the intention of 
achieving that normative result, and why other agents should, in certain contexts, be 




At this point it may be useful to draw together some of the previous remarks and to 
rearticulate the central questions in response to which I aim to develop a theory, as 
well as two initial desiderata for that theory. The central questions to be addressed 
are, 
 
• The Question of Consent’s Normative Force. Why does an agent’s consent 
have normative force, such that when they give consent they waive a right of 
theirs? 
• The Question of Consent’s Relational Significance. Why does the power of 
consent extend over directed and not non-directed reasons? Why should we 
rely on consent to affect the application of these directed reasons? 
 
And the desiderata for that theory are, 
 
• The Authoritative Nature of Consent. An account of why it is that when an 
agent has the power of consent with regard to some right, their valid consent 
                                                
54 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 84. See also David Enoch, “Giving Practical Reasons,” 
Philosophers Imprint 11, no. 4 (2011). 
55 See Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, p. 102, and Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 97. This fact 
bears importantly on the question of the way in which those who possess normative powers can 
exercise them. For example, there has been some debate concerning whether agents can make binding 
promises to perform immoral acts. Whilst some have assumed that the power to promise just is the 
power to give oneself obligations, independently of their content, this ignores the fact the justification 
for the power to promise depends on an account of why it is valuable that agents should possess that 
power. Plausibly, that justification will include limits on the kinds of promises one can make. See 
Gary Watson, “Promises, Reasons, and Normative Powers,” in Reasons for Action, eds. David Sobel 
and Steven Wall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), esp. pp. 167-69. 
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has normative significance independently of the reasons for which it is given, 
whether the consented to action will be in the agent’s interest, and so on. 
• A Practical and Theoretical Foundation. A theory that provides a starting 
point from which to address further practical and theoretical questions about 




Before moving on to give a brief overview of the main claims to be defended, let me 
say a few things about methodology. 
 As I have just said, in constructing a theory of consent we are trying to give 
an account of the reasons, or values, that explain why agents should be able to waive 
rights of theirs by performing acts of consent. In order to do so I consider a number 
of possible theories or principles of consent, and test these against fixed moral 
judgments about what I take to be paradigmatic examples of consent, whilst also 
considering whether the theory under consideration can give answers to our two 
central questions in line with the desiderata outlined. Thus, I rely, as do all moral and 
political philosophers, on our moral intuitions in response to a range of examples. 
The cases I will discuss most often are cases of sexual and medical consent, and this 
is because I believe these to be cases in which we have the most clear and fixed 
intuitions about consent. I suspect that the further we move away from paradigmatic 
examples such as these, the less clear and less helpful our intuitions become.56  
However, no intuition or judgement is, in principle, fixed, such that it is not a 
candidate for revision (even if we find it very hard to imagine the situation in which 
we would be prepared to give some such judgements up). Rather, we must work 
back and forward between our judgements and our candidate principles or theory, 
revising each in line with the other and testing these against new cases until we reach 
a “reflective equilibrium” (something we are very unlikely to reach in the course of 
this thesis).57 By engaging in this process we hope to be able, at least to some 
reasonable extent, to unify our central intuitions and explain the connections 
                                                
56 Which is not to say we never have cause to think about strange and improbable cases, only to say 
that we may want to put less weight on the fact that we have certain intuitions in response to those 
cases. 
57 On the method of reflective equilibrium see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Rev. Ed. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), Sec. 9; T. M. Scanlon, “The Aims and Authority of Moral 
Theory,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 12, no. 1 (1992). 
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between them such that we are in a position not only to answer the questions from 
which we begin, but also to provide a basis for assessing our more or less fixed 
moral judgements, and for making new judgments when faced with new cases.  
Having said this, I do no rely solely on the fact that we can bring a set of 
considered moral judgments about particular cases into alignment with a theoretical 
account of consent’s normative significance. I also provide arguments to the effect 
that if you accept certain intuitions or claims – both about cases of consent as well as 
other widely accepted ideas in moral theory – then you should accept the relational 
theory of consent I outline in Chapter 5. My hope is that the reader will accept a 
sufficient number of the intuitions upon which I rely, and see the theory I present as 
an attractive way of accounting for these intuitions in line with the constraints I have 
set out above. 
  
1.3 Thesis Overview 
 
Let me now present a brief summary of the contents of the chapters to follow. 
 In the next chapter, Chapter 2, I consider four possible theories of consent’s 
normative significance that are tied together by the fact they each seek to ground that 
significance in the fact that the possession of the power of consent in certain contexts 
will serve or protect the interests of agents. Two of these theories focus on the fact 
that an agent is often in the best epistemic position with regard to her own interests, 
such that her possession of this power will promote her overall well-being. The other 
two theories, that I believe are most commonly relied upon by moral and political 
philosophers, emphasise the importance of the possession of the power of consent 
for the living of an autonomous life, either because consent represents an agent’s 
autonomous choice, or because agents would be unable to live rich and diverse lives 
involving interaction with others if they had no means of waiving their rights. 
 Whilst each theory has its own particular pitfalls, I argue that all four theories 
fail to adequately explain the authoritative nature of consent. Briefly, theories that 
are based on the general well-being of agents cannot explain why consent has 
normative force when it will not serve the interests of the consenter, yet reflection on 
a number of examples makes clear that we believe an agent’s consent will often have 
normative force in such cases. On a choice-based account of consent, it is an agent’s 
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choices, and not her consent, that is authoritative. Once again, considering a number 
of examples makes clear that we believe an agent’s consent does have normative 
significance even where it does not represent a choice of hers. Finally, a theory that 
grounds the power of consent in the need to be able to engage in valuable interaction 
with others, whilst intuitive, fails to give any account of why an agent’s consent in 
fact has authority. Specifically, assuming that an agent’s rights are grounded in her 
interests, how could an agent waive her rights by giving consent when acts of 
consent – declarations, signatures, etc. – will in no way affect her underlying 
interests?  
 These theories brings to the fore an important problem faced by any moral 
theory that seeks to ground moral rights and wrongs in an account of interests, and 
that is the problem of moving from an account of morally significant interests to an 
account of moral rights and wrongs in a way that satisfies our considered 
judgements. In particular, I think these theories highlight the difficulty of trying to 
move directly from the former to the latter. Indeed, I take this problem, which I will 
refer to as the bridging problem, to be one of the most significant challenges faced 
by any interest-based moral theory. 
Before exploring this idea further, however, Chapter 3 considers one of the 
only explicit and detailed interest-based theories of consent, which has recently been 
developed by David Owens. Owens’s theory of consent is part of a broader theory 
concerning our ability to shape the normative landscape through the choices we 
make. He argues that standard interest-based theories go wrong because they ignore 
an important class of interests possessed by agents: normative interests.58 Normative 
interests, Owens claims, are interests in normative phenomena, such as rights and 
obligations. In the case of consent Owens argues that we have a permissive interest, 
an interest in certain acts being wrong unless we consent to them. By relying on the 
permissive interest Owens is able to account for many of the problems faced by the 
standard interest-based theories considered in Chapter 2, and to give an account of 
consent’s authority.     
 I level three main objections against Owens’s theory. First, I argue that his 
theory does not offer a plausible account of why consent is valuable, that is, of why 
it matters to us that we rely on one another’s consent as a means for managing our 
                                                
58 See Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape. 
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normative relationships in certain contexts. Second, I argue that Owens’s theory 
lacks explanatory power, in two directions. On the one hand, it is far from clear that 
Owens’s theory of consent actually accounts for the data we think a theory of 
consent should unify and explain. On the other hand, a consequence of relying on the 
postulated permissive interest is that it is difficult to use the theory as a starting point 
from which to address further theoretical and practical questions, in large part 
because the idea of a permissive interest does not map onto other familiar concepts 
or intuitions upon which we rely in our practical thinking. Third, I cast doubt on our 
possession of permissive interests by arguing that even in a paradigmatic case in 
which consent is taken to be normatively significant, viz., sexual relations, agents 
need not always rely on consent to make their interaction permissible, at least when 
consent is understood in the narrow way that both Owens and I understand it. If this 
is correct, however, it suggests that the interest(s) that explain why consent is usually 
taken to be important in the sexual context cannot be an interest in its being wrong 
for others to have sex with us unless we consent. 
This all suggests, I think, that whilst we cannot move directly from an 
account of an agents’ interests to their possession of the power of consent, it is the 
interests of agents – standardly understood – that ultimately ground that power. The 
question, then, is about how we should conceive of the relation between an agent’s 
interests and her moral rights and powers. In Chapter 4 I focus on this issue solely in 
connection with moral rights, and confront a general problem that is faced by the 
interest theory. Typically, rights are taken to be of significance in practical thought 
because of their distinctive structure. Specifically, rights are thought to have a 
preemptive structure, such that as well as giving other agent’s first-order reasons to 
act (or not act) in a certain way, rights also (i) pre-empt the duty bearers 
consideration of the right-bearers underlying interests, and (ii) exclude a range of 
competing considerations from the pool of available reasons for action. For example, 
A’s right that B not touch her gives B a reason not to touch A that (i) cannot be 
modified by an evaluation of A’s underlying interests, (ii) cannot be weighed against 
certain other reasons, including, for example, B’s desire. 
Conceptualising rights as having a preemptive structure provides a fruitful 
way of thinking about many of the difficulties discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
However, we then face the difficult challenge of justifying rights with a preemptive 
structure. What is more, on the assumption that rights protect interests, it might look 
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as if preemptive rights give those interests an undue and unjustifiable weight in our 
moral thinking. Having rejected two possible strategies for justifying preemptive 
rights that can be found in the thought of Joseph Raz, I provide two complementary 
arguments in support of such rights. First, I argue that agents have relational 
interests, interests in being able to recognise that others recognise them as an 
individual who has morally significant interests, interests which they give the 
appropriate role within their practical deliberations. For instance, it does not only 
matter to A that B drives responsibly so as to diminish the risk of his seriously 
setting back A’s interests by crashing into her, but also because by failing to do so B 
fails to relate to A as an agent who has morally important interests. I then argue that 
moral agents stand in an intrinsically valuable relationship with one another – a 
relation I label mutual recognition – when they are able to recognise that they each 
regard the other as having morally significant interests worthy of protection. 
The second argument in favour of preemptive rights derives from the value 
of normative assurance, that is, the assurance agents have if they believe that others 
recognise certain normative standards – certain reasons, rights, and duties – as 
determining how they should behave in certain contexts. Here I argue that a mutual 
recognition of preemptive rights can be particularly valuable in a range of contexts, 
something that is evidenced in both morality and law. For example, in order for the 
practice of promising to play its valuable role in structuring interpersonal relations 
(however exactly we characterise that value), it is plausible to think that a promisor 
and promisee must both recognise the normative standards of promising, whereby 
promises give rise to preemptive rights and duties, in order that the promisee has a 
valuable form of normative assurance. 
These claims serve as the basis for the relational requirement, which I apply 
to the justification of rights. According to the relational requirement, we should not 
conceive of rights as directly protecting the interests of agents. Rather, we must 
mediate the first-order interests of agents through the relational requirement, such 
that if these rights are relied upon as a basis for practical thought and action they will 
allow particular agents to stand in the valuable relation of mutual recognition, and to 
benefit from the normative assurance this relation brings. That is to say, a full 
account of the justification of rights must take into consideration not only whether 
these rights will protects and promote important interests, but whether these rights 
can serve as the basis for mutual recognition between rights-bearers. I then argue 
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that rights with a preemptive structure play an important role in allowing for the 
relation of mutual recognition. Thus, whilst we rely on agent’s interests to identify 
areas that warrant protection, and whilst these interests will be indirectly protected 
and promoted by such rights, the full justification of rights depends on factoring in 
the role rights play in facilitating relations of mutual recognition. 
These arguments for preemptive rights provide the backdrop against which I 
articulate and defend a relational theory of consent in Chapter 5. The central idea of 
the theory is that the power of consent allows agents to interact with one another in a 
variety of valuable ways whilst continuing to stand in a relation of mutual 
recognition, in which agents recognise one another as having legitimate control over 
the central aspects of their own lives. So, according to the relational theory, we start 
by identifying the range of first-order control interests possessed by agents, and 
mediate these through the relational requirement in order to yield preemptive control 
rights. We then note the range of interests agents have in being able to interact in 
ways precluded by these rights, whilst maintaining control over what happens in 
these protected domains. We then mediate this second set of interests through the 
relational requirement and by doing so we are able to explain the normative 
significance of consent.  
To take one example, agents clearly have weighty interests in not having sex 
with others against their will, yet also clearly have interests in being able to 
permissibly have sex with others in the right circumstances. Importantly, in line with 
the relational theory of rights, it does not only matter to A and B that they have a 
sufficient measure of control over whether the other in fact has sex with them, but 
also whether they are able to recognise that others give the appropriate role to these 
control interests in their deliberations. By relying on consent to manage their sexual 
interaction, A and B do not only maintain a sufficient measure of control over what 
happens to them, so as to serve their first-order interests, but also relate to one 
another in an intrinsically valuable way by recognising one another’s legitimate 
control over whether they engage in sexual relations. Moreover, a mutual recognition 
that only consensual sex is permissible will provide both A and B with a valuable 
form of normative assurance.  
With the relational theory in place I turn finally, in Chapter 6, to consider one 
way in which that theory can inform debate in the context of sexual consent. Here I 
turn my attention to the highly contested question of whether sexual consent can 
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serve as a means to manage morally decent sexual relations in a world marked by 
entrenched gender injustice, and argue that the relational theory allows us to see 
something important in the critique of individual sexual consent offered by Catherine 
MacKinnon. Whilst I agree with those who reject the (possible) implication of 
MacKinnon’s view that, because of the structural conditions that obtain, B will 
wrong A by having sex with her even if she gives fully voluntary and informed 
consent, I suggest that a sole focus on particular interactions between consenting 
individuals obscures something important. Specifically, I highlight our need for 
appropriate social structures in order to fully realise the values that account for 
consent’s normative significance. In particular, in order to maintain a sufficient 
measure of control over our sexual relations, and recognise one another as having 
this control, we require appropriate conventions of sexual consent, conventions that, 
as MacKinnon’s work helps to show, we currently lack. 
Whilst my focus throughout concerns that justification of moral rights and 
our power to waive those rights by giving consent, I believe that the present work 
can also be read as contributing to a more general debate in moral theory concerning 
the viability of charting a middle course between wholly reductive interest-based 
moral theories, according to which nothing is of value except the promotion and 
protection of individual interests, and Kant-inspired status-based views, which, as I 
have said, offer a non-reductive explanation for central moral rights and powers 
(upon which they often attempt to build an entire moral system). The central 
difficulty for such a middle way is, as I suggested above, bridging the gap between 
an account of morally significant interests and an account of moral rights and wrongs 
in a way that is consistent with our considered moral judgments. I believe that taking 
seriously the idea that we are not only concerned with the promotion and protection 
of our first-order interests, but are also concerned to relate to one another in ways 
that recognise each other as bearers of morally significant interests, provides the 
foundations upon which such an account can be built.      
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2  
Consent, Well-Being, and Autonomy 
 
In this chapter I consider and reject four views of consent’s normative significance. 
Two of these views ground the significance of consent in considerations of 
individual well-being, whilst the other two ground the significance of consent in the 
value of personal autonomy. Despite important differences, the theories share a 
common structure. They claim that the normative significance of consent can be 
explained by the fact that an agent’s possession of that power will serve or protect 
their interests. Consequently, all the theories face the same fundamental objection: 




One might think that consent is normatively significant because individuals 
themselves are in the best position to know their own interests.1 On this view, which 
I will call the simple well-being view, agents can waive their rights by giving consent 
because they know when it is in their interests to do so. According to the simple 
well-being view, the normative force of consent is explained by the privileged 
epistemic position of agents with regard to their own interests. Such a justification is 
instrumental: it points to the fact that acting in accordance with the consent of 
individuals will best serve their interests. Thus, where consent will not serve an 
individual’s interests, their consent (or non-consent) has no normative significance. 
There are two main objections to the simple well-being view. First, we 
clearly think that an individual can give valid consent in cases where the consented 
to actions will not serve their interests. For instance, consider Victor Tadros’s 
dramatic example.  
                                                
1 For example Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 84-6; Franklin G. Miller and Alan 
Wertheimer, “Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions: Beyond Valid Consent,” in The Ethics of 
Consent, eds. Franklin G. Miller and Alan Wertheimer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 
83. To be clear, these authors do not suggest that this is the only justification for the normative 




Suppose that a child is trapped in a burning building. The child will die 
unless I pull him from the flames…[S]uppose I can rescue the child only 
if you push me into the building on a shopping trolley. If you do this, 
though, a revolving saw will cut off my arm. I ask you to assist me so that 
I can save the child.2 
 
Tadros concludes, and I agree, that whilst it is supererogatory to save the 
child in such circumstances, “if I consent…it is permissible for you to help me save 
the child.”3 I assume, however, that doing so will significantly set back Victor’s 
interests. Of course, there may be scenarios in which saving the child would not set 
back Victor’s interests on balance. But assume that it does. We will still think, I 
believe, that Victor’s consent is valid, and that it is permissible for his assistant to 
help him save the child. But, on the assumption that Victor’s interests will, on 
balance, be set back, the simple well-being view cannot explain why Victor’s 
consent has normative force.  
Furthermore, we can give valid consent even where no one’s interests will be 
served by the consented to actions. Consider, for example, consent to participate in 
painful medical research that is doomed to failure; consent to a large ugly tattoo that 
the consenter will quickly come to regret; or A’s consent for B to smoke in a 
confined space (causing both A and B to inhale toxic fumes). In the other direction, 
an individual may withhold consent even where doing so will severely set back their 
interests, as when an agent refuses life-saving medical treatment. Sometimes we may 
be aware that our consent or dissent will not serve anyone’s interests (as when A 
consents to B’s smoking), and sometimes we may simply be mistaken about what is 
in our interests (as when we consent to the ugly tattoo). But in both kinds of case 
consent can have normative force, and the simple well-being view cannot easily 
explain why this should be. 
The second objection to the simple well-being view is that it renders consent 
unnecessary for permissible action in contexts where we in fact believe that consent 
is necessary. I have two kinds of case in mind. First, since we can communicate what 
we believe to be in our interests in a number of ways, and not just by giving consent, 
there is no reason why we should only be able to waive some of our rights by giving 
                                                
2 Victor Tadros, “Consent to Harm,” p. 29. 
3 Ibid. 
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consent. Yet, in a number of contexts, we think that irrespective of B’s reasonable 
beliefs about A’s interests, B needs A’s consent in order to act permissibly. For 
instance, A may communicate or imply a desire to engage in sexual relations with B 
in a number of ways, but (assuming none of those communications amounts to an act 
of consent) B will still need A’s consent. Yet, if A’s communication of consent only 
serves the purpose of providing B with information about A’s interests, it is not clear 
why B would need to acquire that information in this way (i.e. via A’s consent or 
non-consent). 
In the second kind of case, the consentee, or some third party, may plausibly 
have a better understanding of an agent’s interests then the agent themselves, and in 
such cases consent would be redundant on the simple well-being view. Imagine, for 
example, that I am sick, and you, knowing that I want to get better, are talking to 
Jim, a doctor, on the phone. You describe my symptoms to Jim, and he correctly 
identifies the source of the problem. In order to recover I need an injection. You 
have the injection and can give it to me. Should you ask for my consent? Clearly we 
think that, so long as I am conscious and competent, the answer is yes. Yet it is not 
clear on the simple well-being view why that should be. After all, I haven’t got a 
clue what is wrong with me. And there is very good reason to believe that following 
Jim’s advice will best serve my interests. Why, then, do you need my consent? 
One way of characterising the problem with the simple well-being view is to 
say that, on this view, the giving of consent amounts to providing information, or 
giving advice.4 Since an agent is often best placed to know what is in their interests 
they can provide information or advice to others about what those interests consist 
in, and thus provide others with guidance about what reasons for action they have. 
But this mischaracterises the role we take consent to play, since valid consent can be 
given even where it will not serve our interests, and because consent is sometimes 
required even where others already have good information about what is in our 
interests. Thus, the simple well-being view fails to provide a convincing answer to 
either of the questions I distinguished in Chapter 1 – of why consent, when given, 
has normative force, and of why consent has relational significance.  
It might be suggested at this point that a more complicated version of the 
well-being view can do better than the simple well-being view. Specifically, we 
                                                
4 This way of putting the point is suggested by Victor Tadros in an unpublished manuscript. 
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might adopt a rule-based account, according to which we have reason to adopt a set 
of rules that requires the consent of agents in certain domains because the acceptance 
of these rules will best serve the interests of agents overall. The reason for this is that 
it is true that agents often best know their own interests, and it may be exceedingly 
difficult to judge whether or not this is so on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, even 
where agents make a mistake about what is in their interests, their possession of the 
power of consent over certain domains is, over time, likely to help educate them 
about what is in their interests, about how they should exercise their judgement, and 
so on. Call this view the rule-based well-being view. 
Two problems confront the rule-based well-being view. First, it is an open 
question whether the rules of consent that would best promote the interests of agents 
overall will align with the domains in which we take an agent’s consent to be 
normatively significant. And whilst this is ultimately an empirical question, there is 
good reason to think that in fact the two would not line up. It is, for instance, 
possible that the interests of agents would be better served overall if doctors did not 
need to acquire the medical consent of patients. Furthermore, there is a range of very 
risky activities that we think agents can consent to, such as certain kinds of medical 
experimentation, or risky sporting activities (e.g. cage fighting, bungee jumping), 
where rules that precluded efficacious consent would possibly yield better 
consequences in terms of interest promotion and protection. As I have said, which 
rules would be best from the standpoint of an overall promotion of interests is an 
open empirical question. The point is that we do not think that the outcome of this 
empirical investigation will make a difference to whether or not consent is required. 
For example, medical interventions, of whatever kind, require patient consent. This 
suggests that we do not really believe that it is the fact that adopting certain rules 
will promote the interests of agents overall that explains why consent is normatively 
significant. 
The second problem faced by the rule-based well-being view is that, whilst it 
might make sense to adopt a set of rules as a guide to practical reasoning given the 
various complexities and uncertainties with which we are generally faced, the 
account cannot explain why it would be morally wrong to break such rules, if in 
some particular case we knew that breaking the rule would better serve an agent’s 
interests. After all, the motivation of the view is that adoption of the rules will best 
promote the interests of agents overall. For instance, if the doctor knows (or is 
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reasonably sure) that the patient’s interests will best be served by disregarding the 
patient’s non-consent, and giving the patient an injection, then the rule-based well-
being view has no obvious explanation for why it would be wrong for the doctor to 
give the patient the injection.  
To summarise our discussion of well-being based views, neither the simple 
or rule-based well-being views can provide an adequate explanation for the 
authoritative nature of consent. Most significantly, such views cannot explain why 
an agent’s consent (or non-consent) has normative force even when it does not track 
their underlying interests. But as the examples we have considered suggest, we 
believe that where an agent has the power of consent, their consent has normative 
force whether or not the action in question serves or sets back their interests. 
Furthermore, well-being based views also fail to adequately explain the relational 
significance of consent. For one, it is unclear why, on these views, a consentee 
should not make their own judgment about what is in the consenter’s interests. 
Moreover, if the consentee were to correctly judge that the consenter’s consent 
would not serve their interests then they should regard this consent as normatively 
null. Yet this seems to get things wrong in two respects. First, a consentee should 
generally respond directly to an agent’s consent (or non-consent), without making an 
independent assessment of the consenter’s interests. Second, even if the consentee 
has good reason to believe they know what is in the consenter’s interests (e.g. 
because they are a doctor) they will still require consent in order to act permissibly.  
Before moving on let us consider a possible line of response that we can call 
the reductionist response. A proponent of a well-being based view might argue that 
to reject the well-being views for the reasons I have suggested is to be guilty of rule 
worship.5 Whilst consent is generally a useful guide to an agent’s underlying 
interests, it is no more than that. This is sufficient for us to adopt “rules of thumb,”6 
since we will generally not have the time or epistemic access required to make a 
better assessment of an agent’s interests, but what is really morally significant is the 
protection and promotion of those interests, and nothing more. This gives us an 
explanation for why consent is generally a useful moral guide, and why it is a good 
                                                
5 J. J. C. Smart, “An Outline for a System of Utilitarian Ethics,” in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard 
Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 10. 
6 Ibid., p. 42. 
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thing that rule-based practices of consent are widespread, even though these rules 
have no moral significance in themselves. 
Whilst the reductionist position is coherent, I think it is unappealing, for the 
following three reasons. First, as I have already noted, our actual rule based practices 
of consent seem quite unlikely to be the best candidates for the promotion and 
protection of our interests. So as an account of our current practices the reductionist 
position looks to fail, and it seems more plausible to think that those practices aim to 
track concerns over and above the mere promotion of interests. Second, accepting 
the reductionist position would require us to reject a range of what I take to be firmly 
rooted and considered moral judgements, including the claim that our consent plays 
a direct role in making some acts permissible or impermissible. Whilst our 
considered moral judgements should always be seen as potentially revisable, I will 
later argue, in Chapters 4 and 5, that there is a much more plausible theory of 
consent that allows us to maintain these intuitions. Third, I believe it is 
fundamentally misguided to hold that our moral relations are concerned with nothing 
more than interest promotion. As I will argue in more detail later on, a more 
plausible approach requires us to consider how we ought to deliberate and act if we 




So far, however, I have neglected the importance of personal autonomy – the value, 
roughly, of living a life of one’s own choosing. I have assumed that an agent’s well-
being can be characterised without reference to their intentions, choices, and plans. It 
might be thought that a version of the well-being view that takes the value of 
autonomy into account can explain the authoritative nature of consent. Indeed, most 
existing accounts of the normative significance of consent appeal to the value of 
personal autonomy, and many have gone so far as to claim that the power of consent 
follows naturally from an account of autonomous agency.  For example, Heidi Hurd 
claims that, “To have the ability to create and dispel rights and duties is what it 
means to be an autonomous moral agent.” Similarly, Seana Shiffrin states that, “if 
autonomous moral agency is possible, then [the] power [of consent] must be 
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possible.”7 I will endeavour to show, however, that whilst there is much that is 
intuitive about this idea, autonomy-based accounts cannot provide a satisfactory 
explanation for consent’s normative significance, at least as they stand. 
 
2.2.1 The Value of Autonomy 
 
Of course, the nature and value of personal autonomy has been, and continues to be, 
the subject of intense debate, and different conceptions of autonomy may give rise to 
a number of distinct accounts of the normative significance of consent. I cannot hope 
to do justice to that rich and diverse literature here.8 Instead, I work with a general 
account of autonomy’s value that I think captures many of the central intuitions 
about autonomy’s significance, and consider two accounts of the normative 
significance of consent plausibly grounded in this conception. Let me begin then by 
saying something about the conception of autonomy I will be working with. 
On a popular view, the value of living an autonomous life is thought of as the 
value of being the author of one’s own life.9 As Joseph Raz describes it, the ideal of 
autonomy 
 
holds the free choice of goals and relations as an essential ingredient of 
individual well-being. The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal 
autonomy is that people should make their own lives. The autonomous 
person is a (part) author of his own life. The ideal of personal autonomy 
                                                
7 Heidi M. Hurd, “The Moral Magic of Consent,” p. 124; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Promising, 
Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism,” p. 517.  
8 One family of theories that I will not discuss here deserve special mention, namely internal theories 
of autonomy. Internal theories of autonomy seek to specify the conditions under which an agent’s 
choices or actions can be thought of as truly autonomous. Roughly, an agent’s choices or actions are 
truly autonomous when they are the result of self-government, rather than the product of some deviant 
force (e.g. manipulation, weakness of will, a failure to reason properly). What internal theories seek to 
specify is precisely what the conditions for self-government amount to. Thus they seek to identify the 
conditions for a certain self-relation – between an agent and her choices or actions. Given this focus, 
internal theories do not provide an obvious foundation for a theory of consent, since consent functions 
to manage relations between agents. Still it might be claimed that only choices or actions that meet the 
conditions for self-government are valuable, such that only instances of consent that meet these 
conditions are normatively efficacious. (This is suggested by, for example, Ruth Faden and Tom 
Beauchamp, in A History and Theory of Informed Consent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 
Ch. 7.) However, this is an answer to a distinct further question, and still relies on a general account 
of consent’s normative significance. Moreover, I doubt that this claim is true. Whilst I often suffer 
from weakness of will or fail to act in accordance with my second-order desires when I have another 
beer or another slice of cake, I still author my life in a way that is significant, such that it would be 
wrong for others to interfere with these actions. (Cf. Shiffrin, “Harm and its Moral Significance,” pp. 
380-82.) 
9 See, in particular, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Ch. 14. 
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is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, 
fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives.10 
 
So, on this authorship view of autonomy, an agent lives a more or less 
autonomous life to the extent that they shape their own life over time by choosing 
and pursuing different projects, goals, and relationships. That we value personal 
autonomy so understood is reflected by our belief that individuals should be free to 
choose, for example, what education and career to pursue, what hobbies to partake 
in, where to live, which individuals and groups to associate with, what political 
causes to support, who to form sexual relationships with, and, increasingly, when to 
end one’s own life. 
I think the authorship view is a compelling account of the value of personal 
autonomy. Before moving on, I want to briefly draw attention to two elements of 
what I take to be the best version of this view, since they will be important as we 
progress. First, an important dimension of most valuable autonomous lives will be 
our relationships with others. It will thus matter to us that we are able to shape our 
lives not only by pursuing various goals and projects, but also by developing those 
relationships, which includes shaping and moulding their normative elements – the 
expectations and requirements that obtain between an individual and their friends, 
colleagues, family, and so on.11   
Second, on the version of the authorship view I prefer, the value of living an 
autonomous life is not simply the value of having the world correspond with our 
choices or preferences, but rather the value of actively shaping one’s own life over 
time through intentional action.12 Whilst correspondence is no doubt desirable (at 
least in terms of preference satisfaction), this agency-based view claims that an 
important component of autonomy’s value is located in an agent’s actively striving 
to bring her experience and environment into line with her plans or choices.13 If this 
is right then the authorship account of autonomy supports the idea that individuals 
                                                
10 Ibid., p. 369. 
11 Ibid., The Morality of Freedom, p. 87. 
12 This view is suggested in Raz’s writings, and is clearly expressed by Tom Hurka in “Why Value 
Autonomy?” Social Theory and Practice 13, no. 3 (1987). Recently, Seana Shiffrin has also gestured 
toward such an understanding in Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Harm and its Moral Significance,” 
especially pp. 377-82. 
13 Shiffrin, “Harm and its Moral Significance,” p. 382.  
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possess significant autonomy-based control interests,14 since there is a tight 
connection between the ability to live an autonomous life and the possession of 
individual control. Indeed, on the agency view, the possession of control is not just 
instrumental to autonomy but rather the possession and exercise of control is 
constitutive of living an autonomous life.15 An agent who has absolutely no control 
over her environment or her place within it lacks the agential capacities required to 
be the author of her own life. 
 
2.2.2 The Simple Choice View 
 
In the literature on consent a connection is often drawn between the normative 
significance of consent and the value of choice. For example: 
 
• “[I]nformed consent is rooted in concerns about protecting and enabling 
autonomous or self-determining choice by patients and subjects.”16  
• “The third reason that consent is important in sexual activity has to do with 
the fact that sex matters to us, that it is something over which we do want to 
exercise choice.”17  
• “A woman ‘factually’ consents to sexual intercourse when, whether in mind 
or expression, she actually chooses sexual intercourse as that which she 
unconditionally desires for herself.”18 
• “Choice or consent can have direct practical significance in contexts of 
relational normativity, altering or negating directional obligations that would 
                                                
14 Some might object to discussing autonomy in terms of interests, since it implies that living 
autonomously is an aspect of well-being, and is therefore only instrumentally valuable. I cannot 
adequately discuss the relationship between autonomy and well-being here, but it is worth noting two 
points. First, if interests are understood as something the promotion or protection of which makes a 
life go better, then it seems clear that we have interests in living autonomously. Second, I agree with 
Raz that we should think of autonomy as constitutive of well-being, such that living autonomously is 
an essential aspect of living a good life, independently of the effect this will have on our other 
interests. See Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Ch. 14.  
15 Thus, this conception of autonomy has much in common with Charles Taylor’s account of positive 
freedom according to which freedom is an “exercise-concept,” which “involves essentially the 
exercising of control over one’s life.” See “What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty?” in The Idea of 
Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin, ed. Alan Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 
p. 177.  
16 Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp, “A History and Theory of Informed Consent,” p. 235. 
17 David Archard, Sexual Consent, p. 21. 
18 Peter Westen, “Some Confusions about Consent in Rape Cases,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law 2, no. 1 (2004), p. 335. 
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otherwise obtain….Thus, the bearers of moral rights are in a unique position 
to alter the normative relations at issue through their choices; their consent 
matters directly for the question of whether otherwise proscribed behaviour 
may be engaged in.”19  
• “Having these personal realms [protected by rights] is crucial to our leading 
lives in the ways that we should like. Fundamentally, this generates duties in 
other people to respect our wills: they must respect the choices that we make 
about what shall happen within these realms. If our choices are to maximally 
determine the permissibility of others’ actions, then the rights we waive [by 
giving consent] must be the rights that we intend to waive.”20  
 
All of these statements share a common theme. They suggest that there is a 
close connection between our ability to affect our normative relations through 
choosing and our ability to do so by consenting. This idea resonates with the account 
of autonomy sketched above. Plausibly, it is important that we consent to what 
happens within certain domains because it is important that we choose what happens 
within those domains, in order that we live an autonomous life. Given our underlying 
interests in being the authors of our own lives, some forms of behaviour or 
interaction are only likely to be in our interests if we have chosen them. For 
example, whilst having sex is generally going to be against our interests, it may be in 
our interests if we have chosen to have sex. Alternatively, it is generally going to be 
against my interests that others enter and use my house. But if I choose that they do 
so, whether to have dinner with me or to fix my shower, it will likely be in my 
interests (or at least not against my interests) that they do so. We might then think 
that consent is normatively significant because choice is normatively significant. I 
will call this view the simple choice view. 
Before evaluating the simple choice view let me refine the central idea. We 
live autonomously when we live a life that, at least in crucial respects, we choose to 
live. And autonomy is valuable because it is in our interests to live a life that we 
choose to live. So, by making choices, we affect what is in our interests. Whilst it is 
not necessarily in my interests to be a philosopher, who spends his spare time 
cooking and playing the piano, these activities are likely to be in my interests if I 
                                                
19 R. Jay Wallace, “Reasons, Relations, and Commands: Reflections on Darwall,” p. 29-30. 
20 Tom Dougherty, “Sex, Lies, and Consent,” Ethics 123, no. 4 (2013), p. 735. 
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choose to pursue them. Similarly, if I choose to develop certain relationships and not 
others, then these relationships are likely to be in my interests in ways that non-
chosen relationships will not be. Choice, then, is a mechanism by which we affect 
what is in our interests.21 
Now, on the assumption that our rights and the duties they give rise to are 
justified with reference to our interests, the idea that we can affect what is in our 
interests by making a choice provides us with a possible account of how it is that 
consent can affect which rights and duties obtain. Because our consent reflects our 
choices (in a way to be discussed below), our consent can, by affecting what is in our 
interests, affect whether or not we have a right. That is, by consenting we make it the 
case that some act is in our interest (or at least not against our interests), and so make 
it the case that we no longer have a right against that action.   
How should we understand the nature of the relationship between consent 
and choice on the simple choice view? There are two possibilities.22 On the first, in 
giving consent we communicate a choice, where choice is defined independently of 
consent. For example, choice may be a pro-attitude of some kind, or a decision about 
what to do or what one wants to happen. According to this view, it is as a result of 
having the pro-attitude or making the decision that we make something previously 
against our interests in our interests, and by giving consent we merely communicate 
this fact to others. On a second understanding, the giving of consent itself constitutes 
a form of choice. As a result, just by giving consent we can affect what is in our 
interests, and thereby affect what it is permissible or impermissible for others to do. 
A proponent of the simple choice view should endorse the first understanding 
of the relationship between choice and consent. The reason is that it is implausible to 
think that merely by giving consent (e.g. by saying “Yes,” or signing a form) we 
could affect what is in our interests. This claim is a version of what David Owens 
                                                
21 I have qualified the statements in this paragraph by saying that chosen pursuits or relationships are 
“likely” to be in my interests because on Raz’s view, to which I am sympathetic, chosen pursuits and 
relationships have value only if there is some independent value that attaches to them prior to choice. 
So, whilst I may make it the case that this or that pursuit has more value for me by choosing it, this is 
only if there is some reason to choose this pursuit anyway. See Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 
380-81. 
22 A third possibility is that the terms choice and consent are being used synonymously, which I 
suspect is actually fairly common. But if this is true then, without some further account of choice and 
its value, such as that offered in the text, a proponent of the simple-choice view cannot appeal to the 
value of choice to explain the power of consent, because they are one and the same.  
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has called the problem of normative power.23 If I have interests sufficient to hold you 
under a duty not to ϕ, how could my mere communication of an intention to make it 
permissible for you to ϕ affect my interests so as to make it the case that the duty no 
longer applies? Consider the example of pain. Assuming I have significant interests 
in not experiencing pain, it is plausible that you will have a duty not to cause me (at 
least most kinds of) pain. But, if you are a doctor and I need surgery I can waive that 
duty, despite the fact that the surgery will cause me great pain, by giving consent. 
Yet surely it cannot be the case that just by signing the consent form I make it the 
case that the pain I will experience does not set back my interests.24 
So, a proponent of the simple choice view should claim that our consent 
communicates our choices, defined independently of consent. How, then, should we 
define choice? Somewhat surprisingly, it is exceedingly hard to come by a definition 
of choice in the work of those who make a connection between consent and choice. 
However, we can consider a number of possible definitions of choice together, since 
ultimately they all suffer from the same defects.25 I suggested above that a choice 
might be a pro-attitude of some kind (e.g. a desire), or a decision.26 Alternatively, we 
may think of choice as reflecting an intention.27 I choose to do ϕ if I intend to ϕ or 
intend to bring it about that you ϕ. Whatever account of choice we rely on, it will not 
suffice to explain the normative significance of consent, for two main reasons. 
First, it is not clear why, from the perspective of the consentee, 
communicated consent should be regarded as authoritative on the simple choice 
view. Since on all of the suggested accounts of choice, choices are mental states or 
acts, we are faced by the following question: if an agent entertains the relevant 
                                                
23 See Shaping the Normative Landscape, pp. 127-29, 164. See also, “Does a Promise Transfer a 
Right?” in Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law, eds. Gregory Klass, George Lestas, and 
Prince Saprai (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 87-8. 
24 But won’t the surgery promote my interests on balance? Perhaps, but this observation cannot rescue 
this interpretation, for three reasons. First, it does not resolve the central problem, because it does not 
explain how I can affect my interests by mere declaration. Rather it just highlights that despite having 
my interests set back in some ways I will be compensated by a net gain in well-being. Second, if it is 
true that my interests will be served overall, it is unclear how my consent affects this calculation, and 
so unclear why my consent is even required. Third, the intervention may not serve my, or anyone’s, 
interests (e.g. an ugly tattoo) such that my interests are not even promoted on balance. 
25 It seems plausible that the term “choice” in fact refers to a number of distinct phenomena, 
especially in light of the wide range of ways in which “choice” is employed in ordinary language. 
This does not impact on the argument given in the text. 
26 Richard Holton suggests choosing amounts to deciding in his Willing, Wanting, Waiting (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 57. He also says that the upshot of a choice is an intention, 
bringing him closer to Owens’s suggestion. 
27 See Owens Shaping the Normative Landscape, pp. 173, 164. See also, “Does a Promise Transfer a 
Right?” p. 86. 
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mental state or performs the relevant mental act, why should they also need to 
communicate this fact to others in order to give permission?28  That is, if it is by 
entertaining a certain mental state or performing a mental act that an agent affects 
what is in their interests, why does this not suffice for them to waive their rights? We 
can call this problem the problem of correspondence. For example, if a doctor 
performs surgery, and her acts happen to correspond with the patient’s desire, 
decision, or intention, then we will still think that the doctor has seriously wronged 
the patient unless the patient has also given consent. Mere correspondence between 
the patient’s choices and the doctor’s actions is insufficient for the doctor’s acts to be 
permissible. But the simple choice view struggles to explain why this should be, 
since it is choice and not consent that does the relevant normative work. 
It might be suggested that whilst it is the subjective mechanism of choice that 
brings about the relevant change in interests, this change still needs to be 
communicated to others in order for a consenter to affect her normative relations 
with them. Thus the doctor will wrong the patient unless they know about the 
patient’s choice. But this move cannot rescue the simple choice view because the 
patient can plausibly communicate her choices to the doctor in a wide variety of 
ways, and not only by giving consent. Consent is just one means of communicating a 
choice, and so, on the simple choice view, one amongst a number of ways in which 
we can give others permission to act in certain ways. However, as I noted above, we 
often think that consent in particular is a necessary condition of permissible action: 
consent is authoritative and sometimes plays a direct role in the justification of 
action. For example, the doctor cannot permissibly operate on the patient without the 
patient’s explicit consent, whatever desires, decisions, or intentions the patient has 
communicated (assuming none of these constitute tokens of consent). 
A proponent of the simple choice view might respond that in certain high 
stakes cases – such as serious medical interventions – we require a clear and 
unambiguous channel through which to communicate our choices, and so must rely 
                                                
28 A proponent of a subjective view of consent, according to which consent is constituted by nothing 
more than a mental state or act, will accept that the presence of the relevant mental state or act is 
sufficient to waive a right on the part of a consenter. It is worth noting, however, that a plausible 
version of the subjective view will claim that the relevant mental state or act is in some way distinct 
from other more general mental states or acts, such that the relevant mental act just is the act of 
waving one’s right (see Larry Alexander, “The Ontology of Consent,” Analytic Philosophy 55, no. 1 
(2014), pp. 107-08). So a subjective theorist may still wish to avoid the implication I consider in the 
text that consent just is the general mental act of choice. I give independent reasons for rejecting a 
subjective view of consent in Section 5.3.3. 
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on communications of consent rather than other ways of communicating choice. 
However, this move cannot rescue the simple choice view, because however we 
conceive of choice (as a desire, decision, or intention) reflection on a variety of 
examples shows that consent and choice can, and often do, diverge. Call this the 
problem of divergence.29 The problem is that whilst our choices (however 
understood) can diverge from the consent we give or withhold, we nonetheless think 
that an agent’s consent (or lack of consent) has normative significance, 
independently of their choices. But if the normative significance of consent is 
explained via the significance of choice, then we cannot maintain, consistently with 
the simple choice view, that our consent has normative significance where it 
diverges from our choices. 
For example, imagine that Alison is having a party and has sent out 
invitations.30 Bert, who Alison did not invite, has found out about the party, and asks 
Alison whether he can come. Alison may feel awkward and give Bert consent, even 
though she would really prefer that Bert did not attend. Furthermore, Alison may 
continue to hope that Bert does not show up. If Alison were somehow able to control 
Bert’s behaviour, she would make it the case that Bert did not come to the party. She 
may even try and make it clear to Bert when she gives her consent that she would 
prefer him not to attend, with the intention of putting him off. Still, we believe that if 
Alison sincerely gives Bert consent then Bert is now permitted to attend the party, 
whatever else Alison thinks about his attending. 
Alternatively, imagine that Cassie is in hospital and requires life saving 
surgery, and that she refuses to give consent out of a strong religious conviction. 
Nonetheless, she hopes that the decision will be made to overrule her and give her 
the surgery anyway. What she most wants is to live, but she believes she has a duty 
not to permit others to provide her with medical assistance. On the simple choice 
view, Cassie’s lack of consent does not have the normative significance we generally 
take it to have, since it does not align with her underlying choice about what she 
wants to happen. Of course, the doctors are in no position to know this, but this is 
simply an epistemic problem. Yet, whilst Cassie would be secretly relieved, we 
would surely think that the doctors wrong her by overriding her non-consent, and not 
                                                
29 This objection is developed by David Owens in Shaping the Normative Landscape, pp 173-74. See 
also his, “Does a Promise Transfer a Right?” 
30 This is a variation on an example of Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape, p. 174. 
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just because they were not aware of her underlying choice, but rather because her 
consent or lack of consent should be regarded as authoritative.31 
The problem of correspondence and the problem of divergence both highlight 
that the simple choice view, like the well-being views considered, cannot explain the 
authoritative nature of consent.32 On the simple choice view what has authority is an 
agent’s choices, and not their consent. This fails to reflect our considered judgments 
about consent and its normative significance, as the preceding examples 
demonstrate. We believe that an agent can give normatively significant consent 
without making a corresponding choice, and that others should be responsive to our 
consent even when this is so.  
 
2.2.3 The Control View 
 
At this point, someone sympathetic to the thought that we can explain the 
significance of consent by appeal to the value of autonomy theory may protest. “I 
never meant to say that our power of consent is directly tied to our interests in 
having the world correspond with our preferences, or decisions, or intentions. 
Rather, our power of consent is grounded in our interests in being able to interact 
with others in ways that would be impermissible if we had no means of waiving our 
rights. If we could not waive our rights over our bodies or our property we would be 
unable to permissibly share property, play contact sports, or have sexual relations, 
and activities such as these are an essential component of a rich and diverse 
autonomous life.” 
 A view of this kind is suggested by Seana Shiffrin: 
 
One could imagine a conception of autonomy without consent in which 
an agent exercised complete sovereignty over her body and other 
personal spaces, such as the home, but had no ability to share or transfer 
these powers to others….Such a structure is imaginable but so 
impoverished as to be utterly implausible….Rights of autonomous 
                                                
31 One might think that the value of human life gives the doctors sufficient reasons – all things 
considered – to override Cassie’s non-consent. But even if this is true, and even though Cassie would 
be secretly relieved, the doctors would still violate a duty they to owed Cassie, and thus wrong her, 
even if they justifiably did so for her own benefit.  
32 A reductionist could once again claim that it is really our choices that have normative significance, 
and not our consent. For reasons discussed in the previous paragraphs, however, I believe that such a 
move would get things seriously wrong. 
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control that were inalienable to this degree would render (morally) 
impossible real forms of meaningful human relationships and the full 
definition and recognition of the self….To forge meaningful 
relationships, embodied human beings must have the ability to interact 
within the same physical space, to share the use of property, and to touch 
one another.33 
   
On this view, which I will call the control view, agents would have an 
insufficient amount of control over their own lives if (i) they did not have rights 
against certain forms of conduct, which (ii) could be waived by giving consent. This 
explains why they must have the power of consent. According to this account, the 
interest that explains our power of consent is not straightforwardly an interest in 
choosing what happens in the world, but rather an interest in having control over 
one’s life, where this must include an ability to alter one’s normative relations with 
others in order to allow for valuable forms of human contact and interaction. Thus, 
this account relies on the two features of the authorship view of autonomy that I 
highlighted earlier: the importance of shaping our relationships with others, and the 
significance of having control over our own lives, as opposed to the value of simply 
getting what we choose. 
 The control view is the most plausible account that we have considered so 
far, and in Chapter 5 I will rely on some of the central insights of the control view in 
order to construct a sound theory of consent. However, as it stands, the theory is 
unsuccessful, for three main reasons.34 First, the control view does not offer an 
explanation for why the power of consent is a power to affect directed duties in 
particular, for example, the power that A has to waive a directed duty that B owes to 
A not to ϕ. That is to say, it is not clear why the idea that we need a sufficient 
measure of control over the course of our own lives is especially concerned with 
directed reasons. On the control view it is just the fact that A’s individual autonomy 
– A’s ability to live a life of her own shaping – is constrained by the fact that B owes 
it to her not to act in certain ways that motivates the claim that A must possess the 
power to waive these duties. To be sure, B’s duty will constrain A and B’s ability to 
permissibly engage in certain kinds of relationship unless A can waive that duty. But 
                                                
33 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism,” p. 501-02. 
See also Jeremy Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” p. 137. 
34 For discussion of the second and third problems see Owens, “Does a Promise Transfer a Right?” 
pp. 84-8. 
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the directed duties that others owe to A are not the only source of constraint on A’s 
ability to live a life of her own shaping. For instance, B will have a whole range of 
reasons and other duties (including directed duties owed to C, D, etc.) to act or not 
act in certain ways that may constrain A’s ability to shape her own life, or to engage 
in certain kinds of relationship with B.   
For example, if B is a lecturer he may not be permitted by the university at 
which he works to engage in a romantic relationship with A, B’s student. Plausibly, 
however, B does not owe it to A not to engage in a fully voluntary romantic 
relationship with her, but rather B owes it to the institution of which he is a part 
(even if the requirement is grounded in a concern for the interests of students), such 
that he cannot continue to work there and permissibly engage in a relationship with 
B. This places a significant constraint on the relationship that can permissibly obtain 
between B and A if B wants to continue to pursue another goal of his, that is, his 
academic career. Why then, on the control view, is A’s power of consent only able to 
manage directed duties that B owes to A, and vice versa? 
Second, the theory moves too quickly from the claim that agents require a 
means of non-wrongfully interacting with one another to the claim that they must 
possess the power of consent. It starts from the assumption that agents possess 
certain autonomy rights, and points out that such rights preclude many forms of 
human interaction that are valuable and that we assume can be engaged in 
permissibly. From this observation the conclusion is drawn that agents must possess 
the power of consent so as to be able to waive these rights. But this conclusion does 
not follow. At most, what follows is that agents must possess some means of waiving 
their rights so that they can interact without wronging one another. But there is no 
obvious reason why this means should take the form of a power to waive rights by 
intentional declaration. It could, for example, take the form of making a choice.35   
 Third, even if we assume that the relevant means of affecting one’s rights 
would be through the giving of consent, a proponent of the control view will be 
faced with the problem of normative power. If our rights to control over our bodies 
and our property are grounded in our interests, how is it that merely by 
communicating an intention to waive a right we can affect our underlying interests 
                                                
35 Ibid., p. 85. 
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so as make it the case that the right no longer applies? Consider David Owens’s 
description of this problem. 
 
Suppose I have a natural right to control what happens to my body. There 
must be something about me in virtue of which I have that right. For 
example, I might possess the right to control my body because it is in my 
interests to control my body, because my life goes better in various ways 
if I control my body and worse if I do not….Let us call the basis for my 
natural right to control my own body, whatever it may be, the 
Foundation. I loose much or all of this natural right if the Foundation is 
altered or disappears….But if the right is indeed a natural right it can’t be 
degraded or lost unless the Foundation is somehow affected. And – here 
is Hume’s Point – how could any plausible foundation be affected simply 
by the fact that someone (anyone) has spoken with the intention of hereby 
making it the case that I no longer possess some portion of my right to 
control my body.36 
 
 Now, it might be objected that we can affect the foundation of our right to 
control over our body, by making a choice. But if that is the case the control view 
collapses back into the simple choice view. Indeed, one advantage of the simple 
choice view is that it provides a solution to the problem of normative power. But as 
we saw, the simple choice view faces serious difficulties of its own. What we require 
is an explanation for why consent and not choice has normative significance. Whilst 
the control view provides a plausible explanation for why it would be valuable for us 
to be able to waive our rights (in some way or other), it does not explain how a mere 
declaration of consent could affect our underlying interests, and thus alter the 
structure of the rights and duties that obtains. We might say that the control view 
insists upon, rather than explains, consent’s authoritative nature. 
 
2.3 Harmless Wronging 
 
 
                                                
36 “Does a Promise Transfer a Right?,” pp. 87-8. Later on, in Chapter 5, I will argue that Owens’s 
central claim in this passage, that in order to waive a right one must affect the “Foundation” of that 
right, is false. However, this requires thinking carefully about the precise nature of the connection 
between interests and rights, a task I undertake in Chapter 4. Without the kind of story I offer there, I 
take it that Owens’s objection stands against the control view, at least as articulated by Shiffrin 
(Owens’s primary target in the quoted passage).  
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There is one final objection to all of the theories we have so far considered, which 
we can call the problem of harmless wronging.37 In general, the objection operates 
by highlighting cases in which we regard consent as a necessary condition for 
permissible action, whilst also pointing out that it is far from obvious that an agent 
has any interest in whether or not the act occurs without her consent. Imagine, for 
example, that B takes a mouth swab from A without causing any harm and without 
A ever knowing (whilst A is in a deep sleep).38 Plausibly, B has not undermined any 
significant interest of A’s – he has not caused A pain and has not prevented A from 
living a life of her own choosing in any important sense. Or, to take another 
example, imagine that whilst A is away on holiday, B sneaks into A’s house and 
takes a short nap, without causing any damage to A’s property, and without A ever 
finding out.39 The views we have considered, all grounded in the interests of agents, 
cannot easily explain why, in these cases, B still requires A’s consent in order to act 
permissibly. Assuming A has no significant interests in whether or not B takes the 
swab, or sneaks in for a nap without her consent, then why should it only be 
permissible for B to do these things if A does give her consent? 
One possible explanation is that B wrongs A because B is likely to set back 
some significant interest of A’s. But I sincerely doubt this can provide a full 
explanation. Our judgement is unlikely to change even if B could be well assured 
that he will not set back any interest of A’s (because B knows of A’s holiday plans, 
etc.).40 Alternatively, it might be claimed that such cases are so unlikely to occur that 
they are irrelevant. But it is the conceptual possibility and not the likelihood of such 
cases that is problematic. Our theory of consent should be able to explain why, in 
such a situation, B is required to acquire A’s consent. Finally, it is always tempting 
to try and find some interest of A’s that explains why it is important that B acquires 
A’s consent. In general, I doubt that such a case can always be made without 
begging the question. But I think that this also misses a more important point. 
Whether or not A has an interest in having control over whether B is permitted to act 
                                                
37 This objection has been advanced in a number of forms and to make a number of distinct, though 
generally related, points. In the context of consent it is David Owens who has most forcefully 
developed the objection. See Shaping the Normative Landscape, Ch. 7. See also David Archard, 
“Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2008). 
38 This example is from Archard, “Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership.” 
39 Arthur Ripstein, “Beyond the Harm Principle,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 34, no. 3 (2003), p. 
218. 
40 On this point, see Dougherty, “Sex, Lies, and Consent,” p. 726. 
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by giving or withholding consent, A has general rights (over her body, and property) 
that explain why B must acquire her consent. Thus, we require a more robust 
account of why it is that irrespective of her underlying interests A has such rights, as 




Let us take stock. I have considered four theories of consent’s normative 
significance, all of which attempt to ground the significance of consent directly in 
the fact that the power of consent protects or promotes an agent’s interests, whether 
these be their general interests, their interests in choosing what happens, or their 
interests in living an autonomous life. All of these theories share a common flaw: 
they cannot explain the authoritative nature of consent. However, whilst each theory 
fails, their failure is instructive. As we have seen, we believe that our power of 
consent is normatively significant in certain spheres despite not always tracking our 
interests, and that an agent’s consent often plays a direct role in the justification of 
action, as opposed to simply serving as a proxy for our interests. Furthermore, we 
have seen that the commonly drawn connection between choice and consent is, 
without further development, misguided. Finally, whilst it is plausible that we should 
want to be able to waive our rights so as to lead a valuable autonomous life, this fact 
alone cannot explain why we should be able to waive our rights by giving consent. 
Our discussion of these four theories also highlights a more general problem 
confronted by any theory that gives individual interests a central place in the 
explanation of moral rights and wrongs, which we can call the bridging problem.41 
Essentially, the bridging problem asks how it is we move from an account of the 
morally significant interests of individuals to an account of moral rights and wrongs, 
in a way that is consistent with our considered intuitions. As the preceding 
discussion demonstrates, our beliefs about what constitute morally significant 
interests do not always align with our beliefs about which rights we have, or which 
actions would constitute wrongs. Ultimately, a convincing account of consent’s 
normative significance will need to bridge this gap. 
                                                
41 I take this terminology from Niko Kolodny, “Rule Over None I: What Justifies Democracy?,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 42, no. 3 (2014), p. 201, although my usage is slightly modified. 
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Positively, we can draw two general lessons from our discussion that can 
serve as desiderata for our on-going investigation. First, as suggested in Chapter 1, 
our theory of consent needs to be able to account for the authoritative nature of 
consent: the fact that where an agent has the power of consent, their (voluntary and 
informed) consent is sufficient to waive a right. Second, we require a solution to the 
problem of normative power, an explanation for how an agent’s mere declaration can 





Normative Interests and Consent 
 
As we have seen, anyone attempting to ground the power of consent directly in the 
interests of agents faces serious obstacles. I will later argue that this is because of the 
way in which the theories we have considered so far conceive of the relationship 
between interests and rights, and, consequently, the way in which we affect the 
application of those rights by giving consent. But before moving on, we must 
consider another interest-based theory of consent, which has recently been developed 
by David Owens. Motivated by the problems faced by standard interest-based 
theories discussed in Chapter 2, Owens has proposed an innovative alternative. He 
argues that, in addition to the standard interests that agents possess, they also have 
specifically permissive interests: interests in certain acts being wrong unless we 
consent to them. Owens claims that it is permissive interests that explain the 
normative significance of consent. In this chapter I argue that, whilst Owens makes a 
compelling case for the inadequacy of standard interest-based theories, and presents 
us with an intriguing alternative, we have good reason to reject his theory.    
 
3.1 Owens’s Theory 
 
In his book Shaping the Normative Landscape Owens postulates normative interests. 
“[A] normative interest is an interest that takes normative phenomena as its object, 
an interest in which thoughts, feelings, and actions are obligatory, blameworthy, 
appropriate, or even intelligible”.1 For instance, I have a normative interest where I 
have an interest in ϕ’s constituting a wronging against me.2 Alternatively, I have a 
normative interest where I have a direct interest in having a right, or an interest in 
someone else being obligated. To give one of Owens’s examples, he claims that we 
                                                
1 Shaping the Normative Landscape (henceforth, Shaping), p. vi  
2 Owens uses the terminology of “wronging” to refer to cases in which one agent A wrongs another 
agent B. For example, when A breaks her promise to B this constitutes a wronging, since she wrongs 
B (and does not just act wrongly) by breaking the promise. In the cases with which we are concerned 
(although perhaps in all cases) a wronging constitutes the violation of a directed duty.  
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have an authority interest, an interest in “having the right to oblige others to do 
certain things,”3 and relies on this interest to explain the power to promise. 
  Normative interests, such as the authority interest, stand in contrast to non-
normative interests. Non-normative interests are simply interests as they are 
standardly understood: interests in avoiding pain, experiencing pleasure, having a 
sufficient amount to eat, developing our capacities, partaking in relationships such as 
friendship, and so on. To be sure, Owens thinks that our non-normative interests are 
normative for us, in that they give rise to reasons for action, ground rights and 
obligations, and make sense of desires and emotions. The contrast between 
normative and non-normative interests is just in the content of those interests. Both 
normative and non-normative interests share in the fact that when they are served our 
lives go better, and when they are set back our lives go worse. This explains why 
normative interests give us reasons of various kinds. So just as the fact that your 
standing on my toe will cause me pain and therefore set back my non-normative 
interests gives you a reason not to do so, the fact that without a practice of promising 
we would lack one significant way in which the authority interest can be served 
gives us reason to create and maintain a practice of promising.  
Owens deploys the idea of a normative interest to provide a unified account 
of a range of normative phenomena, but our concern here is with Owens’s account of 
the power of consent. How, then, is the idea of a normative interest used to explain 
our possession of that power? Like the power to promise, Owens claims that there is 
a specific normative interest that underpins the power of consent, namely the 
permissive interest. The permissive interest is an interest in being able to “determine 
by declaration whether something constitutes a wronging.4 More specifically, 
permissive interests are interests in certain acts constituting wrongings unless we 
consent to them.5 For example, Owens claims we have a permissive interest with 
regard to sex, an interest in its being the case that it is wrong for others to have sex 
with us unless we give our consent.6 Importantly, this is not an interest in having 
control over whether others in fact have sex with us. (This would be a non-normative 
interest.) Rather, it is in an interest in its being wrong for others to have sex with us 
unless we give them our consent. 
                                                
3 Shaping, p. 146. 
4 Ibid., p. 172. 




Consider another example. Derek is ill in hospital. He has been presented 
with several treatment options, but doctors think the best thing to do would be to 
operate. We generally assume that Derek must give consent before it is permissible 
for the surgeon to operate,7 and we usually think this has something to do with the 
fact that individuals should be able to choose or control whether or not the surgery 
goes ahead. But according to Owens’s theory this misrepresents the situation. What 
is actually significant is that Derek has control over whether the surgeon would be 
wronging him by operating, independently of his interests in controlling whether the 
operation goes ahead.  
For Owens, the power of consent gives Derek precisely the kind of direct 
control over the normative situation that he needs, by making it the case that the 
surgeon will wrong him by operating unless he consents. Importantly, the wronging 
that Derek has control over by giving or withholding consent is not a wrong that 
relates to his non-normative interests in avoiding pain, or having control over his 
course of treatment. Rather, it is an example of what Owens calls a bare wronging: a 
wronging that does not relate to action against any human interest.8 What makes it 
wrong for the surgeon to operate without Derek’s consent is simply the fact that it is 
in his interests that the surgery be recognised as constituting a wronging unless he 
declares otherwise. 
As a result, there are two distinct kinds of wrong that the surgeon might 
perpetrate by operating upon Derek. First there is the possibility of a bare wronging, 
if the surgeon operates without Derek’s consent. Bare wrongings are one instance of 
what Owens calls interested wrongings, “wrongings whose existence depends, in 
part, on our interest in their constituting wrongings.”9 Importantly, interested 
wrongings “require that we are in the habit of recognizing them as such,”10 and so 
the surgeon will only be in a position to wrong Derek by operating on him without 
his consent when it is generally socially recognised that it is wrong to operate on 
patients without their consent. Second, there is the possibility of what Owens calls a 
non-interested wronging, a wronging that is related to Derek’s non-normative 
interests, for example, his interests in not experiencing pain, having control over his 
course of treatment, and so on. I will call these non-interested wrongings standard 
                                                
7 Specifically, on the assumption that Derek is conscious and competent. 
8 Shaping, pp. 8, 180. 
9 Ibid., p. 65. 
10 Ibid. 
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wrongings or standard wrongs. As opposed to bare wrongings, standard wrongings 
can constitute wrongs regardless of whether anyone is in the habit of recognising 
them as such.11  
With regard to standard wrongings, Owens claims that it is the normative 
significance of choice rather than the power of consent that does the normative work. 
Owens thinks that standard accounts of the normative significance of consent go 
wrong in conflating these two distinct phenomena,12 and Owens provides compelling 
reasons for distinguishing between the two, many of which I relied upon in the 
previous chapter in order to reject the simple choice view of consent. On Owens’s 
view, to consent to ϕ is to intentionally communicate the intention of hereby making 
it the case that ϕ does not wrong you.13 To choose, by contrast, is to intend some 
non-normative state of affairs, such as playing football, having sex, or undergoing an 
operation.14 Owens thinks this distinction is important, in part, because of the 
distinct wrongs consent and choice attach to – bare wrongings and standard 
wrongings respectively. Furthermore, by consenting and choosing we affect our 
normative relations with others in different ways. By giving consent we directly alter 
our normative relations by intentionally communicating a choice of that very 
relation, e.g., communicating that the surgeon would not wrong us by operating. By 
choosing, on the other hand, we indirectly shape our normative relations with others 
by choosing something non-normative, e.g. surgery, because by doing so we affect 
what is in our interests, and so what it would be wrong for others to do to us.  
Before moving on, it is worth briefly dwelling on Owens’s account of choice. 
As I noted in the previous chapter, Owens conceives of choice (at least for the most 
part) as an intention.15 So, for Derek to have chosen surgery, he must intend to have 
the surgery, or intend to make it the case that the surgeon goes ahead with the 
operation. Furthermore, Owens claims that choices do not need to be communicated 
in order for them to have normative significance. As he says, “it is the choice and not 
the communication of the choice that matters.”16  
According to Owens’s theory then, consent is normatively significant 
because we have permissive interests in certain acts constituting wrongings unless 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 166. 
13 Ibid., p. 165. 
14 Ibid., p. 173; Owens, “Does a Promise Transfer a Right?” p. 86. 
15 Shaping, p.173; “Does a Promise Transfer a Right?” p. 86. 
16 Shaping, p 168. 
52 
 
we consent to them. I will call this the permissive interest view. Owens focuses his 
discussion around the familiar examples of sex and surgery, and so we might say we 
have particular permissive interests in its being the case that it is wrong for others to 
have sex with us, or operate upon us, without our consent (although I assume there 
are a range of other permissive interests). On the permissive interest view, the 
wrongings that will be perpetrated against us if others behave in these ways without 
our consent are bare wrongings – wrongings not connected to the setting back of any 
of our non-normative interests.  
By grounding the power of consent in normative interests, Owens’s theory 
avoids many of the objections faced by the interest-based theories we considered in 
Chapter 2. Moreover, the permissive interest view can meet the desiderata for a 
theory of consent that I set out above. First, it can explain what I called the 
authoritative nature of consent. Consent is authoritative in the sense that where an 
agent possesses the power of consent, a mere declaration of consent (which meets 
the relevant conditions of voluntariness and information) is sufficient to waive a 
right. Moreover, in many contexts, consent will be a necessary condition for 
permissible action on the part of others. Owens’s theory can explain the authoritative 
nature of consent in both senses because it does not connect the power of consent to 
an agent’s non-normative interests. Rather, an agent’s consent is sufficient to waive 
certain rights because those rights are grounded directly in the fact that they have an 
interest in having this right (or in its being wrong for other’s to act) unless they 
consent. Since it is only in an agent’s interest that these acts to constitute wrongings 
unless consent is given, consent can ensure that these rights no longer apply. 
Similarly, consent is a necessary condition for the permissibility of other’s actions 
because the permissive interest is precisely an interest in certain acts being wrong 
unless an agent consents. 
 Second, Owens’s theory provides a solution to the problem of normative 
power, that is, the question of how it is we could affect our underlying interests by a 
mere declaration of consent. Owens’s solution is simply to say that declarations of 
consent do not affect our non-normative interests. Rather, by giving consent we 
simply control whether some act will constitute a bare wronging, a wronging in no 
way related to any non-normative interest of ours. And, since these wrongings are 
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bare wrongings, “[i]t is perfectly intelligible to suppose that [they] are created and 
abolished by declaration.”17 
 
3.2 Objections to the Permissive Interest View 
 
We might then be tempted to endorse the permissive interest view. It provides us 
with an account of consent’s normative significance that does not face the objections 
faced by the theories considered in Chapter 2, and explains both why consent is 
authoritative, and how it is that we are able to waive a right just communicating an 
intention to do so. However, the permissive interest view has problems of its own, 
and in what follows I will outline three reasons to think that the permissive interest 
view is unsatisfactory. 
 
3.2.1 The Value of Consent 
 
In Chapter 1 I suggested that status-based views of the power of consent, whilst they 
seem to account for some of our central intuitions, do not provide much in the way 
of explanation. I relied on this observation to motivate the interest-based approach I 
have adopted. The basic idea of the interest-based approach is that by demonstrating 
that something is in our interests – that it will make our life go better – we can 
explain and justify a range of normative phenomena. For example, one way moral 
rights can be justified is with reference to the fact that the lives of agents go better in 
various ways if they possess certain rights. 
As we have seen, Owens also adopts the interest-based model. However, 
Owens position differs significantly from standard interest-based approaches in two 
respects. First, he postulates the existence of certain interests, including the 
permissive interest, rather than relying on widely recognised (non-normative) 
interests in, for example, autonomy, special relationships, knowledge, nutrition, and 
so on. Second, he claims that the postulated normative interests are irreducible. By 
this Owens means that the normative phenomena in which he claims we have 
interests (rights, obligations) do not just matter to us as a means to non-normative 
                                                
17 Ibid., p. 165.  
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ends (autonomy, control, nutrition, etc.).18 If this were the case then normative 
interests would be reducible and, “the notion of a normative interest would be of 
little theoretical importance.”19  
Whilst providing the basis for a unique perspective on a range of issues, these 
differences also threaten to undercut the appeal of the interest-based approach. 
Generally, when we formulate claims about the interests of agents in order to defend 
normative arguments, the interests that are identified are recognisable to us, such that 
the idea that our lives should go better when these interests are served or protected is 
an intuitive one. Think, for example, of our interests in adequate nutrition, intimate 
relationships, intellectual development, and so on. By contrast, the claim that our 
lives will go better just because some acts constitute wrongs unless we consent to 
them is far less intuitive.  What is more, Owens has little to say directly in support of 
this claim. To be sure, this is no oversight on Owens part: 
 
[N]ormative interests are not explananda either. I’m not seeking to allay 
these misgivings by accounting for our possession of normative interests 
in other terms…Rather I establish the existence and content of our 
normative interests by describing how they hang together with other 
elements of a theory that has a certain overall explanatory power. This 
involves specifying a range of normative interests, showing how they 
relate to one another and then describing how our possession of these 
interests helps to explain the existence and character of a whole range of 
normative phenomena.20   
 
I will return to the issue of explanatory power in the following section. For 
the moment I want to focus directly on the question of whether our lives go better if 
some acts are socially recognised as wrong unless we consent to them; or rather, the 
question of what reason we have to think we possess permissive interests in the first 
place. If we do not have good grounds for accepting the existence of permissive 
interests, then we are no better off with Owens’s theory than with a status-based 
view. The explanation will have been secured by fiat. 
According to the permissive interest view, it is not wrong to have sex with 
others, operate upon them, or use their private information without their consent 
                                                
18 Shaping, p. 65. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p. 7. 
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because of their (non-normative) interests in choosing or having control over these 
aspects of their own lives, maintaining certain relationships with others, and so forth, 
but rather because of their permissive interests. Thus, acting without an agent’s 
consent is primarily wrong because it is the perpetration of a bare wronging. The 
primary wrong of having sex with someone, operating upon them, or reading their 
private information without consent is grounded in an interest they have in these acts 
being wrong unless they give consent, independently of the way in which these acts 
will (or might) impact upon their non-normative interests.21 So, on Owens’s view, 
we care (or should care) about acquiring the consent of others because, ultimately, 
we are concerned to avoid bare wrongings, wrongings that do not relate to any (non-
normative) interest.  
Why, though, should this be? Clearly, it will not always be good for us if 
certain things are socially recognised as wrong unless we consent to them. Imagine 
that, for some reason, it is socially recognised to be wrong to look at a certain star 
constellation without your consent. Obviously enough, you have no non-normative 
interests in whether other people look at this constellation or not, but, nonetheless, it 
is thought to be seriously wrongful to do so without your consent. Now imagine that 
an avid group of stargazers is secretly meeting and looking at the constellation in 
question without your consent, and that a concerned third party informs you of this 
fact. Should you care? The fact that it is generally socially recognised to be wrongful 
might mean it is likely that you will care, since, psychologically speaking, it is 
difficult not to internalise norms that are widely recognised. But we clearly think 
there is no reason why you should care, and, moreover, that it would be a good idea 
to revise the social norms that exist within your community. The point being that the 
mere fact something is recognised as a wronging unless you consent to it has no 
obvious value whatsoever. 
Of course, Owens will protest that in this case you have no permissive 
interest, and claim that it is this fact that explains why there is no value in its being 
recognised as wrongful to look at the constellation without your consent. In cases 
                                                
21 Whilst Owens grounds these wrongs in the postulated permissive interest, it is worth noting the 
resemblance between Owens’s view and a Kantian view. Cf. Arthur Ripstein: “[I]ntentional touching 
is objectionable even if harmless or undetected…Your person – your body – is yours to use for your 
own purposes, and if I take it upon myself to touch you without your permission, I use it for a purpose 
you haven’t authorized. The problem is not that I interfere with your use of your person or powers, 
but that I violate your independence by using your powers for my purposes. The trespass against your 
body is primary, and any consequent injury second to it.” Force and Freedom, pp. 45-6. 
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where we do have a permissive interest – cases of sex and surgery for example – he 
will say that things are quite different. How, though, do we identify the cases in 
which we have permissive interests? Essentially, we rely on our conviction that 
consent is normatively significant in certain contexts and postulate an interest to 
explain this fact. Thus, the claim that our lives go better when our permissive 
interests are served is just a restatement of our initial conviction that consent is 
valuable. 
Yet, I think our initial judgement that consent is valuable in certain contexts 
is likely to lose much or all of its force when we realise that the non-normative 
interests that we usually take consent to protect are not at stake. For example, our 
judgment that it is valuable that doctors acquire the consent of patients before 
subjecting them to medical interventions cannot support the existence of permissive 
interests if, as is generally the case, that judgement is underpinned by a belief that 
autonomous agents have interests in shaping their own lives. On the permissive 
interest view, these interests are accounted for via the significance of choice. But 
insofar as Owens relies on examples of consent in which we do, in the vast majority 
of cases, have significant non-normative interests at stake (sex, surgery), it is hard 
not to suspect that it is our concern with the various non-normative interests and 
their protection, rather than with permissive interests, that motivates our concern for 
consent. 
Furthermore, according to the permissive interest view, what it is that makes 
our lives go better is the fact that it is socially recognised that it is wrong to have sex 
with us, or operate upon us, without our consent, and not the fact that, for example, A 
recognises that it is wrong to have sex with B, or operate upon B, without B’s 
consent.22 So we might wonder why, from the point of view of A, they should be 
concerned to acquire B’s consent at all. If there is sufficient social recognition that A 
will have wronged B by acting without her consent, B’s permissive interest will have 
been served. To be sure, the fact that it is socially recognised as a wrong will place 
an important motivational pressure on most agents. But either way, Owens suggests, 
our lives will go better in virtue of the broader social recognition that some acts are 
                                                
22 Shaping, pp. 150-51 (in the context of promising). 
  57 
 
wrong if not consensual, and not because of the ways in which individuals deliberate 
and act in light of this fact.23 
What further resources does Owens have at his disposal to try and convince 
us of our possession of permissive interests?  As I noted above, Owens provides no 
direct argument for the claim that we have such interests. However, I think Owens 
has four avenues of response open to him at this point. First, he can point to the 
overall explanatory power of his theory, an issue I will return to in the next section. 
Second, he can suggest that the inadequacy of other interest-based theories gives us 
reason to accept the existence of permissive interests. In particular, Owens will say, 
we are otherwise unable to account for bare wrongings. Third, Owens might claim 
that double standards are being applied. I am asking for an argument for our 
possession of permissive interests, without asking for a similar argument to justify 
the claim that we have, for example, interests in avoiding pain, or living 
autonomously. It may simply be that no direct argument for our possession of 
interests of any kind can be given. Fourth, he will point to his suggestion that there is 
some relationship between permissive interests and non-normative interests, even if 
the former are not reducible to the latter. Let us consider these ideas in turn. 
Bare wrongings are acts that constitute wrongings despite setting back none 
of our non-normative interests. In chapter 2 I mentioned two examples of bare 
wronging. In the first, B harmlessly takes a mouth swab from A without A’s 
knowledge. In the second, B sneaks into A’s house and takes a nap without causing 
any damage to A’s property and without A ever finding out. In his own discussion, 
Owens, drawing on Gardner and Shute, focuses on an imagined case in which a rape 
is committed without any harm being caused to the victim.24 Since these wrongs do 
not, ex hypothesi, set back our non-normative interests, Owens maintains that they 
support the idea that we have normative interests in these acts constituting wrongs.25 
                                                
23 In Shaping Owens develops a complex account of habitual agency that he relies upon (in part) to 
show why it will make sense for the promisor or consentee to act in accordance with their promises or 
another’s consent. This account deserves much more attention that I can give it here, but I am unsure 
whether, even accepting that account, the mere fact it would make sense for an agent to act in a 
certain way is sufficient here. Whilst the social recognition of certain wrongs may make sense of A’s 
acting in certain ways, it hardly follows that it is the social recognition, rather than the ways in which 
A acts in relation to B that matters to B. 
24 See Gardner and Shute, “The Wrongness of Rape,” in Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in 
the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
25 I am somewhat suspicious of whether all the cases discussed under this label are really cases in 
which no non-normative interests are set back. For instance, on the not implausible assumption that 
we possess non-instrumental interests in having control over our sexual relations, cases of “bare rape” 
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That is, Owens takes these cases to support the existence of permissive interests, and 
to bring out the way in which it is valuable for us to possess the power of consent 
independently of the way in which our non-normative interests are implicated. 
As I suggested above, the suggestion that the primary wrong of assault, 
trespass, or rape is a bare wronging will strike many as odd. Still, the mere fact that 
this idea does not cohere with our pre-reflective view does not count against its 
being true, and Owens will maintain that we have to accept this seemingly 
counterintuitive result if we are to be able to explain the considered intuition that 
cases of bare wronging are in fact wrongs. Yet this is too quick. The existence of 
bare wrongings is not sufficient on its own to establish that we have permissive 
interests, since there are competing explanations for those wrongs. For one, cases of 
bare wronging might be thought to help establish a case against interest-based moral 
theories altogether.26 More importantly for my own purposes, I will later rely on an 
interest-based account according to which the relationship between interests and 
wrongs is indirect. To foreshadow that later discussion, I believe that we relate to 
one another in a morally decent and valuable way when we recognise one another as 
bearers of interests worthy of protection, and think this fact can explain why we 
ought not to perpetrate bare wrongings. 
What is particularly noteworthy here is that the need to postulate permissive 
interests (and normative interests more generally) in order to explain bare wrongings 
derives from an assumption Owens makes about the connection that obtains between 
non-normative interests and wrongings. Owens claims that on a popular view about 
wrongdoing, represented by what he calls the Injury Hypothesis, it is a necessary 
condition of wronging that an agent must set back or injure some non-normative 
interest of another agent.27 Since this view cannot accommodate bare wrongings, this 
undermines the idea that all wrongings are grounded in our non-normative interests. 
Yet, the injury hypothesis is a significant assumption, and one that I am not sure is 
justified. As an interpretive matter, I am unconvinced that some of those to whom 
                                                                                                                                     
would set back such interests. Still, I assume that other cases of bare wronging are at least conceptual 
possibilities, and so may be able to play the role in Owens’s argument that he takes them to play. 
26 See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom, pp. 45-7, who takes such cases as grist for the 
Kantian’s mill. 
27 Shaping, p. 61. 
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Owens attributes this position (notably, Scanlon and Raz) really hold it.28 But either 
way, we need not accept the injury hypothesis, and, as I will argue later, upon 
reflection it does not seem well grounded. The point, for present purposes, is that 
unless the injury hypothesis is the only way of conceiving of the relation between 
non-normative interests and wrongs it is not necessary to postulate permissive 
interests in order to explain bare wrongings in a way that is consistent with an 
interest-based view, and so this claim cannot be relied upon to support the idea that it 
is valuable for us that certain acts constitute (bare) wrongings unless we declare 
otherwise. This means that we should want some independent reason for 
conceptualising matters as Owens does, especially in light of the fact that, as I have 
said, it is quite unintuitive to hold that our lives go better purely in light of the fact 
that certain acts constitute bare wrongings unless we give our consent. 
Consider next the idea that I am asking for something that cannot be given: a 
direct argument for the claim that we possess certain interests. In response to some 
who have pressed some similar worries against Owens’s view,29 Owens makes the 
following remarks: 
 
Shaping is a sustained argument for the proposition that we do have a 
serious interest in obligation as such. I doubt one can prove this directly 
(how could you prove that human beings have a serious interest in 
knowledge or pleasure as such?)...[I]n Shaping I sought to establish the 
existence of normative interests by arguing that their postulation is the 
best way of making sense of our social practices and of our views about 
what is valuable in human life.30 
 
 Now, I agree with Owens that it may be difficult to give a direct argument for 
any interest, or at least any foundational or basic interest. But, as Owens is well 
aware, this does not vindicate our postulation of any interest whatsoever. Rather, that 
postulation has to be able to make sense of “our social practices and of our views 
about what is valuable in human life.” Moreover, I assume that, where possible, we 
                                                
28 Rahul Kumar has suggested that it is part of the appeal of Scanlon’s position that nothing like the 
injury hypothesis holds on his view. See Rahul Kumar, “Who Can Be Wronged?” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 31, no. 2 (2003).  
29 In particular, Christopher Bennett, “A Review of David Owens’ Shaping the Normative 
Landscape,” Jurisprudence 6, no. 2 (2015); and Daniel Markovits, “Authority, Recognition, and the 
Grounds of Promise,” Jurisprudence 6, no. 2 (2015). 
30 David Owens, “Reply to Commentators,” Jurisprudence 6, no. 2 (2015), pp. 386-87. 
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have reason to avoid the postulation of new interests. That is to say, I assume it will 
be preferable to explain consent’s normative significance in terms of widely 
recognised (non-normative) interests if that can be done in a way that is consistent 
with other considered intuitions we have about the power of consent. As I suggested 
above, part of the appeal of standard interest-based views is that they can provide an 
explanation in terms of something that is widely recognised to contribute to how 
well our life goes. If this is correct, whilst it may be true that direct arguments cannot 
be given for any basic interest, we will have reason to prefer relying on widely 
recognised and intuitive interests to postulated interests in our explanations. Whether 
we can do so remains to be seen, but I will argue in Chapters 4 and 5 that such an 
explanation is in fact available. 
Finally, consider the relationship between our permissive interests and our 
non-normative interests. Owens briefly suggests that there are four possible relations 
that might hold between normative and non-normative interests without normative 
interests being reducible to non-normative interests.31 Of particular interest here is 
Owens’s suggestion that our permissive interests may be embedded with various 
non-normative interests. A normative interest in ϕ is embedded with a non-normative 
interest in φ “when we couldn’t have one without the other, when our interest in ϕ 
depends (directly or indirectly) upon our interest in φ and vice versa.”32 To try and 
clarify this idea, let’s take an example. Suppose I have a permissive interest in 
whether others touch me.  If this interest is embedded it follows that my permissive 
interest depends upon my possession of non-normative interests in whether others 
touch me (concerning, for example, the fact that others touching me might harm me 
in various ways), and, furthermore, that I would not have these non-normative 
interests without also having the permissive interest in its being wrong for others to 
touch me without permission. 
Speaking later on Owens suggests that understanding our permissive interests 
as embedded might explain why we should be particularly concerned with consent in 
cases where we have significant non-normative interests at stake.   
 
It may be no coincidence that normative interests cluster around the body, 
i.e. around the very thing that is also the object of numerous non-
                                                
31 Ibid., p. 65-6. 
32 Ibid., p. 66. 
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normative concerns, without it being the case that these normative 
interests are grounded in these non-normative concerns.  Rather each may 
be embedded in the other.  The whole set of bodily interests – normative 
and non-normative – may come in a package whose elements can’t either 
be pulled apart or arranged in order of explanatory priority.33     
 
 Whilst this relationship between permissive interests and non-normative 
interests is coherent, however, we have no positive reason to think that this 
relationship in fact obtains, and, therefore, no positive reason to think that we 
possess permissive interests. Assuming that I have various non-normative interests 
regarding whether others touch me, it does not follow that I possess permissive 
interests in this, or that I must possess permissive interests in order to make sense of 
my non-normative interests. So we still require some independent motivation for this 
central claim. 
 Here Owens must return, I think, to cases of bare wronging, in order to try 
and show that we do in fact recognise this value. Thus, a lot of weight in Owens’s 
argument is placed upon the significance of bare wrongings. Methodologically 
speaking, I am unconvinced that this reliance on cases of bare wronging is well 
motivated. The mere fact that we should want an explanation of these cases does not 
support our treating them as the central explanandum, especially when the resulting 
theory does not obviously cohere with our intuitions about the statistically common 
cases of consent in which significant non-normative interests are at stake. Moreover, 
these cases are so uncommon that our intuitions about them are less likely to serve as 
a reliable guide. And, as I have said, cases of bare wronging are particularly 
problematic in light of the injury hypothesis. We might be better to challenge this 
assumption before rejecting our prior intuitions about consent’s significance out of 
hand.  
 
3.2.2 Explanatory Power 
 
As I noted above, Owens claims that he will “establish the existence and content of 
our normative interests by describing how they hang together with other elements of 
                                                
33 Ibid., p. 182. 
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a theory that has a certain overall explanatory power.”34 Perhaps, then, we can be led 
to accept the existence of permissive interests through recognition of the explanatory 
purchase that is to be gained from the postulation of normative interests.  
In fact, I do not think that the explanatory power of the permissive interest 
view is sufficient to justify the postulation of permissive interests, and actually 
believe that relying on postulated normative interests limits the explanatory power of 
the theory in important respects. I will discuss my reasons for thinking this is the 
case under two headings, downstream reasons and upstream reasons.  
The downstream reason for thinking that the explanatory power of the 
permissive interest view is limited is that it is not clear that the theory actually 
provides an explanation for the phenomena that we are trying to account for. To see 
why this should be, let us think briefly about exactly what it is that we are trying to 
account for. In Chapter 1 I set out two central questions to which we should want an 
answer when trying to explain consent’s normative significance. First, why does 
consent have normative force when given by agent? Second, why does consent play 
such an important role in the management of directed duties?  
Now we will not be happy with just any answer to these questions. Rather, 
we are motivated to pursue this investigation because we notice the prevalence of 
consent in moral and legal theory and practice, but do not find a convincing 
theoretical account of why consent should have the normative significance attributed 
to it. Importantly, however, these practices provide us with data that we then rely on 
as the basis for thinking about the issue in question. For example, we see that there 
are certain spheres where consent is seen to be particularly important; that we can 
give consent in different ways in different contexts; that there are explicit rationales 
for acquiring consent presented in particular settings (e.g. medical settings), and so 
on. Thus, we see that it is generally considered to be wrong to act in certain ways or 
in certain contexts without consent. Furthermore, our understanding of these 
practices is generally coupled with some (perhaps vague) intuitions about the 
normative significance of those practices,35 for example, the importance of being 
able to make certain choices oneself. 
In all likelihood we will not be able to account for all of the data with which 
we are faced. Nevertheless, the data given to us by existing practices of consent play 
                                                
34 Shaping, p. 7. 
35 Cf. T. M. Scanlon, “The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory,” p. 9. 
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an important role in assessing different answers to the two questions from which we 
started. Generally, a theory that answers those questions in a way that is consistent 
with more of the data of our practices and the intuitions related to them, and which 
draws out the connections between and thus and unifies the data, will be better 
placed than a theory that does this less well. Of course, upon reflection we may have 
reason to significantly revise our existing practices, and the intuitions that support 
them, since we are ultimately interested in sound moral principles, and not just 
interpreting existing moral practices. But it does not follow from this that existing 
moral practices are irrelevant. Where revision is necessary it will generally be 
motivated by our recognition of the inconsistency of these practices with other 
firmly held moral commitments, which themselves play an important role in the 
construction of any moral theory. 
As we have seen, Owens’s answer to the two questions from which we 
started is that we have permissive interests, which ensure that our lives go better if it 
is socially recognised to be wrong to act in certain contexts without an agent’s 
consent. Importantly, according to the permissive interest view, the wrong that A 
will perpetrate against B by acting without B’s consent is a bare wronging – a wrong 
unrelated to any of B’s non-normative interests. It is this fact, I want to suggest, that 
gives rise to the question of how well the permissive interest view responds to the 
data of our existing practices. Specifically, I suspect that when we are concerned 
(either theoretically or practically) with whether A acquires B’s consent, it is because 
we are concerned with the standard wrongs A may perpetrate against B, those 
wrongs grounded in B’s non-normative interests.36 Indeed, the idea that consent 
matters because it is simply in our interests that certain things are socially recognised 
as wrong, in isolation from our interests in being able to choose or control what 
happens to us within certain spheres of our lives, does not fit well with our existing 
practices at all. We might even conclude that on Owens’s theory it is really the 
significance of choice, and not the power of consent, that does the majority of the 
important normative work. That is, we might accept Owens’s theory of consent, and 
conclude that consent is simply much less important than we previously thought. 
Owens is likely to respond by saying that a significant revision in our thought 
about consent is justified by our need to be able to account for bare wrongings. But 
                                                




let me recap on two points made at the end of the last section. First, since cases of 
bare wronging lie at the statistical margins it is unclear whether we are right to treat 
these as the central explanandum, as Owens suggests we should.37 If we think in 
terms of the data we want to account for in our theory, cases of bare wronging are 
certainly relevant. Yet by focusing on these cases we disregard the majority of our 
existing practices of consent. Moreover, it is not the case that by doing so we come 
to a theory that can easily accommodate and explain those practices. Whilst 
ultimately this may be a price we have to pay, it still constitutes a limit to the 
theory’s explanatory power. A theory that could account for bare wrongings whilst 
simultaneously accounting for existing practices of consent would have greater 
explanatory force, and I believe the theory I outline in Chapters 4 and 5 can do just 
this. Second, the need to postulate normative interests to explain bare wrongings 
derives from Owens’s acceptance of the injury hypothesis. Thus, a radical revision 
of our understanding of consent is unnecessary. As I will later argue, I think we do 
better to reject the injury hypothesis instead.38   
Turn now to the upstream reasons that the permissive interest view has 
limited explanatory power. Even assuming that Owens is right to tie consent’s 
normative significance to bare wrongings, we should hope that the postulation of 
permissive interests provides a basis for answering further questions connected to the 
power of consent, such as when consent is necessary, how consent should be given 
in different contexts, or what form of voluntariness standard we should adopt.  
However, I do not think the permissive interest view offers us such a basis.  
To see why, note that the most common ways in which a theory will be able 
to play such a role is if the explanation offered is in terms of concepts or ideas with 
which we are familiar and rely upon in other contexts, or if some connection is 
drawn between a new concept and more familiar concepts. Since the idea of the 
permissive interest is a new one, and is largely unconnected by Owens to anything 
with which we are familiar in our practical thinking or moral theorising, it cannot 
connect the significance of consent to anything that we already have some intuitive 
                                                
37 Shaping, p. 177. 
38 Owens might suggest that if we accept the claim that permissive interests are embedded with non-
normative interests, the permissive interest view will be able to account for existing practices of 
consent just as well, if not better, than views that just focus on non-normative interests. For this 
strategy to work, however, I think more needs to be said about the specifics of the embedded 
relationship that is supposed to obtain (e.g. which non-normative interests permissive interests are 
embedded with). 
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grip on or understanding of. This fact makes it difficult to rely on the theory in order 
to defend further claims about consent.  
Consider an analogy. I am curious about how it is that your Jack in the Box 
pops up when you take the lid off, and ask you how it is done. Imagine that you give 
me one of two responses. The first response is that the Jack is connected to a spring 
that is tightly coiled when the lid is on, but can uncoil when the lid is taken off, thus 
causing the Jack to jump up. Since I have at least a rudimentary understanding of 
springs and how they work this response is somewhat enlightening. Moreover, the 
way in which springs operate can be explicated in terms of more fundamental ideas 
commonly used in physics (such as “energy” and “motion”), and I could thus find 
out more about springs if the desire should take me, so as to have a more detailed 
understanding of how the Jack in the Box works.  
The second response is that the Jack is connected to a twozit. Since you 
yourself were wondering how the Jack pops out of the box, but wanted some 
explanation without having to leave your armchair, you postulated the idea of a 
twozit, the function of which, you tell me, is precisely to make the Jack leap up when 
the lid is removed. In comparison to the first response, the second is not particularly 
helpful. I now know the name of the mechanism by which the Jack jumps up (at least 
according to you). But since I have no idea of what a twozit actually is – other than 
the thing that makes a Jack pop out of the box – I am in no better position to 
understand how the Jack in the Box works. In particular, since the concept of a 
twozit bears no relation to other more familiar ideas (e.g. springs), the twozit-based 
explanation has limited explanatory power, given that I cannot situate your 
explanation of the Jack in the Box within my more general understanding of objects, 
movement, energy, and the like. 
Now clearly this is an oversimplified picture of what the permissive interest 
view provides us with, especially in light of the connections that Owens draws out 
between normative interests and the explanation of different aspects of the normative 
domain (an issue I will return to below). Moreover, the objection might seem to 
ignore the fact that the permissive interest view relies, at root, upon the concept of an 
interest, understood as an aspect of individual well-being, a concept that my 
investigation of consent’s significance is premised upon. 
However, the fact that Owens relies upon the concept of an interest is 
insufficient on its own to increase the explanatory power of the permissive interest 
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view. That is because the content of the interest – in certain things being wrong 
unless we consent to them – has been posited precisely to fill the explanatory gap in 
question. One way to put this point is in terms of the methodology of reflective 
equilibrium. To engage in the process of reflective equilibrium we must formulate 
principles and test these principles against our considered moral judgements, 
working back and forth between the principles and our judgements until (hopefully) 
we achieve equilibrium between the two. Now imagine we aim to use this method to 
assess two different theories of consent: the permissive interest view, and a theory 
that grounds consent’s normative significance in the value of autonomy. In fact, we 
can only use the method to assess the autonomy theory because, on the permissive 
interest view, the considered judgments against which we would judge the relevant 
principles are the very same judgements that we rely on in order to construct those 
principles. That is, since we postulate a permissive interest in every case in which we 
take consent to be normatively significant there is no possibility that the principle 
and our considered judgements will not be in equilibrium. Any variation in the case 
presented directly leads to a variation in whether the principle is thought to apply. 
Thus we have no independent means of assessing whether the postulation is justified, 
in terms of its ability to make sense of our considered intuitions across a range of 
cases. 
As a consequence the theory also struggles to do further explanatory work. If, 
upon reflection, we thought that the autonomy theory of consent cohered with a 
sufficient number of our considered judgements, we might begin to use the theory to 
make further claims. For example, we might say that consent is normatively 
significant where autonomous choice is valuable, that the standards for valid consent 
are the same as the standards for truly autonomous choices, and so on. Since we can 
then plug in our favourite theory of autonomy, these claims will have a sufficiently 
determinate content. By contrast, we could not rely on the permissive interest view 
to make further claims such as these because, since we have not explained consent in 
terms of other concepts or ideas, we have no grounds from which to make these 
claims. We are left with nothing more than the intuitions we had to begin with.  
Owens is likely to respond by saying that the kind of explanation I am 
looking for is only possible if there is some way of explaining consent’s normative 
significance in terms of concepts or ideas with which we are already familiar or 
already rely upon in our moral theorising. Yet sometimes, he might continue, we do 
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not have the conceptual resources that we require in order to explain particular 
phenomena, and here we must postulate new concepts in order to render those 
phenomena intelligible. In light of the objections raised against the interest-based 
theories considered in Chapter 2 (many of which were initially developed by 
Owens), the power of consent may look like one case where this is necessary. Whilst 
it is true that we do not have a grip on permissive interests now, they may come to 
have an intuitive place within our conceptual repertoire as we develop and rely on 
the notion in our theorising and practical thinking.  
As a general matter, this response is perfectly legitimate. I do not mean to 
claim that it is never acceptable to postulate concepts as part of the construction of a 
theory that aims to explain various phenomena.39 The point I am making is that such 
an account is necessarily limited in its explanatory power, since the explanation is 
given in terms of a concept with which we are unfamiliar, and which is unrelated to 
more familiar concepts or ideas. A theory that can situate consent’s normative 
significance within a familiar framework of concepts and ideas is, at least in this 
regard, more desirable for this reason. Of course, a theory of consent of this kind 
may be unavailable. But I will later articulate a theory that I think can meet these 
demands.  
At this point, Owens is likely to point out that the postulation of normative 
interests provides us with a unified way of explaining a whole range of normative 
phenomena, including forgiveness, friendship, and promising, and urge that an 
assessment of the explanatory power of the permissive interest view must take these 
broader theoretical ambitions into account.  
I would not deny that a full evaluation of the permissive interest view would 
have to take Owens’s broader theory of normative interests into account, although 
this is not a task I can undertake here. However, two things are worth noting. First, 
the fact that the overall theory has a certain explanatory power does not mean that 
                                                
39 Indeed, the history of the natural sciences is built upon such postulations. But it is worth comparing 
the justification of these postulations in the sciences. For a postulation to count as defensible we will 
need to be able to test the hypothesis it gives rise to. For instance, consider our postulation of a force 
– gravity – that attracts two objects in proportion to their mass. With this hypothesis on the table, we 
can begin to conduct experiments to see whether this postulated force has explanatory power. If the 
hypothesis can make sense of the test results then we have good reason to accept the existence of the 
force in question, and might use it as a basis to make further predictions, and then see whether these 
predictions are correct, and so on. But if the hypothesis cannot explain the data, we should reject it. 
Of course, we cannot rely on any such methodology when engaged in moral philosophy. But we 
might still hope for some independent means – such as that offered by the process of reflective 
equilibrium – by which to assess the justifiability of such postulations. 
68 
 
the permissive interest view has explanatory power. Since our primary concern is 
with the normative significance of consent, I do not think we have reason to accept 
the postulation of permissive interests on grounds of explanatory power, especially if 
a theory with a greater explanatory power is available. Second, I suspect that the 
need to postulate normative interests across the board arises from assumptions made 
by Owens that I think we have good reason to reject. For instance, Owens partly 
motivates his own account of promising by pointing to the need to explain cases of 
bare wronging (broken promises that will not set back any one’s interests). As I have 
already said, the need to postulate normative interests to explain cases of bare 
wronging arises from Owens’s acceptance of the injury hypothesis, a thesis I think 
we do well to reject. Furthermore, as I outline my positive theory of consent in 
Chapters 4 and 5 I also outline an alternative understanding of the relationship 
between interests and wrongs, which I believe can serve as the basis of a view that 
could be relied upon to provide the kind of wide reaching explanation that Owens is 
looking for, without relying on the postulation of normative interests. 
 
3.2.3 The Relationship Between Communicated Choice and Consent 
 
In Chapter 2, I followed Owens in rejecting the simple choice view of consent, in 
part because, on a plausible understanding of what choice consists in, our choices 
can diverge from the consent we give or withhold. For Owens, the possibility of 
divergence serves to highlight that choice and consent are entirely distinct 
phenomena that have a distinct normative significance, explained in each case by the 
fact that they serve different interests. Whilst the power of consent is grounded in 
our permissive interests, the significance of choice is grounded, roughly, in our non-
normative interests in having control over what happens.40  
 As I have said, these distinct bases for consent and choice correspond to 
different ways of affecting one’s normative relations with others. To give consent to 
S’s dentistry, for example, is “to intentionally communicate the intention of hereby 
making it the case that S does not wrong you by whitening your teeth.”41 To choose, 
by contrast, is to intend, decide, or desire some non-normative object, e.g., intending 
to have one’s teeth whitened, or deciding to play football. These forms of choice are 
                                                
40 Ibid., p. 168.  
41 Ibid., p. 165. 
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all constituted by mental states or mental acts. As we have seen, Owens maintains 
that one need not communicate these choices in order for them to make a normative 
difference, although, as he points out, we often do communicate our choices to 
others, both intentionally and non-intentionally.42  
Now, whilst I agree with Owens that there is an important distinction to be 
drawn between choice and consent, Owens ignores the normative significance of a 
third category: objectively communicated choices. Objectively communicated 
choices can be characterised as intentional actions performed in contexts that allow 
others to discern (or reasonably believe they can discern) some aspect of the actor’s 
mental contents (their intentions, desires, decisions), although these actions need not 
be performed with the intention of communicating a choice. I want to suggest that 
our objectively communicated choices often render the actions of others permissible 
in a way that purely subjective choices cannot, but without constituting consent (i.e., 
an act performed with the intention of waiving of a right).43 I believe this possibility 
gives rise to a difficult question for the permissive interest view, because we can 
sometimes waive our rights through objective choices even in cases where we 
supposedly have permissive interests. Yet if the permissive interest is an interest in 
something’s being wrong unless we intentionally declare otherwise (by giving 
consent), how could an objective choice have this effect? Ultimately, I think this 
casts doubt on the claim that we possess permissive interests.  
Consider, first, the example of playing football. Usually others would wrong 
me if they tackled me, but this not so if I am voluntarily playing football with them. 
How, though, do I make it the case that the other players will not wrong me? I 
assume that simply by running onto the field in my kit, or shouting for someone to 
pass the ball, I make it clear to others that I am playing, in full knowledge of how the 
game is played and the risks this entails, and thus make it permissible for them to 
tackle me if I have the ball. In other words, by joining in with the game I 
communicate a choice to play. I take it that there is no further need for me to give the 
                                                
42 Ibid., p. 169. 
43 Our objectively communicated choices can sometimes come apart from our subjective choices, at 
least in that our actions may sometimes reasonably lead others to believe we have intentions (etc.) that 
we do not have. For example, others may reasonably believe that we intend to play football when we 
do not. I leave open whether in these cases others are excused for wronging us, or whether they do not 
in fact wrong us, since we should have known that acting in these ways would lead others to believe 




other players my explicit consent, i.e., intentionally communicate the intention of 
hereby making it non-wrongful for them to tackle me in the course of the game.44 I 
also assume that unless I partake in some actions that communicate my choice to 
play, the other players would wrong me by tackling me if, standing on the side lines, 
the ball should happen to roll to my feet.45 
It is worth noting at this point that many of the non-normative interests that 
presumably make tackling me outside the game wrongful (e.g. my interests in not 
being subject to pain, and in having control over my own body), are often at stake in 
cases where we believe consent is necessary. Thus, if permissive interests are 
embedded with these non-normative interests, as Owens suggests, we might wonder 
why consent is not necessary in the footballing context also. Still, so long as the non-
normative interests that are embedded with permissive interests are sufficiently fine 
grained, there is no inconsistency on Owens’s part in claiming that we have no 
permissive interest in the football case, and that all that is required to make tackling 
me non-wrongful is choice, because only my non-normative interests are 
implicated.46 
However, Owens’s theory requires that there must be some cases in which 
consent is always a necessary condition for permissible action. This follows from the 
fact that we have permissive interests, since the wrongs connected to consent are 
grounded in interests in certain acts being wrong unless we intentionally permit 
them. A plausible example of this is the example of sex, and Owens relies on this 
example as the basis for much of his discussion. As he notes, the sexual context 
represents a paradigm example of a sphere in which consent is normatively 
                                                
44 Of course, in common parlance it would not be strange to say that by joining in the game the 
footballer consented to being tackled. But Owens and I are both operating on the assumption that to 
consent is to intend to waive a right. 
45 Here I disagree with Owens, since he claims that choices need not be communicated in order to be 
normatively significant. Indeed, I think the football example helps to bring out the fact that such an 
analysis is incorrect. We can easily imagine that I have chosen to play football (i.e. I intend to play), 
but have not yet motivated myself to join in, such that the other players are completely unaware of my 
choice. Were the ball to find its way to my feet, and if I were about to take this opportunity to join in 
the game (passing it to a member of my preferred team), it would, to my mind, still be wrongful for 
the other players to tackle me despite my intentions, since they have no idea about what I intend to 
do, and believe that I am merely observing the game. Owens does add the qualifier “provided they 
[i.e. the other players] know of my choice” (p. 168) but this just suggests that uncommunicated 
choices are not sufficient to effect the relevant normative change. Of course, we then face the 
question of what exactly the connection must be between my choice and others’ knowledge of my 
choice (whether I must communicate the choice directly, or deliberately, via a third party, etc.), but it 
certainly does not follow that what the other players require is my consent. 
46 Although, as I suggest in the previous footnote, I believe this choice will have to be communicated 
in some way. 
  71 
 
significant.47 Indeed, Owens maintains that this is because rape is a bare wronging,48 
over and above the grave wrongs that will be perpetrated as a result of the serious 
harms suffered by the victim. Thus, according to the permissive interest view, in 
order to engage in non-wrongful sexual relations we must do two things. First, we 
must choose to have sex, so as to avoid those wrongs grounded in our non-normative 
interests. Second, we must consent, meaning that we must intentionally 
communicate the intention of hereby making it the case that we will not be wronged 
by certain sexual acts. 
 Yet, I contend that sexual consent of this sort is relatively rare. No doubt, 
when we have sex we give off all kinds of verbal and physical cues, generally 
indicating that we wish to have sex, or that we wish to go no further.  What is more, 
having sex with someone when these cues are absent, or cues to the contrary are 
present, is certainly a grave wrong. My claim is simply that there are a significant 
number of sexual interactions in which sexual intimates do not intentionally 
communicate the intention of hereby making it the case that their sexual partner 
does not wrong them by having sex with them, and that we take many of these 
interactions to be quite permissible instances of sexual relations.  
In support of this claim I can mostly offer only anecdotal evidence, and ask 
the reader to reflect upon personal experience. It will perhaps help to emphasise the 
claim that I am making.  I am not saying that when we engage in sexual relations we 
do not, and need not demonstrate signs of positive willingness.  Indeed, I agree with 
the strong intuition shared by most people that sex must be consensual, where 
“consensual” refers to something more general than Owens’s technical definition of 
consent (e.g. a mutual willingness to engage in sexual activities).  What I am 
claiming is that the kind of consent we do give in sexual interactions (if consent is 
what we should call it) does not usually (or at least always) take the form of consent 
as defined by Owens.  Rather, it looks as if we choose to have sex, and communicate 
these choices by partaking in a range of both verbal and non-verbal communications. 
For example, we kiss, touch, talk, and so on; but none of these acts is aimed at giving 
our consent. Where this is clearly the case, and where there is no evidence to the 
contrary, and no coercive pressure has been levied, I would suggest that such forms 
of sexual interaction are generally permissible. 
                                                
47 Shaping, p. 177. 
48 Ibid., p. 179. 
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 I am not claiming that consent as Owens describes it is never given, nor that 
it might not be desirable if consent of this kind was given more regularly, or even 
seen as a necessary condition for permissible sexual interaction. My claim is simply 
that consent, as defined by Owens, it is not at the heart of our current sexual practice 
and that, given our current practice, I am assuming in a great number of cases 
individuals are able to have sex without wronging one another, even though they do 
not give the kind of consent Owens describes. Yet the implication of Owens’s view 
is that sexual relations that occur absent consent of this kind will amount to rape.49 
One may worry this objection is misguided on the grounds that I am taking 
Owens’s definition of consent to require something like a verbal standard of consent, 
e.g., explicitly saying “I consent”.  If this were the case my contention could be 
shown to be mistaken on the grounds that we do give consent of the kind Owens 
describes, only, in the sexual case, we often give it by partaking in certain actions, or 
even by remaining silent.50  However, I accept that one may give consent in a variety 
of ways, including through non-verbal acts, and even, in some contexts, by 
remaining silent.51  What I deny is that in the present case such actions or silences 
represent a communication of an intention to hereby change the normative situation.  
In order to give consent one would have to say or do something in order to 
intentionally communicate an intention of hereby making it the case that sex is non-
wrongful; one would have to deliberately and directly alter the normative status of 
the wrong that would otherwise obtain.  It seems more likely, however, that our 
various actions indicate a choice to have sex, without representing an intention to 
change the normative status of sexual acts. 
Another response would be to say that I am focusing too closely on the 
philosophical language Owens employs, and that we need not think about consent-
giving in these terms. When I give you consent to borrow a book from my office, for 
example, I do not usually entertain the thought “I am hereby communicating an 
intention to make it non-wrongful for you to borrow the book.” Similarly, it might be 
said, we need not conceive of our actions or verbal communications in that way in 
order give sexual consent. However, whilst it is certainly true that we very rarely 
form and communicate intentions of the kind just described, this is not the target of 
                                                
49 Ibid., p. 181. 
50 Ibid., p. 165. 
51 On silence as tacit consent see A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, pp. 75-
83. In the sexual sphere I doubt that we should ever think of silence as constituting consent. 
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my argument. In order to maintain the distinction between consent and choice that 
Owens relies upon it must be the case that consent is communicated intentionally; 
that is, a token of consent must be performed with the intention of giving consent. 
My contention is just that in many cases of what we take to be permissible sexual 
interaction, sexual intimates will not perform a specific token of consent (whether 
verbal or non-verbal) with the intention of giving consent (however this intention 
might be represented in an agent’s mental contents).  
 Recall that Owens cannot rely on the objective communications of choice 
that I am claiming occur, and which I am suggesting, in at least some contexts, will 
allow for permissible sexual relations. Indeed, he is explicit about the fact that mere 
choice alone cannot ensure the permissibility of sexual relations: “[C]an sex that has 
been chosen constitute rape?  It must be so if the interest that generates the wrong of 
rape is an interest in being wronged by sex unless you declare otherwise.”52 Yet it is 
somewhat revealing that the contrast Owens draws in this passage is between 
consent and explicit refusal, claiming that, “Someone chooses to be raped where 
they intend that the rapist have sex with them after they have explicitly refused their 
consent.”53 He thus implies that chosen but non-consensual sex occurs only where 
there is explicit refusal. As Owens himself is at pains to point out, however, you can 
make and communicate a choice, and even do so deliberately, without giving 
consent, and I take it, without denying consent either.54 Moreover, as feminist 
writers have repeatedly pointed out, mere non-refusal does not amount to the giving 
of consent.55 Thus, Owens cannot rely upon either communicated choices, or a lack 
of refusal, in order to show that most of the sexual relations to which I am referring 
are consensual in the narrow sense. 
 At this stage Owens has three strategies open to him. First, he can continue to 
deny that sexual relations of the kind I am describing are in any way common, and 
claim instead that in fact most sexual partners do in fact give explicit consent. Whilst 
I cannot disprove this claim, however, I believe there is good reason to think that it 
does not accurately reflect the phenomenology of our sexual lives. We often 
communicate with one another in subtle and nuanced ways, avoiding direct forms of 
                                                
52 Shaping, p. 181. Emphasis in original.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., p. 169. 
55 See, for example, Michelle J. Anderson, “Negotiating Sex,” Southern California Law Review 78 
(2005), and David Archard, Sexual Consent, p. 85. 
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communication akin to the giving consent, and this is no less true in the sexual 
sphere than in any other. Second, Owens can agree with me that explicit consent is at 
least often lacking, but claim that in all such cases, sexual partners seriously wrong 
one another.56 But again, I do not think this move will accurately reflect our sexual 
lives, nor our beliefs about sexual wrongdoing, especially rape. Whilst sexual 
wrongdoing is all too common, and we may have very good reason to revise our 
sexual practices in various ways,57 the kinds of sexual relations I have been 
describing are both fully voluntary and actively engaged in by sexual partners. All 
that is missing is consent understood as an intentional communication of an intention 
to waive a right, and I doubt that this alone is always good reason for claiming that a 
serious wrongdoing has occurred. Finally, Owens could weaken the intention 
requirement built into his account of consent in some way, so as to allow that the 
kinds of objective communications of choice to which I have been referring do in 
fact constitute tokens of consent. But to do this would be to collapse the distinction 
between choice and consent that Owens takes to be central to a compelling 
explanation of the nature and significance of the power of consent.58  
Yet, whilst none of these options are attractive, if I am right to claim that 
consent is not always required to make interaction permissible in the paradigm case 
of sexual relations, it casts serious doubt on our possession of permissive interests. 
Owens postulates permissive interests to explain why consent should be necessary in 
certain contexts, and why our consent should have normative force, but in doing so 
                                                
56 This would have the somewhat strange implication that sexual partners can simultaneously rape one 
another. 
57 Moreover, where we do have reason to revise our current sexual practices, I suspect our motivation 
is rooted in our desire to better protect the non-normative interests of agents, e.g., interests in having 
control over sexual relations. No one is campaigning for revised consent standards in the law, or on 
college campuses, because of the need to serve the permissive interest, but rather because of the very 
significant harms to an agent’s non-normative interests that are occasioned by rape. So whilst there 
may be, for example, good grounds for insisting upon a verbal standard of sexual consent, those 
grounds are likely to consist in the way in which such a standard would better protect non-normative 
interests as opposed to permissive interests. 
58 Owens could reformulate his view such that the primary distinction is between subjective choices 
on the one hand, and objectively communicated choices and the power of consent on the other. But 
this would have significant implications for his view. Owens would then either have to postulate a 
further normative interest to account for the way in which we can affect the normative status of acts 
through our objectively communicated choices, which would appear ad-hoc, or accept that the 
permissive interest can be served by objective choices. The latter option would force Owens to revise 
his conception of the permissive interest to include both intentional right-waiving (i.e. consent), and 
rights waived indirectly through objective choices. But Owens would then struggle to account for the 
important distinction between, and normative significance of, rights waived by communicating an 
intention to do so, and rights waived indirectly by engaging in certain actions. In Section 5.3.2 I 
provide an account of how we can better accommodate these different ways of affecting the 
application of our rights and duties within a unified framework. 
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he precludes the possibility that the wrongs addressed by consent can be addressed in 
any other way, since they are specifically interests in certain acts being wrong unless 
we consent. In a wide range of cases this seems implausible – often the same 
normative consequences can be reached via a different route.59 For instance, whilst I 
can consent to your touching me, I can also make it permissible for you to touch me 
(in certain ways at least) by standing next to you on a busy train, or playing a contact 
sport with you. In cases such as these, it seems plausible to think that my objectively 
manifested behaviours make it permissible for you to act in certain ways, 
independently of whether I intend to waive any rights by acting in these ways. 
In my view, Owens goes wrong in claiming that there are two distinct forms 
of wrong to be addressed in contexts where our consent is at issue: the standard 
wrongs grounded in our non-normative interests, and the bare wrongings grounded 
in our permissive interests. We can maintain the distinction between consent and 
different forms of choice without assuming that they are connected to different forms 
of wrongdoing.60 In the sexual context, for instance, I suggest that there is one kind 
of wrong with which we should be particularly concerned – what we might call the 
wrong of unwilling sex – and that this wrong can be addressed either by consent or, 
at least sometimes, by objectively communicated choices. This is not to say that 
there are no contexts in which consent is a necessary condition for permissible action 
on the part of others. But, as I will later argue in more detail, where this is so it is 
because of the various non-normative interests we seek to protect.61  
A unified account of these wrongs would also avoid the somewhat strange 
implication that, if an agent does give consent to surgery or to sex, for example, then 
they will also need to choose these activities to forestall wrongs grounded in their 
                                                
59 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 85. 
60 To be clear, as I suggested above, I doubt that subjective choices ever make a difference to the 
application of rights and duties. On my view, we can distinguish between subjective choice, 
objectively communicated choice, and consent, and further hold that only the latter two can affect our 
normative relations. Indeed, assuming that our rights and duties play an important role in structuring 
interpersonal relations in large part because they can play a role in the practical deliberations of 
agents, it is not clear how our purely subjective choices could make a difference to these relations. By 
contrast, it is obvious how our intentional actions could have such an effect (since others can have 
good reason to believe that I have certain intentions, or made certain decisions, which may affect the 
application of my rights, on the basis of my actions). Here again I am in disagreement with Owens 
since he appears to claim that subjective choices can directly affect the structure of rights and duties 
that obtains. For some related discussion see Section 5.3.3. 
61 See Section 5.3.2. 
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non-normative interests.62 Upon reflection, I think it quite odd to claim that there are 
two distinct kinds of wrong that need to be addressed in situations of this kind. 
Imagine, for example, that Derek complains that the surgeon has wronged him 
because, despite giving voluntary and informed consent to undergo an operation, he 
did not in fact choose the surgery (i.e. intend for the surgery to go ahead). Whilst this 
case strikes us as odd, the possibility must be a live one, since Owens is otherwise at 
risk of conceding that consent always coincides with choice, thus undermining the 
motivation for his view. Yet, allowing that the case is possible, we should not 
conclude that the surgeon wrongs Derek. It is true that if Derek consents without 
choosing then the surgery is likely to set back his interests in a way it would not if he 
had chosen the surgery. But it does not follow from this he will be wronged by the 
surgery. This result is forced upon Owens, however, because he claims that the 
wrong addressed by our consent is a bare wronging, thus leaving any wrongs 
grounded in our non-normative interests to be addressed by choice. And whilst 
Owens plausibly claims that consent often represents a communication of choice,63 it 
need not do so, as we have just seen.64 
This all suggests that Owens’s claim that there are two distinct forms of 
wrong connected to choice and to consent is misleading. At the very least, a theory 
of consent that could provide a unified explanation for the wrongs that attach to 
consent and objectively communicated choices would seem to better reflect our 
judgements of the cases just discussed. Moreover, recognising that in at least some 
contexts an objective communication of choice can address the same wrong as 
would be addressed by the giving of consent coincides with the intuitive idea that the 
significance of “choice” and consent are in some way connected. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, the form of choice in question cannot be our subjective choices, since 
                                                
62 I do not mean to say that if we have consented to sex or surgery we cannot be wronged in any other 
way. For example, a doctor can wrong a patient who has consented by acting negligently, or by 
failing to act on a reasonable judgment about what is in the patient’s best interests. The point is that, if 
a patient has given sincere consent, there is no wrong grounded in their interests in choosing or 
having control over what happens to them, as Owens suggests. This possible wrong is addressed by 
their consent. 
63 Shaping, p. 180. 
64 Owens might try to claim that the surgeon is not blameworthy in the example described because he 
reasonably took Derek’s consent to mean that Derek had also chosen the surgery. Three things are 
worth noting about this possibility. First, we can clearly communicate consent without 
communicating choice, as Owens himself points out (p. 174). Second, this response once again fails 
to capture the phenomenology of such interactions. If the surgeon believes she has Derek’s sincere 
consent then she will not believe there are further wrongs connected to Derek’s choices that she must 
be alive to. Moreover, and this is the third point, it is not that we just think the surgeon is not culpable 
in this example, but rather that they are not responsible for having wronged Derek in the first place. 
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these may diverge from the consent we give or withhold. But this still leaves room 
for the idea that there is a connection between the normative significance of our 
objectively communicated choices and the power of consent.65 
In any case, the foregoing discussion casts serious doubt on the idea that we 
possess permissive interests. Owens claims that we have an “interest in its being the 
case that one is wronged by [sex] unless one consents to it.”66 But, where consent is 
understood as an intentional communication of an intention to waive a right, this 
seems doubtful. Since sexual relations are a paradigm case in which consent – of 
some sort – is normatively significant, if I am right to claim that narrow consent is 
not always necessary in this case, such that we do not have a permissive interest in 




Owens offers an original account of consent’s normative significance that avoids the 
problems associated with the standard interest-based views that we considered in 
Chapter 2. However, I believe that his account, whilst rich in insight and ideas, 
should be rejected. In this chapter I have offered three reasons for this rejection. 
First, the theory fails to account for our pre-theoretical understanding of why consent 
is valuable, and the explanation that is offered in its place – that our lives go better 
simply as a result of certain acts being socially recognised as wrong unless we 
consent to them – is far from intuitive. Second, as a consequence of relying upon the 
postulated concept of permissive interests, the explanatory power of the theory is 
limited. Third, an examination of the paradigm case of sexual consent casts doubt on 
the idea that we possess permissive interests, and the further idea that choice and 
consent always address distinct wrongs. The strength of the first and second 
objection depends in part upon whether an alternative theory is available. I will seek 
to develop one such alternative over the next two chapters. The third objection, by 
contrast, would need to be addressed by Owens in order to maintain a coherent view. 
                                                
65 Couldn’t our objective choices come apart from our consent or dissent, thus once again giving rise 
to the problem of divergence? Not easily. We would think that someone who ran onto the football 
pitch shouting, “I do not consent to being tackled,” was either making a strange joke, or was seriously 
confused about the game being played. (Others might respond, “Either play or get off the pitch.”) 
66 “The Possibility of Consent,” p. 420, emphasis in original. 
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By postulating permissive interests that attach to distinct wrongs, Owens is 
able to avoid many of the problems faced by standard interest-based theories of 
consent. But he does so at the cost of failing to reflect our intuitions about consent’s 
significance, and our existing practice of consent. Whilst a theory of consent need 
not account for every aspect of existing practice, I take it that it is a desirable feature 
of the theory that it map onto the practice and our considered intuitions about that 
practice, since these give rise to the data which the theory seeks to explain. Whilst 
ultimately no such theory may be available, we should in the first instance want to 
explain, for example, the intuitive connection between the normative significance of 
(communicated) choice, and consent, as well as to explain why philosophers have so 
regularly assumed the significance of consent is explained by the value of autonomy. 
We can regard this as a third desideratum for a theory of consent. As well as being 
able to explain the authoritative nature of consent, and account for the problem of 
normative power, the theory should, so far as possible, cohere with our pre-
theoretical understanding of consent as normatively significant because of our 
interests in shaping our own lives. 
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4  
Interests, Rights, and Mutual Recognition 
 
I have been assuming that by giving consent we waive a right. But so far, I have said 
little about rights themselves, other than to set out Hohfeld’s conceptual schema. 
However, I believe that in order to understand consent’s normative significance we 
first require a more detailed understanding of the role rights play in structuring our 
moral relations with one another. Only then are we in a position to see why our 
ability to waive those rights by giving consent should have the kind of significance it 
does.  
In accordance with the confines I set out in Chapter 1, I am assuming an 
interest-based theory of rights. Yet how exactly we conceive of our interest-based 
theory is crucial. The main purpose of this chapter is to argue that the relationship 
between interests and rights should not be thought of as direct. Rather, rights protect 
interests indirectly by providing a normative framework that sets the terms for our 
interactions with one another. Importantly, the value of this framework is not 
exhausted by the fact that rights generally protect our significant interests. I argue 
that by recognising one another as rights-holders we also relate to each other in an 
intrinsically valuable way, by recognising one another as bearers of interests worthy 
of protection. This observation provides the basis for an attractive solution to the 
bridging problem, and establishes a framework within which we can better 
understand the normative significance of consent. 
 
4.1 Interests and Rights 
 




‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being 
equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for 
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.1 
 
Faced with this definition we might reasonably ask two questions. First, 
when will X’s interests be sufficient to hold some other (Y) under a duty? Second, 
what is the precise nature of the duty that flows from a right?  
For our purposes, we can assume an answer to the first question. More 
specifically, we can assume some account of why it is that Y will owe it to X to act 
or not act in certain ways, such that Y owes X a directed duty, when X and Y’s 
interests stack up in a certain way.2 There are many clear examples in which we 
believe this relation to hold between X and Y, and it is plausible enough that the 
justification is grounded in X and Y’s interests.3  For example, X’s interests in not 
being harmed will generally be such that Y has a directed duty to X not to assault 
her. There are a variety of possible accounts that might be relied on to give an 
account of why, in certain cases, this normative relation will obtain. We might, for 
instance, rely on T. M. Scanlon’s contractualist theory, according to which “an act is 
wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of 
principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject 
as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement.”4 Alternatively, we might rely 
on a non-contractualist non-consequentialist account that considers the implications 
of adopting certain principles.5 Finally, we might adopt some form of sophisticated 
consequentialism.6 All that is ruled out are those forms of utilitarianism and 
consequentialism, according to which right and wrong is simply a matter of 
promoting the agent-neutral good. This is no significant restriction since, on these 
                                                
1 The Morality of Freedom, p. 166. 
2 It is unclear whether Raz himself conceives of the duties in question as directed duties. Frances 
Kamm suggests that he does not. See her Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible 
Harm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 244-45. 
3 See Gopal Sreenivasan, “Duties and Their Direction.” 
4 What We Owe To Each Other, p. 153. This formulation leaves open the precise explanation for why 
Y will owe a directed duty to X, rather than simply act wrongly by acting on a principle that could 
have been reasonably rejected by others. I assume that the explanation will centre on the idea that in 
certain circumstances, given the various considerations in play, X is the agent who could reasonably 
reject a principle that licensed Y to act in a certain manner. Cf. Rahul Kumar, “Contractualism,” in 
The Routledge Companion to Ethics, ed. John Skorupski (London: Routledge, 2010). 
5 For some suggestive remarks see Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 4-5. 
6 See, e.g., Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, “The Truth in Deontology,” in Reason and Value: Themes 
from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, eds. R. Jay Wallace et al. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
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forms of utilitarianism and consequentialism, there is no interesting sense in which Y 
has directed duties to X that X may waive by giving consent.  
Even assuming this much, we still lack an account of why X’s interests will 
yield duties of a particular kind. On Raz’s view, duties are marked out by their 
distinctive structure.  
 
The connection between rights and duties establishes that rights are 
special considerations, since duties are. […] Duties are special in the role 
they assume in practical reasoning. Their role cannot be captured by the 
usual weighing metaphor which applies to the evaluation of ordinary 
reasons. They have pre-emptive force. The point is seen clearly when we 
consider again the duty to obey a legitimate authority. It is special since 
being pre-emptive it replaces rather than competes with (some of) the 
other reasons which apply in the circumstances.7 
 
The idea that duties are preemptive has two features that are worth drawing 
attention to. First, as Raz says, a duty is preemptive because it “replaces rather than 
competes with (some of) the other reasons”. To see this idea, consider an arbitrator 
A who is making a judgment on a dispute between X and Y about whether they 
should take Route 1 or Route 2.8 If X and Y agree to regard A’s judgement as 
binding then A’s judgement will have preemptive force for both X and Y, in that it 
should replace the reasons that bear on the question of which route to take in their 
practical deliberations. That is, when A makes the decision that they should take 
Route 1, Y can no longer appeal to the reasons in favour of taking Route 2 because 
the whole point of asking A to arbitrate was to have him consider the various reasons 
and make an authoritative judgement. Thus, when A has made a judgement, the 
reasons for and against taking each route have been replaced by the judgement made 
by A about which is the best way to go. 
Rights play a similar preemptive role. To see what this means, consider the 
fact that the interests of agents often give other agents first-order reasons for action 
even where they do not ground a right. For example, the fact that it would be in your 
interest to succeed in your project gives me a reason to help you, even though you 
will not usually have a right that I help. Or, the fact that you are running late for a 
                                                
7 The Morality of Freedom, p. 186. 
8 This is a variation of Raz’s example, ibid., pp. 41-2. 
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meeting gives me a reason to let you go before me in the queue, but again, that 
interest presumably grounds no right on your part. However, where your interests are 
sufficient to ground a right, your right pre-empts or replaces the reasons given to me 
by the interests that justify your right. Consider, for example, X’s right against Y’s 
touching her body. Most likely, X has a range of interests (e.g. in not experiencing 
pain, in having control, etc.) that coalesce to justify this right. Assuming the right is 
justified, X’s right gives Y a reason not to touch X’s body. Yet this reason is not to 
be added to the reasons Y already has for touching or not touching X’s body that are 
grounded in X’s various interests. Rather, X’s right replaces those reasons, and so 
Y’s reason for not touching X derives from X’s possession of this right. Moreover, 
once we have established that X’s right is justified (by her various interests), Y will 
be precluded from appealing to X’s underlying interests as a justification for his 
course of action. Instead he can only appeal to the reasons given to him by X’s right. 
To continue the analogy from above, just as Y can no longer appeal to the reasons in 
favour of Route 2 once the arbitrator has made a judgement on the best route, Y can 
no longer appeal to the first-order reasons that would otherwise be given to him by 
X’s interests if it has been concluded that those interests are protected by X’s 
possession of a right.    
The second feature of rights and duties is that they do not only give us first-
order reasons for acting or not acting (e.g., a reason not to touch your body), but also 
second-order exclusionary reasons to disregard some of the competing first-order 
reasons. According to Raz, an exclusionary reason is, “a second-order reason to 
refrain from acting for some reason.”9 This is most easily seen by way of an 
example. If X has a right against Y touching her body, such that Y has a correlative 
duty, this means that Y has a first-order reason not to touch X’s body and a second-
order reason not to act for some of the competing reasons, such as Y’s great desire to 
touch X, the medical knowledge that might be gained by allowing Y access to X’s 
rare biological material, or the usefulness of using X’s body to bridge a gap over a 
small river.10 
                                                
9 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, p. 39. 
10 I cannot settle the question here of how we are to draw the exclusionary scope of rights and duties, 
nor what the exclusionary zone will consist in in any particular case. I rely instead on what I take to 
be intuitive examples. For some related discussion see David Owens, “Rationalism about Obligation,” 
European Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 3 (2008) pp. 426-27. 
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We can refine the idea that rights and duties have preemptive force by saying 
that they are protected reasons.11 Protected reasons are first-order reasons to act (or 
not act) in some way, coupled with a second-order exclusionary reason to disregard a 
number of competing first-order reasons. If X has a duty to help Y then, then this 
gives X a protected reason for action: a first-order reason for providing assistance 
coupled with an exclusionary reason to disregard some competing considerations, 
e.g., the fact that X’s favourite TV programme is on, or his desire to take a walk 
rather than help Y.12 So, on Raz’s view, to say that X has a right means that X’s 
interests are sufficient to hold some other person (Y) under a duty, where Y’s duty 
amounts to Y having a protected reason.  
I find this view of rights and duties compelling. Whilst there is some question 
about how exactly we should understand the exclusionary nature of rights and 
duties,13 Raz’s analysis nicely captures a common view about rights. On most 
theories, rights are not only first-order considerations for or against some action, to 
be weighed equally along with all other considerations that could sensibly bear on 
the issue. Rather, rights are significant precisely because they serve to pre-empt 
consideration of some first-order reasons by replacing them with a single reason to 
act or not act in some way, whilst also excluding a range of competing 
considerations, so that those considerations are no longer relevant in determining 
whether a course of action is permissible or impermissible.14 Moreover, one need not 
be an interest-theorist in order to accept this account of rights’ structure.15 
                                                
11 On protected reasons in general see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 17-19; Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, p. 
191; John Gardner, “Justifications and Reasons,” in Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the 
Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 105; Owens, “Rationalism 
about Obligation,” pp. 411-12.  
12 A may also have a positive second-reason for providing assistance, i.e. a reason to act on his first-
order reason, insofar as this is what required of friends. This complication need not detain us here. 
13 In particular, whether duties should be thought of as giving us second-order exclusionary reasons, 
or whether they should be thought of as shaping deliberation without themselves constituting reasons. 
See Owens, “Rationalism about Obligation.” 
14 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron’s “Introduction,” in his edited collection Theories of Rights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 14; Leif Wenar, “Rights.” It is worth noting that, whilst there are 
different vocabularies available for talking about the structure of rights and duties, I believe that most 
adherents to the view that rights and duties are robust moral considerations which play an 
independent role in moral thought will agree with the broad outlines of Raz’s conceptual schema even 
if they would disagree with some of the details. Thus I will continue to use the Razian language of 
exclusionary and protected reasons to capture a broader family of views, whilst acknowledging that 
some theorists may prefer to employ different terms or concepts to capture the same fundamental 
ideas.  
15 See, e.g., Frances Kamm, Intricate Ethics, p. 237. Of course, if one is not an interest-theorist then 
one will not conceive of rights as replacing reasons grounded in interests (or, at the least, one would 
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Furthermore, understanding rights as having this preemptive structure also 
provides a way of thinking about one of the central problems we came across in 
Chapter 2, concerning the relationship between our individual interests and the 
normative relations that hold between us. As we saw in the discussion of harmless or 
bare wrongings, X can be wronged by Y even if none of X’s interests are in fact set 
back by Y’s actions. For example, if Y takes a mouth swab from X without X’s 
consent, but without setting back any interest of X’s, then Y will still wrong X. More 
important for our present purposes, it is also the case that X can forestall this wrong 
by giving Y consent, even though her consent will not necessarily communicate or 
affect her underlying interests. This is why we were unable to adopt any direct 
theory of consent according to which X’s consent has normative significance 
because it either communicates or affects what is in her interests such that Y no 
longer wrongs her by taking the swab. However, if we conceive of rights as 
protected reasons, we can say that the fact X has a preemptive right against being 
touched by Y means that Y wrongs X by violating X’s right by acting without X’s 
consent. Since X’s right constitutes a protected reason this right pre-empts the 
reasons otherwise grounded in X’s interests, and so Y is unable to claim that he has 
not done anything wrong since he did not set back (nor, let us assume, seriously risk 
setting back) any of X’s underlying interests. Yet if X gives consent then, even 
though she will not directly affect what is in her interests, she will cancel the 
protected reasons constituted by her right, thereby making it permissible for Y to 
take the swab.16 
The question, then, is whether preemptive rights of this kind can be justified 
in a manner consistent with an interest-based view, and, furthermore, whether we 
can justify a power to (at least sometimes) cancel these protected reasons by giving 
consent. Notice that our assumption that there is some account that explains why Y 
will owe X directed duties when their interests stack up in a certain way does not 
take us all the way to account of why those duties will take on the structure of 
protected reasons. For all that has been said, we could think that Y will only wrong 
X by violating a directed duty when X and Y’s interests have a certain weight in 
                                                                                                                                     
need to say more about why rights would do so). Nonetheless, it is plausible to think that on an 
alternative account, rights will still replace some of the first-order reasons that flow from whatever is 
supposed to ground rights.   
16 I give a detailed account of the way in which consent affects rights and reasons for action in Section 
5.3.4. 
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relation to one another. But this will leave us unable to provide an interest-based 
account of harmless wrongings and of the power of consent. So we need an 
argument for why rights and their correlative duties will have the structure of 
protected reasons, reasons that can be cancelled through the giving of consent. In the 
remainder of this chapter I take up the first challenge, turning to the second 
challenge in Chapter 5.  
 
4.2 Two Unsuccessful Strategies 
 
How then are we to justify rights with a preemptive structure? Whilst Raz’s account 
appears to map onto our understanding of rights in important ways, we now need to 
account for the fact that (i) rights replace some of the other reasons for action agents 
might have had (i.e. those grounded in the interests that justify rights), and (ii) rights 
exclude what otherwise appear to be relevant considerations from the pool of 
available reasons for action. Such an account is necessary, because the proposed 
understanding of rights may otherwise seem to give interests more weight than they 
deserve. After all, if the interests of agents already give rise to first-order reasons for 
action, why should rights and duties supplant those reasons, and exclude other 
reasons from consideration? 
Raz himself offers two possible responses to this challenge. First, Raz 
suggests an instrumental strategy.17 Assuming that rights tend to protect significant 
interests of the right-bearer, it might be that if agents treat one another’s rights as 
protected reasons they will better comply with the first-order reasons given to them 
by one another’s interests. Take my right against being assaulted. An instrumental 
justification for treating this right as a protected reason would point to the fact that, 
in general, I will be harmed in significant ways if I am punched or hit by others, such 
that my life will go worse for me if they do so. As a result, other agents are likely to 
better comply with the reasons they have (those reasons grounded in my interests) if 
they simply deliberate about how to act by replacing the need to consider my 
                                                
17 This line of thought is suggested by Raz in a number of places. See, generally, Practical Reason 
and Norms. See also Gardner, “Justifications and Reasons,” pp. 105-06. It may be that, in the contexts 
it is most frequently invoked by Raz (e.g. practical authority), this instrumental strategy is sufficient, 
despite what I go on to say about rights in the text. That may be because, unlike most moral rights, the 
value of political authority is plausibly purely instrumental. 
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underlying interests with a first-order reason not to punch me, and a further second-
order reason not to include a number of other considerations (e.g. the enjoyment they 
might get from punching me). Whilst my interests may not be seriously set back in 
all the cases in which someone might assault me, other agents will better comply 
with the reasons they have if they never consider my underlying interests against 
being hit, or weigh certain reasons in favour of hitting me, in their deliberations. 
That is to say, we will maximize compliance with certain reasons, such as those 
grounded in the interests of agents, if we treat rights as protected reasons, and this 
justifies regarding them as such. 
 Whilst this instrumental justification might be able to explain why it 
generally makes sense to treat rights as protected reasons in our practical 
deliberations, since doing so is more likely to lead agents to comply with the reasons 
they have, it fails to explain something more important, namely, why another agent 
would wrong me by assaulting me if they correctly reasoned that doing so would not 
set back any significant interest of mine, or would in fact better serve my interests. 
After all, if the justification for seeing rights as protected reasons is that this better 
serves my interests, then what cause for complaint could I have in such a case? 
Moreover, on this account, whether we are justified in regarding certain reasons as 
protected reasons is a purely epistemic matter, turning on whether the epistemic 
position of an agent means that they are sufficiently more likely to serve or protect 
the interests of others if they regard some reasons as protected. Yet it is hard to see 
how the outcome of this epistemic investigation bears directly on the question of 
moral rights and wrongs. I may, for instance, better serve all of your interests by 
always doing as you say, but this hardly means that you have a right that I do what 
you say. Thus, the instrumental justification will not succeed as an account of moral 
rights because it is both under- and over-inclusive. It is under-inclusive because it 
cannot explain why an agent is not permitted to consider and weigh your first-order 
interests when they are in a good epistemic position to do so. It is over-inclusive 
because it wrongly implies that in any case that another agent would better serve 
your interests by treating certain reasons as protected you have a moral right that 
they do so.  
The second strategy suggested by Raz is somewhat more complicated. He 
argues that often the full justification of a right will not only depend on the interests 
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of the individual right-holder, but also the interests of others.18 For this to be the case 
the interests of others must coincide with the interests of the right-holder. For 
example, a parent may have a right to a payment of child benefit from the 
government, even though the payment is justified in large part by the fact that it will 
serve the interests of the child and not the parent (although the right will contribute 
to the parent’s well-being since it supports a valuable caring relationship between 
parent and child).19 Raz also argues that many important civil and political rights are 
partly justified by their contribution to the common good, “goods which, in a certain 
community, serve the interest of people generally in a conflict-free, non-exclusive, 
and non-excludable way.”20 Raz claims that freedom of contract, freedom of 
marriage, freedom of occupation, and freedom of speech are all such examples.  For 
instance, whilst protecting an individual’s right to freedom of speech may come at 
significant cost, and the interests of the speaker alone in being able to speak freely 
may not obviously have sufficient weight to justify holding others under a duty not 
to interfere, protecting rights to free speech in general will support a common liberal 
culture in which agents can share opinions, learn, acquire information, and so on, 
and this culture constitutes a common good that will benefit all of those within a 
community. Raz elaborates: 
 
This explains why civil and political rights which are the prize of the 
official culture of liberal democracies do not enjoy a similar place in the 
estimation of most ordinary people. Many people judge them by their 
contribution to their well-being, and it is not much. Their real value is in 
their contribution to a common liberal culture. That culture serves the 
interests of members of the community. Given the great contribution that 
observance of the civil and political rights of individuals makes to the 
preservation of the common good, it would be irrational not to let that 
fact be reflected in the value of rights.21    
 
 Raz’s argument does not take us all the way to an account of why it is that 
rights should have preemptive force, but the gaps might be filled in by claiming that 
it is only by regarding rights as having a preemptive character that they are able to 
                                                
18 See Raz, “Rights and Individual Well-Being,” in Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the 
Morality of Law and Politics, Rev. Ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
19 Ibid., pp. 50-1. 
20 Ibid., p. 52. 
21 Ibid., p. 55. 
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support a valuable common culture. For instance, only by regarding the right to free 
speech as something that cannot be weighed against some possible reasons for 
interference (e.g. offensiveness) can free speech rights support and facilitate an open 
liberal culture.22 On this view, the justification for regarding (at least some) rights as 
protected reasons as opposed to a simple reflection of the weight of agents’ interests, 
is that this is necessary in order to foster and protect a shared liberal ethos. 
  I find this idea somewhat appealing, and think that, as an account of political 
rights such as freedom of speech, there may be something important in the idea. I 
certainly agree that it is far from obvious that an individual’s interests in free speech 
alone can justify a right with the degree of stringency that we take that right to have, 
but that the community at large will benefit from a culture that supports free 
speech.23 However, whatever the ultimate success of this strategy, I do not think that 
this account can establish a satisfactory justification for the preemptive structure of 
rights in the cases we are most interested in. Think back to examples such as the 
harmless mouth swab or the harmless trespass. It is perhaps not implausible to say 
that the community at large will benefit from living in a culture within which agents 
are not permitted to take mouth swabs or use other’s property without permission, 
and it might be suggested that we can rely on this idea to account for the preemptive 
nature of X’s rights over her body or property even where she has no significant 
interests at stake. Yet this account cannot obviously explain something important 
about the nature of the duties that Y owes to X in these examples, namely, the fact 
that they are directed duties.24 
 As I noted in Chapter 1, claim-rights ground directed duties, such that the 
right-holder (X) stands to be wronged by the duty-bearer (Y) where Y violates X’s 
right. Moreover, this fact seems important in accounting for how it is that X could 
waive her right and therefore release Y from her duty by giving consent, since unless 
                                                
22 It is important to note that on one reading, Raz is simply presupposing the preemptive character of 
the rights in question, and arguing for the conclusion that the interests of others, where they coincide 
with the interests of the right-holder, can affect the stringency of the right. Thus, while I am relying 
on the common culture argument as a possible tool for solving our puzzle, it may not have been 
designed to play anything like this role, which would help to explain why it is ultimately 
unsuccessful. If this reading is correct then it simply leaves us back where we started: without an 
adequate justification for the preemptive structure of rights. 
23 Although it may be possible to support such a culture, or at least a culture in which those with 
useful or important things to say have their speech protected, without extending stringent rights of 
free speech to everyone, in which case Raz’s approach may be subject to a significant challenge. On 
this point see Kamm, Intricate Ethics, p. 246.   
24 I leave it open whether we think of rights such as the right to free speech in the same way. If so, the 
following objection may represent a wholesale rejection of Raz’s position. 
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the duty is owed to X it is not clear how she (or her representative) could have any 
standing to release Y from that duty. Thus, we want to retain the idea in the cases 
with which we are concerned that Y owes X a directed duty. However, justifying the 
preemptive nature of rights partly by appeal to the interests of others or to the 
common good seems to distort this directional element. If the preemptive structure of 
X’s right somehow depends on the interests of others in X’s community (A, B, C…), 
such that X’s interests are not sufficient to ground Y’s duty, it is unclear why we 
should think of Y’s duty as a directed duty (even if X figures in the content of Y’s 
duty).25 Indeed, where X has no interests in whether Y takes the swab or uses her 
house we might describe Y as having a duty to the community not to act in these 
ways, and not to X herself. But we then lack an explanation of the kind we require, 
an explanation for why the directed duty Y owes to X constitutes a protected reason, 
since Y’s duty does not seem to be a directed duty at all.26 
 
4.3 A Relational Theory of Rights 
 
We are assuming that rights are grounded in interests, and trying to account for the 
preemptive structure of rights in a way that is consistent with that assumption. In 
what follows, I offer an account of the preemptive structure of rights that is 
motivated by the following observation. In our interactions with others we do not 
only value whether others act in ways that, as it happens, serve or set back our 
morally significant interests,27 but are also concerned with the way in which others 
relate to us. That is, we are also concerned with the ways in which others take our 
interests into consideration when deliberating about what to do. Moreover, we 
further value others’ ability to understand that we recognise them as bearers of 
                                                
25 See Kamm, Intricate Ethics, pp. 244-45. 
26 This mirrors a criticism of conventionalist accounts of promising. Some have sought to explain 
promissory obligations by pointing out that the practice of promising is socially beneficial, and that, 
were we to rely on this practice without in fact keeping our promises, we would free-riding on a 
useful convention, and damaging or undermining a practice which is beneficial for the community at 
large. But this explanation cannot obviously explain why X will wrong Y in particular when X breaks 
a promise he made to Y. That is, this conventionalist strategy cannot obviously explain why X owes 
Y a directed duty. 
27 I shall use the term “morally significant interests” to refer to those interests that agents have a claim 
to be taken into consideration by others. I doubt there is any principled line to be drawn between 
interests that are and interests that are not morally significant in this sense, and suspect that whether 
an interest is morally significant will depend partly upon the context.  
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interests worthy of protection. I suggest that these observations render plausible the 
idea that agents possess a set of relational interests: interests in being able to 
recognise the ways in which they relate to one another. These interests are, I will 
argue, crucial in explaining why interest-based rights constitute protected reasons. 
Moreover, justifying protected reasons in this way will allow us to capture one of the 
central animating ideas of status-based views, according to which the possession of 
rights is, in Nagel’s words, “seen as the expression of a status whose value for 
individuals cannot be reduced to the value of what actually happens to them.”28    
 
4.3.1 Relational Interests 
 
I am assuming that moral agents owe one another at least some consideration of their 
interests, and that in some instances those interests will be such that Y owes it to X 
to act (or not act) in a certain way, and will wrong X by not acting (or acting). The 
question is: why are moral agents unable to rely on the first-order moral 
considerations (including one another’s interests) that obtain, and weigh these 
against one another in order to decide what, morally speaking, they ought to do? 
Indeed, it might be suggested that what is really at stake in our general moral 
relations is the fact that all agents have a set of basic interests that we ought to 
promote and protect, and that moral rights have no significance over and above 
articulating those interests, and guiding us towards their promotion and protection. 
Why then must we introduce protected reasons into the picture? 
We can make progress by first noticing that we are not only concerned with 
whether others act in ways that, as it happens, serve or set back our morally 
significant interests.29 We further care about the way in which others relate to us; 
that is, with the way in which they take our interests into consideration when 
deliberating, and, more generally, the question of whether they treat us with the 
appropriate level of concern, respect, or regard. For instance, we are likely to 
seriously resent someone who pushes us off a cliff, even if, as it happens, a large bed 
of feathers breaks our fall; or someone who drives recklessly whilst drunk, although, 
                                                
28 Thomas Nagel, “Personal Rights and Public Space,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 24, no. 2 
(1995), p. 92. 
29 I focus here on the concern others have for our own morally significant interests, but I assume we 
are also concerned with the way in which others relate to third-parties, including both loved ones 
(children, friends), as well as complete strangers (e.g. the disregard a dictator shows for his subjects).  
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as it happens, they do not cause anyone harm.30 As Niko Kolodny has said, “It 
matters to us not only that…people and things fare well in nature: that they escape 
harm, flourish, and so on. It matters to us also that they are properly regarded by 
others.”31  
More positively, it does not seem far-fetched or unfamiliar to claim that we 
relate to others in a morally decent and valuable way when we recognise that they 
are bearers of interests worthy of protection; that they, like us, are agents who have 
lives that can go more or less well, and that we have reason (within limits) to protect 
and promote their well-being. Indeed, the idea that we relate to others in a 
particularly valuable way when we recognise them as having moral claims is a 
popular one amongst moral philosophers. For instance, Scanlon claims that when we 
deliberate and act in accordance with principles that others could not reasonably 
reject, we stand in a relation of “mutual recognition” with them, a relation that is 
“appealing in itself – worth seeking for its own sake.”32 What is more, Scanlon 
thinks the appeal of standing in this kind of relationship with others is crucial to a 
proper understanding of moral motivation.33 More concretely, many recent 
discussions of social justice and democratic institutions have focused on the 
importance and value of citizens standing in a certain kind of relationship with one 
another – a relationship of equality.34 For instance, David Miller discusses “the ideal 
of a society in which people regard and treat one another as equals,”35 and Elizabeth 
Anderson argues for a theory of democratic equality that “views equality as a social 
relationship.”36 Clearly, these authors are not only concerned with the way in which 
our actions affect one another’s interests, but also with our attitudes toward one 
another, with whether (in this case) we regard others as having an equal claim to 
                                                
30 Kumar, “Who Can Be Wronged?” p. 103.  
31 Niko Kolodny, “Which Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents and Children,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 38, no. 1 (2010), pp. 43-4. See also Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 
188. 
32 Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, p. 163. See also his Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, 
Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), esp. pp. 139-41; and R. Jay 
Wallace, “The Deontic Structure of Morality,” in Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the 
Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, eds. David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker, and Margaret Olivia Little 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 161.  
33 See What We Owe To Each Other, pp. 153-58. 
34 Elizabeth S. Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109, no. 2 (1999); David Miller, 
“Equality and Justice,” Ratio 10 (1997); Daniel Viehoff, “Democratic Equality and Political 
Authority,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 42, no. 4 (2014); Niko Kolodny, “Rule Over None II: 
Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 42, no. 4 (2014). 
35 Miller, “Equality and Justice,” p. 224. 
36 Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” p. 313. 
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shaping the social world within which we live, and to the products of social 
cooperation, and whether they, in turn, recognise us as having an identical claim.   
 So far, however, it might appear as if the relevant form of recognition or 
regard can be guaranteed by appropriately weighing certain considerations in one’s 
practical deliberations. For instance, I relate to others as a democratic equal when I 
recognise their various interests in autonomy, democratic participation, and so on, 
and regard them as therefore having a claim to participate. None of this, it may seem, 
requires the invocation of protected reasons. Yet something important is still missing 
from this picture. To appreciate this we need first to see that we are not only 
concerned with how others relate to us in the abstract, but with actually being able to 
recognise whether others treat us with the appropriate level of concern; so that we 
may understand, in our concrete social relations with others, how they relate to us. 
Rousseau draws our attention to this aspect of interpersonal interactions when he 
says: 
     
As soon as men had begun to appreciate one another and the idea of 
consideration had taken shape in their mind, everyone claimed a right to 
it, and one could no longer deprive anyone of it with impunity. From here 
arose the first duties of civility even among Savages, and from it any 
intentional wrong became an affront because, together with the harm 
resulting from the injury, the offended party saw in it contempt for his 
person, often more unbearable than the harm itself.37  
 
More recently, Philippa Foot makes a similar point: 
 
It is…important for the question of the needs of human beings that there 
is second-order evil in human life, meaning for instance the misery that 
comes from the consciousness of being disregarded, lonely or 
oppressed.38  
  
A central aspect of the idea that both Rousseau and Foot are articulating is 
that we are not only concerned with whether others’ actions impact upon our 
                                                
37 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men,” in 
The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p. 166, emphasis added. 
38 Philippa Foot, “Rationality and Virtue,” in Norms, Values, and Society, ed. Herlinde Pauer-Studer 
(Netherlands: Springer, 1994), pp. 210-11. 
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interests, but are also concerned with the reasons for which others act, and so the 
manner in which they take our interests into consideration when deliberating about 
how to act. To use Foot’s example, my ability to understand that my suffering 
derives from my membership of an oppressed group, such that when others harm me 
or disregard me they do so because they see “my kind” as inferior, will mean that my 
understanding of these attitudes constitutes a harm independently of the ways in 
which their actions set back other interests of mine.  More mundanely, if Y treads on 
X’s toe by complete accident then, at the most, X has reason to resent Y for being 
clumsy, and if it is clear to X that it was an accident then this is how X is likely to 
respond. Alternatively, if Y treads on X’s toe so as to deliberately inflict pain upon 
X, then even if this causes X exactly the same degree of pain, the significance of Y’s 
action will be quite different, since in this case Y disregards X’s interests and acts 
with the positive intention of causing X pain. Following Scanlon, we can say that the 
reasons for which an agent acts affects the meaning of their action, and that the 
meaning of the actions agents perform has important effects on the value of 
interpersonal interactions and relationships.39 
This idea – that we value having an understanding of the reasons for which 
others act, so as to understand the meaning of their actions and the way in which 
they relate to us – should, I think, strike most as familiar. I believe, in light of this, 
that we can conceive of human beings as having what I will call relational 
interests.40 In general, I will define relational interests as interests in understanding 
how others relate to us, where I mean by this the consideration others give to our 
interests in their practical thought and action.41 More specifically, we can identify 
two relational interests.42 First there is what might be thought of as a second-order 
interest in being able to recognise that others give appropriate consideration to our 
first-order interests (in avoiding pain, adequate nutrition, intellectual stimulation, and 
so on). Second, there is what might be described as a third-order interest in having 
                                                
39 See Scanlon, Moral Dimensions. 
40 More specifically, those human beings who are capable of understanding and making judgments 
about the reasons for which others act have relational interests. This may have important implications 
for the rights of young children and non-human animals (among others). See note 70 below.  
41 For further suggestive remarks about the importance of this kind of mutual understanding between 
agents, with a particular emphasis on Scanlon’s account of moral reasoning, see Rahul Kumar, “Who 
Can Be Wronged?” and also his, “Contractualism on the Shoal of Aggregation,” in Reasons and 
Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, eds. R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and 
Samuel Freeman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. pp. 131-38. 
42 The following list is not supposed to be exhaustive. There may be further instances of relational 
interests that I do not discuss here. 
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others recognise our second-order relational interest, that is, an interest in having 
others recognise and respond to the value for us of being able to understand how 
they relate to us. As I will now go on to argue, I believe that relational interests play 
a much more important role in structuring our moral relations with one another than 
has previously been recognised. 
 
4.3.2 Mutual Recognition and Normative Assurance  
 
Mutual Recognition. So far I have discussed the value for an individual agent of 
being able to comprehend the reasons for which others act, and so to understand the 
ways in which others relate to them. In some cases this may matter to us quite 
independently of any mutual understanding of the reasons for which we each act. For 
example, it may be unclear to a doctor or loved one who cares for someone suffering 
from locked-in syndrome that the patient understands their reasons for acting in 
various ways (partly because they may be unaware that they are suffering from 
locked-in syndrome), but it might still matter greatly to the patient that they can 
recognise the fact that others relate to them in a caring or loving manner. However, 
since those agents who have relational interests have them in virtue of the capacity to 
understand and make judgements about the reasons for which others act, in the 
majority of cases it will also be true that others will be able to appreciate the reasons 
for which they themselves act. Thus, if X has relational interests with regard to Y, 
then Y will also have relational interests with regard to X. 
 I now want to suggest that our mutual possession of relational interests 
makes an important difference to the value of many forms of interaction and 
relationship. Most, generally, I believe that we interact with one another in an 
intrinsically valuable way when we have a mutual understanding that we give one 
another’s interests the appropriate role within our practical deliberations. To help see 
this, consider the case of friendship. If Alison and Bert are friends they will have a 
variety of friendship-based reasons for action. For example, they ought to keep one 
another’s confidences, to provide emotional encouragement and support, to help in 
the pursuit of one another’s projects, and so on. Being a good friend requires Alison 
and Bert to recognise these reasons and give them the appropriate role within their 
practical deliberations. And in order to develop and maintain a friendship Alison and 
Bert must develop a mutual understanding that they each recognise these reasons, 
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and treat them accordingly. Moreover, Alison and Bert will each need to believe that 
the other believes that they recognise these reasons. For instance, if Alison believes 
that Bert believes that Alison does not really relate to Bert as a friend, because (she 
believes that he believes that) she does not respond to the friendship-based reasons 
for action she has, then this fact in itself will threaten, and potentially undermine, the 
relationship.43 
Thus, in order to engage in the valuable relationship of friendship, two agents 
will need to develop a mutual recognition44 of their relationship, that is, a common 
understanding of how they relate to one another. More specifically we can say that 
two agents achieve mutual recognition of a relationship where they have a common 
belief that they stand in that relationship, such that they are each bound by certain 
normative standards, where the idea of common belief can be characterised as 
follows: 
 
A and B have a common belief that p where: 
(i) A and B believe that p 
(ii) A and B both believe that the other believes that p 
(iii) A and B both believe that the other believes that they believe that p.45    
  
I take the claim that mutual recognition is partly constitutive of friendships 
value to be prima facie plausible, and see no obvious reason to reject it. I now want 
to suggest something that might appear to have less prima facie plausibility, namely, 
                                                
43 We can imagine that Alison is quite wrong about this, and that Bert actually believes that Alison is 
a friend to him. But if Alison continues to have the contrary belief then this will still threaten the 
relationship, since it is very difficult to be friends with someone who you believe thinks that you are 
not truly a friend to them.  
44 Note that my usage of the term “mutual recognition” differs in an important respect from the use 
made of it by Scanlon mentioned above. Whilst Scanlon suggests that individuals stand in a relation 
of mutual recognition with others when they act on principles that others could not reasonably reject 
(What We Owe To Each Other, p. 162), I am suggesting that two (or more) agents stand in a relation 
of mutual recognition when there is a common understanding that they each recognise certain 
normative standards as governing appropriate behaviour between them. Whilst I think these two uses 
are ultimately compatible, and believe that Scanlon still requires the idea that what might be called 
hypothetical mutual recognition is also valuable, I suspect that the appeal of Scanlon’s position partly 
derives from the value we recognise in concrete relations of mutual recognition such as those I am 
referring to in the text. For instance, it seems plausible that the value of standing “in unity with our 
fellow creatures” (p. 163) must extend beyond the hypothetical unity we might acquire by acting only 
on principles that we alone believe that others cannot reasonably reject, into our actually standing in 
social relations with others in which we jointly recognise the validity of certain principles.     
45 Tom Dougherty, “Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 43, 
no. 3 (2015), pp. 236-37. 
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that moral agents in general relate to one another in an intrinsically valuable way 
when they engage in relations of mutual recognition. Whilst this claim is more 
controversial, if I am correct to claim that, qua moral agents, we have relational 
interests, I think this suggests that the value of mutual recognition will extend to 
relations between moral agents in general. To be sure, these relations will be of quite 
a different nature to relations of friendship. But that does not imply that our ability to 
mutually recognise the fact that we give one another’s interests an appropriate role 
within our practical deliberations will not partly constitute a valuable form of 
interaction. Rather, it just suggests that the ways in which we are required to give 
one another’s interests a role in our deliberations, and so the moral reasons we each 
recognise, will be quite different. In according the interests of others an appropriate 
role in my deliberations I relate to them in a morally decent and valuable way by 
recognising them as bearers of interests worthy of protection. But given that in many 
cases they are capable of recognising whether or not I adopt this attitude, and that I 
in turn am capable of understanding whether they adopt a similar attitude toward me, 
it does not seem implausible to think that this mutual understanding can partly 
constitute a valuable form of relation between us.        
This may be, I think, somewhat hard to see, in part because these sorts of 
moral beliefs and structures are built into the fabric of our social world, and 
implicated throughout our social interactions, such that this form of recognition is 
perhaps surprisingly commonplace. I generally assume that others recognise me as 
having, at the very least, a set of basic moral rights, just as I recognise them as 
having the very same rights. This is valuable, at least in part, because we each 
understand one another as owing certain forms of moral treatment to each other, 
whatever further consequences this brings. In the same way that friends stand in a 
valuable relationship partly because they understand one another as friends, and 
therefore as recognising the friendship-based reasons for action they each have, we 
can see moral agents in general as interacting with one another in intrinsically 
valuable ways partly because they each recognise that they give one another’s 
interests an appropriate role within their deliberations.   
This may be easier to see in the negative. Imagine that I arrive in country C 
on a business trip. A local guide informs me that the inhabitants of C do not regard 
me as having the same moral rights as them, or indeed as having any moral standing 
whatsoever. They believe that since I am not from C I fall outside of the moral 
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community, and so am not worthy of (moral) concern. This discovery would 
significantly affect me and my thoughts about the relations I am able to have with 
the inhabitants of C.46 This would be true even if I could be guaranteed that my basic 
rights would be respected for other (say, financial) reasons, and even if I achieve 
exactly the same ends as I otherwise would have (e.g. signing the contract). The fact 
that the inhabitants of C do not regard me as having morally significant interests will 
impair the value of my relations with them because we cannot stand in a relation of 
mutual recognition.   
As this example helps to demonstrate, relations of mutual recognition, as I 
am using the term, only exist where particular individuals actually come into contact 
with one another, and understand one another as giving the other’s interests the 
morally appropriate role in their deliberations. Thus, I am not suggesting that moral 
agents “relate” to others in a morally decent way simply in virtue of an abstract 
commitment to give those others interests the appropriate role in one’s practical 
deliberations, or because they, unilaterally, act on what they take to be the correct 
moral principles. This is important because, as we will see below, the fact that the 
shared social conditions under which we actually live determine our ability to 
engage in relations of mutual recognition plays an important role in justifying the 
claim that rights constitute protected reasons. 
Normative Assurance. Before turning to this argument, however, I want to 
highlight another value attached to relations of mutual recognition. So far I have 
emphasised the intrinsic value of standing in relations of mutual recognition with 
others. But an understanding that others recognise certain reasons in their 
deliberations, and act in accordance with these reasons, can have a further 
instrumental value by providing agents with what I will call normative assurance:47 
the assurance that derives from believing that another agent (or agents) recognises 
certain normative standards – certain reasons, requirements, duties, and rights – as 
governing appropriate behaviour within a certain context.48  
                                                
46 Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, p. 76. 
47 I take the phrase “normative assurance” from Joseph Raz, “Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?” 
in Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law, eds. Gregory Klass, George Letsas, and Prince Saprai 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Raz claims that the point of promises is to provide 
promisees with normative assurance (p. 75), but does not develop this idea in the general way in 
which I do here. 
48 It should be noted that normative assurance need not be mutual, since A can believe B recognises 
certain reasons without B believing that A also recognises those reasons. However, insofar as 
normative assurance facilitates valuable forms of relationship and interaction both parties will need to 
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To see why normative assurance is important, consider again the case of 
friendship. If Alison confides in Bert then Bert has a duty to keep her confidences. 
This means that even if Bert loves to gossip, or if, because Alison is a celebrity, he 
could sell Alison’s story to a newspaper, he must refrain from doing so. Now 
obviously enough, being able to confide in one’s friends is an important aspect of 
friendship. Discussing various delicate matters can be cathartic, or open up a space 
in which to tackle and resolve difficult issues, as well as deepening our 
understanding of one another. Crucially, however, our ability to confide in someone 
generally depends upon our believing that we can trust him or her.49 Thus, the fact 
that Alison is aware that Bert has a duty to keep her confidences, and also believes 
that Bert recognises this duty, is an essential part of the explanation for why she feels 
she can confide in him. Mutual recognition between Alison and Bert of Bert’s duty 
provides Alison with normative assurance. And without this assurance, Alison would 
be reluctant to communicate openly with Bert, thus forestalling Alison and Bert’s 
ability to realise this valuable aspect of friendship. As this example shows, 
normative assurance need not be purely negative, that is, assurance that others will 
refrain from acting in certain ways. Normative assurance also has an important 
positive dimension insofar as it opens up a space within which two (or more) agents 
are able to engage in valuable activities, such as confiding in one another. 
We can develop the idea of normative assurance further by recognising that 
friends are in a distinct position to hold each other to certain expectations and 
requirements, and, furthermore, can reasonably blame the other if they fail to meet 
these expectations and requirements.  For instance, we can easily imagine Alison 
saying, “I know I can count on Bert,” or Bert thinking “I ought not to tell anyone 
about Alison’s secret,” and these statements make perfect sense of Alison’s blaming 
Bert if he fails to keep her confidences. As R. Jay Wallace has put it, friends stand in 
a nexus of relational normativity, such that one’s friend has “a kind of claim on you 
to attend to their interests and crises, and a special vulnerability to being injured or 
wronged if you should fail to take these considerations into proper account in 
deliberating about what to do.”50 Wallace elaborates: 
                                                                                                                                     
have such beliefs. Importantly, normative assurance can facilitate valuable forms of interaction where 
two agents have, and recognise one another as having, quite different reasons, e.g., a doctor and a 
patient; a manager and an employee; a parent and child. 
49 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, p. 133. 
50 Wallace, “The Deontic Structure of Morality,” p. 156, emphasis added. 
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The implication of your reason in a structure of this kind helps to give it 
the character of an obligation….It means that, quite independently from 
considerations of systematic importance, there is a definite sense in 
which you lack discretion to ignore or discount the reasons at the core of 
friendship.51   
 
Wallace claims, as do I, that the basis for this relational nexus of reasons is 
the value of the relationship in question,52 although he says little to explain how the 
value of such relationships connects to their particular normative structures. 
Plausibly, one important element in the explanation is that our understanding of 
ourselves and of others as implicated in these relational normative structures 
provides us with normative assurance. That Alison not only expects Bert to keep her 
confidences, but also understands herself as having standing to blame Bert if he fails 
to do so, partially constitutes a normative structure that facilitates and supports the 
valuable forms of interaction that friends usually engage in, by grounding 
expectations and requirements to which friends can hold one another accountable. 
As is true of the intrinsic value of mutual recognition, I want to suggest that 
normative assurance is just as valuable, if not more valuable, in the context of our 
general moral and social relations. If I can be reasonably assured that most of the 
members of my community will refrain from acting in certain undesirable ways (e.g. 
physically assaulting me, stealing my property, manipulating me toward their ends) 
because they recognise certain normative standards as governing appropriate 
conduct, then I am able to engage in the various activities that make up my life 
without fear or anxiety. Furthermore, if I have normative assurance with regard to 
those with whom I share a community then this provides an important basis for 
positive interactions with others, who may be perfect strangers, whether this is in the 
economic marketplace, the political arena, at the local chess club, or at the football 
ground.  
Of course, we do not believe that all others recognise exactly the same 
standards as we do, or that every single individual recognises even some basic 
claims (e.g. “Do not murder innocent people”). We are all too familiar with cases in 
which people disregard what we might think of as the most basic moral standards. 
                                                




But these cases, if anything, demonstrate just how important normative assurance is. 
For example, if we believe, correctly or incorrectly, that our city is likely to be the 
target of a terrorist attack, then this will significantly impact upon our ability to go 
about our business in a way we should like, and is likely to affect the nature of our 
relations with others in important ways. It may, for instance, forestall the possibility 
of friendly or mutually beneficial interactions with others, since the threat of the 
attack may give rise to widespread feelings of distrust and suspicion. Indeed, without 
some significant degree of normative assurance between the members of a 
community nothing like the form of social life with which we are familiar would be 
possible.53 Thus, normative assurance is something we should value highly, insofar 
as it supports and facilitates the various valuable modes of action and interaction that 
are central to living a valuable life. 
 
4.3.3 The Relational Requirement 
 
Let us take stock. So far I have argued that agents have relational interests – interests 
in being able to understand whether others give their interests the appropriate role in 
their practical deliberations – and that, in light of these interests, agents engage in an 
intrinsically valuable relationship when they mutually recognise one another as 
giving each other’s interests the appropriate role in their deliberations. Moreover, 
mutual recognition between agents also provides those agents with normative 
assurance, assurance that others recognise the authority of certain reasons, and thus 
will act in accordance with them.   
How do these claims help to justify the claim that rights constitute protected 
reasons? The central idea is this: in order to relate to others in a morally decent way 
we need not only to give their interests the appropriate weight within our practical 
deliberations, but also to act in ways that allow them to recognise that we give their 
interests the appropriate role within our deliberations, and thus recognise that we 
                                                
53 Cf. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 181. Consider, for example, the on-going social tensions in 
the United States concerning the relationship between the police and people of colour that have 
recently been brought to international attention through a number of high profile cases in which 
police shot and killed African Americans without good grounds. I take it that one reason why these 
cases have triggered a number of popular mass movements is because they imply that the police do 
not recognise the appropriate normative standards in their interactions with people of colour. Not only 
does this suggest a failure of appropriate recognition, but also undermines the normative assurance 
that many agents should have, with serious ramifications for their ability to live a flourishing life.     
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relate to them in a morally decent way, as bearers of interests worthy of protection. 
Relating to one another in this way serves our relational interests, provides a basis 
for valuable relations of mutual recognition, and further provides a basis for 
normative assurance, thereby enabling agents to act and interact in a wide variety of 
valuable ways. However, in order to recognise that we give one another’s interests 
the appropriate role within our practical deliberations, we must rely on commonly 
recognised fixed-points that establish a shared normative framework. Without such 
fixed-points agents would lack a measure against which to interpret and understand 
one another’s behaviour and form expectations that serve as the basis for normative 
assurance. Because a sole reliance on first-order moral considerations (including the 
interests of agents) will provide no such fixed-points, we must instead rely on (more 
or less) general normative standards that are commonly understood to govern 
behaviour in different spheres. Moral rights, understood as protected reasons, are one 
such fixed-point. Thus, on the view I am suggesting, protected reasons can be seen 
as playing an important role in establishing the social conditions necessary for the 
realisation of valuable relations of mutual recognition between moral agents. 
The idea, then, is that we cannot rely on the weight of one another’s interests 
(as well as other first-order moral considerations) as a sole guide to how we ought to 
relate to one another, because by doing so we undermine the possibility of mutual 
recognition between agents. In particular, I want to suggest that an interest-based 
theory of rights should understand the interests of agents as mediated through a 
relational requirement.      
 
Relational Requirement: moral requirements justified by the interests of 
agents must allow for mutual recognition between agents.   
 
There are two main reasons for thinking that the relational requirement would 
yield protected reasons.54 First, since we do not, at least in general, have direct 
                                                
54 It is plausible to think that there are a number of further reasons that I do not discuss in the text 
which further support a reliance on shared fixed-points. For example, Stephen Darwall claims that 
“Moral obligations entail moral accountability conceptually, and agents can be held accountable only 
if there exist general rules and principles that are accessible to all who are morally bound as a matter 
of common public knowledge” (“Morality and Principle,” in Thinking about Reasons: Themes from 
the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, eds. David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker, and Margaret Olivia Little 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 187). Alternatively, Erin Taylor has argued that, insofar 
as moral norms are mediated by social conventions, they must meet certain conditions, including a 
publicity condition, so as to coordinate the activities of the conventions participants. See Erin Taylor, 
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access to one another’s mental contents, interpreting and understanding the meaning 
of others’ actions requires making judgements about those actions in light of 
publicly available facts about which we can have common beliefs. Moreover, since 
agents themselves will generally intend their actions to be understood as having a 
particular meaning, they will need to rely on aspects of the situation that are 
accessible to all parties in order to portray the intended meaning of their acts. Thus, 
agents must rely on some form of shared framework through which they can 
represent their intentions, and interpret the intentions of others. Raz makes a similar 
point in a discussion about the importance of “social forms,” – that is, “the public 
perception of common social forms of action,”55 – in the pursuit of one’s goals. 
 
[O]ften when the goal concerns interaction between people, its very 
possibility depends on the partners having correct expectations about the 
meaning of other people’s behaviour. The significance of a thousand tiny 
clues of what is known as body language contribute, indeed are often 
essential, to the success of the developing relationship. All these are 
derived from the common culture, form the shared social forms, and 
though they receive the individual stamp of each person, their foundation 
in shared social forms is continuing and lasting.56  
 
The thought is that, because the interests of agents are not generally the 
subject of common beliefs between agents, they cannot straightforwardly serve as a 
basis for interpreting the meaning of one another’s actions, and so cannot serve as a 
basis for understanding how it is that we relate to one another.57 Even if we assume 
that X has full knowledge of Y’s interests, Y will be unlikely to know that X has this 
knowledge, such that Y would be unable to gauge the meaning of X’s actions with 
reference to whether or not X responded appropriately to her interests. Moreover, 
even if Y did know that X had this knowledge, Y would also need to be aware of all 
                                                                                                                                     
“A New Conventionalist Theory of Promising,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91, no. 4 (2013). 
Finally, there may be a number of relevant epistemic considerations.  
55 The Morality of Freedom, pp. 309-10. 
56 Ibid., p. 312. 
57 Clearly, there are some interests that we are likely to have common beliefs about, e.g., interests in 
adequate nutrition. However, two points should be borne in mind. First, as I go on to say in the text, 
unless we have common beliefs about all of the relevant considerations then our common beliefs 
about some basic interests will (at least generally) be insufficient to serve as a basis for mutual 
recognition. Second, whilst there is plausibly a number of general interests that all agents have, I 
assume that an agent’s particular interests at any given time are much more fine-grained, depending, 
for example, on her intentions, plans, relationships, tastes, and desires, such that they are much less 
likely to be the subject of common belief. 
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of the other first-order considerations relevant to X’s practical deliberations in order 
to know whether her interests were given the appropriate weight relative to those 
other considerations. And even in the far-fetched scenario where X has this 
knowledge, and Y reasonably believes X to have this knowledge, unless X also 
knows that Y believes he has it (that is, unless X and Y have common beliefs about 
all of the relevant first-order considerations) then X will still need to rely on publicly 
available considerations in order to make clear to Y that he is relating to her in the 
appropriate manner.   
By contrast, if we rely on a framework of rights about which we can much 
more readily have common beliefs, we are in a much better position to interpret the 
meaning of one another’s actions, and so to stand in relations of mutual recognition. 
The idea would be that in order to justify rights we would consider a range of 
interests (as well, perhaps, as other relevant moral considerations) across a range of 
possible circumstances, in order to make a judgement about the relative weights of 
these considerations in the usual cases. We would then mediate these interests 
through the relational requirement so that the judgements we have made could be 
relied upon to facilitate relations of mutual recognition. In those cases in which 
individuals tend to have morally significant interests that outweigh other possible 
considerations, we ascribe them a general right, which can be the subject of common 
knowledge.58 This would mean “protecting” the first-order reason to act or not to act 
in certain ways in light of the interests usually at stake by yoking a number of the 
relevant first-order moral considerations, and excluding a range of other 
considerations from the reasons for action that are admissible within an agent’s 
practical deliberations. For example, whilst our weighty interests in bodily integrity 
may occasionally be outweighed, their general significance justifies a general right 
to control over one’s own body. This is partly because a common belief in such a 
right will provide agents with a means of recognising one another as relating in a 
morally decent fashion and thus of standing in a relation of mutual recognition. If 
others violate this right we assume that they do not relate to us in a morally decent 
way, and they in turn know that we have this belief. On the other hand, if others 
respect our right we assume they relate to us in a morally decent fashion, by giving 
our interests the appropriate role within their deliberations.    
                                                
58 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, “A Right to Do Wrong” Ethics 92, no. 1 (1981), pp. 31-2. 
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The second reason for relying on a shared normative framework established 
by a set of commonly recognised rights is that such a framework can provide agents 
with a valuable kind of normative assurance that a reliance on first-order moral 
considerations alone could not. Even if we believed that all other moral agents did 
their utmost to understand and weigh all of the pertinent first-order considerations 
that applied in any given situation, the fact that we would be very unlikely to have a 
common belief about all of the relevant considerations would (even assuming a 
perfect ability to weight the considerations in question) prevent us from forming 
reliable expectations about the ways in which others will act.59  
Moreover, our mutual understanding that rights function to exclude a number 
of considerations from the pool of reasons for action can itself establish normative 
assurance and facilitate valuable forms of interaction between agents. To help see 
this, consider the example of promising. A valid promise gives rise to a duty on the 
part of the promisor. Thus, a promise gives rise to a protected reason, such that a 
conscientious promisor will, when it comes to the time of fulfilling the promise, 
recognise that at least some conflicting reasons (such as laziness or mild 
inconvenience) must be excluded from their practical deliberations. As Seana 
Shiffrin has argued, if agents lacked the ability to generate obligations by promising, 
but could only state present intentions, this would often leave others in a vulnerable 
position, a fact that would threaten to undermine the health of their relationship.60  
Shiffrin gives the example of A and B, who are considering whether or not to 
move to a new city.61 A is keen to move, but B, whilst open to the prospect, is less 
sure. Whilst moving may be good for B, B also has some alternative options 
elsewhere that she may be better off pursuing, options that A does not have. A is 
aware that B has these options and so does not want to invest in the move unless B is 
committed to moving. However, whilst B can state her intention to move, this 
intention is (ex hypothesi) not binding, and so B is free to change her mind. Given 
this, there is an imbalance of power between A and B with regard to the move, and 
                                                
59 For related discussion of the importance of assurance in assessing moral principles see Scanlon, 
What We Owe To Each Other, pp. 202-03. In the context of the law, John Gardner argues that 
criminal offences constitute protected reasons that thereby exclude all reasons against conformance 
with the law (unless the law also offers justificatory defences). See Offences and Defences, pp. 147-
48. Assuming this to be correct, I take it that a plausible motivation for the creation of criminal 
offences is precisely the fact that a common understanding of legally enforceable protected reasons 
provides a basis for normative assurance between co-citizens.  
60 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism.” 
61 Ibid., pp. 502-10. 
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this may damage their relationship: A may very well feel vulnerable and powerless, 
or she may decide not to invest because she cannot be sure B will go through with it, 
something that may set back both A’s and B’s interests.62 But, if B has the power to 
promise A she is able undercut this vulnerability, by committing to the move and 
committing herself to exclude some of the otherwise relevant considerations (e.g. 
B’s prospects in other cities), that may have led her to reconsider.63 Thus, the 
promise serves to neutralise the imbalance of power between A and B, something 
likely to help sustain a healthy relationship between them. 
Plausibly then, whatever the ultimate justification for this power – whether 
because it allows agents to provide others with reliable expectations,64 because it 
supports valuable relationships,65 or because it serves the promisee’s authority 
interest66 – it depends for its efficacy on our common belief that promises have the 
effect of excluding certain reasons for action, something that provides promisees 
with normative assurance.67 As Scanlon notes, “Anyone who understands the point 
of promising – what it is supposed to ensure and what it is to protect us against – will 
see that certain reasons for going back on a promise could not be allowed without 
rendering promises pointless.”68 
 
4.3.4 Rights as Protected Reasons 
 
Let me summarise the argument I have made so far before drawing out several 
implications of the view that I am defending, and considering some possible 
objections. 
Agents who have the capacity to recognise and assess the reasons for which 
others act possess relational interests, interests in being able to recognise whether 
others give their interests an appropriate role within their practical reasoning. In light 
of these interests, agents engage in a valuable form of interaction when they 
                                                
62 Ibid., p. 504. 
63 Shiffrin does not discuss the matter in terms of excluding some of the relevant considerations, but I 
think this is both compatible with and implied by what she does say. 
64 Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, Ch. 7. 
65 Joseph Raz, “Promises and Obligations,” in Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H. L. 
A. Hart, eds. P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); Shiffrin, “Promises, 
Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism.”  
66 Owens, Shaping, Ch. 6.  
67 Raz, “Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?” p. 75. 
68 Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, p. 200. 
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mutually recognise one another as giving the other’s interests the appropriate 
practical significance. However, in order to assess and interpret the meaning of 
other’s actions, and to gain the full benefits of normative assurance, we must rely on 
socially recognised fixed-points to structure our moral relations.69 Thus, we must 
mediate the interests of agents through a “relational requirement,” in order to 
establish rights that simultaneously protect the morally significant interests of agents 
and provide a basis for mutual recognition between them. This requires protecting 
some first-order reasons for action, thereby excluding a range of possibly conflicting 
considerations. Thus, partly in virtue of constituting protected reasons, moral (and 
legal) rights can be thought of as establishing a shared normative framework that 
allows agents to stand in concrete relations of mutual recognition.70  
Note that this is importantly different from Raz’s instrumental justification 
for protected reasons considered above. On that account, the preemptive structure of 
rights is justified by the fact that by deliberating in this way an agent is more likely 
to comply with the first-order reasons they have. This opens the door to considering 
an agent’s first-order interests on any occasion where doing so would better promote 
compliance with those first-order reasons. On the relational theory, by contrast, 
                                                
69 An interesting implication of this view is that social practices and conventions play an important 
role in allowing for decent and valuable moral relations between agents. I discuss some of these 
issues in Chapter 6. For some related discussion see Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 307-13; Raz 
“Individual Rights and Well-Being,” p. 42; Andrei Marmor, Social Conventions: From Language to 
Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Ch. 6; Taylor, “A New Conventionalist Theory of 
Promising.” This further suggests that the social conditions required to instantiate rights and make 
possible morally decent forms of interaction are an important common good. Cf. John Finnis: “The 
fact is that human rights can only be secured in certain sorts of human milieu – a context or 
framework of mutual respect and trust and common understanding.” Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
2nd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 216.  
70 Another implication of this view is that those individuals unable to understand and assess the 
reasons for which others act (e.g. young children and non-human animals) do not have rights that 
amount to protected reasons. This may strike some as an unsatisfactory result, but I think it is less 
problematic than it might at first appear. For one, I am not claiming that the only way we can wrong 
others is by violating rights that amount to protected reasons. As I noted at the beginning of the 
chapter, I am assuming some underlying theory of morally right and wrong action, and I assume that 
the correct theory does not regard the capacity to recognise and assess reasons as a pre-condition for 
being morally wronged. All that my theory implies is that these wrongs are to be characterised in 
terms of the weight of various considerations. Thus, there is an important sense in which these agents’ 
interests are protected, because their weight ensures that they will be wronged if others act (or do not 
act) in certain ways. The upshot is that whilst we can wrong rational agents by violating their rights 
even when we have very good reason to believe that the interests that justify the right will not be set 
back, we would not (necessarily) wrong non-rational agents by acting under the same circumstances. 
Furthermore, for all that has been said there may be further reasons (moral, epistemic, and pragmatic) 
for regarding non-rational agents as having rights that amount to protected reasons in the stronger 
sense. Finally, in the case of young children it seems plausible to think that they develop the capacity 
for some form of recognition at a very young age, and that it is further important to demonstrate to 
children that their interests play an important role in our motivations in order to ensure that they 
understand that we love and care for them.       
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relating to others in a morally decent way requires us not only to give others interests 
an appropriate role in our practical reasoning, but to act in ways that will enable 
them to recognise that this is how we relate to them, and for us, in turn, to 
understand that they do recognise this. This means that in order to relate to one 
another in a morally decent way we must rely on socially recognised fixed-points, 
including rights, as imposing constraints upon the considerations we can take into 
account in our practical deliberations. To be clear, I do not mean to imply that we are 
never permitted to reflect upon the range of first-order moral considerations that are 
at stake in any particular occasion. What is crucial is that, where others have rights, 
we cannot rely on the first-order considerations as a guide to our practical 
reasoning. That is to say, our reasoning about how to act should be constrained by 
protected reasons so that others are better able to understand that we relate to them in 
a morally decent way.   
An important implication of the relational theory is that the injury hypothesis 
– the claim that setting back some interest of an agent is a necessary condition for 
wronging them – is false. We wrong an agent when we violate some right of theirs, 
and their possession of a right is not directly tied to whether they have sufficient 
interests on any particular occasion.71 Rather, a preemptive right is justified when an 
agent’s interests, mediated through the relational requirement, justify a protected 
reason. Thus, according to the relational theory, the relationship between interests 
and rights is indirect. Whilst we establish which rights agents have with reference to 
a conception of their interests, the role of rights is not to directly promote and protect 
an agent’s morally significant interests, but to provide a basis for mutual recognition 
between agents. 
Thus, the relational theory I have outlined provides a solution to the problem 
of bare wronging without postulating normative interests. We can still wrong an 
agent by acting in a way that does not set back their interests because, in doing so, 
they will often be unable to recognise that we gave their interests the appropriate role 
within our deliberations. Consider, for example, the case in which Y takes a secret 
nap in X’s house. Imagine that X later finds out and asks Y for an explanation. If Y 
responds by saying, “You have no standing to blame me since, as I correctly judged 
                                                
71 For an interesting discussion of whether we can wrong agents even where they do not have a right, 




beforehand, I did not set back any of your interests by sneaking in and taking the 
nap” then X may well respond by saying, “That is besides the point. I have a right 
over my house and that right precludes you from considering my underlying 
interests, and also requires you to exclude certain considerations, such as your 
tiredness, from your deliberations. You are required to recognise this protected 
reason because we each have interests in standing a relation of mutual recognition. 
By failing to recognise my right, and treat it accordingly within your deliberations, 
you wronged me because I was unable to recognise whether you gave my interests 
the appropriate role within your deliberations. If you had asked me beforehand then I 
would have been able to see that you regard me as an agent who has morally 
significant interests.”  
More generally, we now have (partial) solution to the bridging problem.72 As 
I noted at the end of Chapter 1, the bridging problem asks how it is we move from an 
account of the morally significant interests of individuals to an account of moral 
rights and wrongs in a way that is consistent with our considered intuitions. One of 
the central intuitions that I assume we need to account for when advocating an 
interest-based view is the idea that moral rights (and our ability to waive those rights 
by giving consent) are not directly tied to an agent’s interests on a particular 
occasion. By breaking into my house, having sex with me without consent, or 
stealing my property you will wrong me whether or not you happen to set back my 
interests. According to the relational theory of rights, the explanation for this is that 
the interests of individuals must be mediated through the relational requirement: the 
need for moral agents to interact with one another whilst engaging in relations of 
mutual recognition. The idea, then, is that we can bridge the gap between interests 
and rights by mediating the interests of agents through the relational requirement. By 
doing so, the relational theory retains the idea that X’s rights against Y ground 
directed duties. Y owes it to X to act (or not act) in certain ways because a 
combination of X’s first-order interests and second-order relational interests suffice 
to hold Y under a duty to X. 
It is worth briefly contrasting this account of rights with a suggestion made 
by Owens about the role of obligations within relationships. Focusing on cases such 
                                                
72 The solution is partial because we still require an underlying theory about when an agent’s interests 
will be sufficient to hold others under a duty. As I noted toward the beginning of this chapter, I am 
simply assuming that such a theory is running in parallel, and think the account I am offering is 
compatible with a number of the most popular contemporary theories. 
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as friendship Owens argues that, “what underlies the obligation-entailing character 
of all such involvements is the fact that they serve our deontic interests, our interests 
in being bound to one another.”73 Thus, for Owens, special relationships such as 
friendship are partly good for us, and make our lives go better, simply in virtue of 
the fact that they involve obligations. Given Owens’s claims about other normative 
interests (e.g. the permissive interest and authority interest), we might extend this 
idea to moral rights in general: moral rights are partly in our interests because it is in 
our interests to be bound to one another. On the view I have just described this gets 
things wrong. My view might be characterised as claiming that we have an interest 
in engaging in a variety of relationships with others, from minimal kinds of decent 
moral interaction to friendships and romantic relationships, and that a valuable 
aspect of many such relationships consists in a mutual recognition that we relate to 
one another in the appropriate manner (where what is appropriate will partly depend 
upon the relationship in question). Since rights and duties facilitate mutual 
recognition, many such relationships involve rights and duties as part of their 
normative structure.  
The difference may seem subtle, but I believe it is important. In particular, 
the order of explanation is reversed. Whilst Owens claims that special relationships 
are partly valuable because they involve obligations, I claim that obligations are 
partly valuable because they allow for special relationships that involve mutual 
recognition. As Gerald Lang remarks, “The specific normative vulnerabilities and 
powers I accumulate as I get into these different involvements may be an essential 
by-product of those involvements, but they do not explain why the involvements 
matter to me.”74 Moreover, even if Owens were to claim that this accepts his main 
contention that our lives go better when we engage in relationships that entail 
obligations, and so, have interests in the existence of those obligation-entailing 
relationships, the account I have offered gives us a further explanation of how it is 
that our normative interests connect to our non-normative interests.75 We are thus 
able to explain why we should have deontic interests, and, furthermore, provide an 
explanation for why only some obligation-entailing relationships should be good for 
us and others not (e.g. friendship as compared to slavery). This all suggests that in 
                                                
73 Ibid., p. 96. 
74 Gerald Lang, “Book Review: Shaping the Normative Landscape,” p. 177. 
75 Indeed, if I am on the right lines then it is quite unclear how important an explanatory role deontic 
interests really play. For related discussion see Section 3.2.2 and 5.4. 
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order to explain rights and duties understood as protected reasons we need not 
conceive of ourselves as having irreducible normative interests.  
 The relational view also captures what I think is a central intuition that 
motivates proponents of status-based views of rights, namely that moral rights 
cannot be considered as merely instrumental to the promotion and protection of 
interests. Consider, for example, Frances Kamm’s claim that fundamental human 
rights “are not concerned with protecting a person’s interests, but with expressing his 
nature as a being of a certain sort, one whose interests are worth protecting. They 
express the worth of the person rather than the worth of the interests of that 
person.”76 According to the relational theory this is half-right. Moral rights do 
express the idea that agents have a certain status, that they are bearers of interests 
worth protecting, and that these rights cannot be reduced to the ways in which they 
happen to protect or promote those interests on any given occasion. Rather, relating 
to others in a morally decent way requires recognising these rights in our practical 
deliberations, whether or not our actions would, as it happens, set back the morally 
significant interests of others, so that they can understand us as relating to them in a 
morally decent way. However, the relational view retains the intuitive connection 
between an agent’s rights and their first-order interests. It simply claims that a full 
justification of rights grounded in these interests requires us to mediate those 
interests through the relational requirement.  
Moreover, this account of rights is also able to explain why rights are widely 
regarded as inviolable, as establishing a sphere over which an individual is 
authoritative, despite the common association of this idea with status-based views.77 
For one, the preemptive character of rights explains why rights are not just one 
further consideration to be weighed against others. Their exclusionary structure 
entails that many considerations are irrelevant, and this reflects the idea that an 
individual agent has a form of authority over the sphere protected by her right. 
Furthermore, the relational view claims that in order to relate to one another in a 
morally decent way we must reason in accordance with rights of this nature. Thus, 
rights ground demands that we do not have leeway to disregard or ignore. 
One possible objection to the relational view is that it wrongly implies that 
moral agents stand in some kind “relationship” with all other (rational) moral 
                                                
76 Intricate Ethics, p. 271. Emphasis added. 
77 See, e.g., Nagel, “Personal Rights and Public Space.” 
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agents.78 But this misunderstands the view. All the relational view claims is that 
when moral agents come into contact with one another it is valuable for them to 
engage in a relation of mutual recognition. Thus, I am not suggesting that the 
grounds for moral rights partly involve the fact that we already stand in some kind of 
personal relationship, but rather that the value of a certain form of interaction can 
justify preemptive rights so as to structure moral relations in such a way as to 
facilitate this valuable form of interaction. 
Alternatively, it might be objected that the relational view implies that the 
content of moral rights is determined by existing social practices, because I have 
claimed we must rely on socially recognised fixed-points in order to stand in a 
relation of mutual recognition. But again this is false. Whilst it is true on the 
relational theory that the social structures within which agents live will make a 
significant difference to their ability to relate to one another in morally decent ways, 
and achieve the relation of mutual recognition, it does not imply that the social 
structures that are justified are just those that already happen to exist. Rather, the set 
of moral rights that is justified are those that would serve to protect the morally 
significant interests of agents whilst allowing for valuable relations of mutual 




The central claim that I have advanced in this chapter is that we relate to one another 
in an intrinsically valuable way when we recognise one another as possessing 
(justified) rights. This is because recognition of such rights reflects the fact that we 
recognise each other bearers of interests worthy of protection, thereby allowing for 
the relation of mutual recognition. This fact can account for the preemptive structure 
of rights and duties, thus providing an explanation for harmless wrongings, and a 
more general response to the bridging problem. On the relational view I have 
outlined, whilst rights are grounded in the interests of agents, the connection 
                                                
78 For a discussion of a similar problem as applied to Scanlon’s moral theory, see R. Jay Wallace, 
“Dispassionate Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive Sentiments,” in Reasons and Recognition: 
Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, eds. R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 358-60. 
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between interests and rights is indirect. In order to establish which rights agents 
have, interests must be mediated through the relational requirement.  
 If the relational theory of rights is on the right track, what implications does 
this have for a theory of consent’s normative significance? Plausibly, if our rights are 
partly justified by our second-order relational interests in being able to recognise that 
we relate to one another in a morally decent way, our power of consent is also partly 
justified by these relational interests. That is to say, consent may be normatively 
significant not only because it promotes or protects our first-order interests, but also 
because it allows agents to interact with one another whilst recognising that they 
give one another’s interests the appropriate role within their deliberations. It is this 
possibility that I articulate and defend in the following chapter.   
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5  
A Relational Theory of Consent 
 
In this chapter I present a positive theory of consent’s normative significance. In 
Chapter 2 I suggested that we could rely on a central insight of the control theory, 
according to which the power of consent is connected to our need for a sufficient 
measure of control over our own lives, to help construct a sound theory of consent. 
With the account of rights outlined in the previous chapter now in place we are in a 
position to do this. Whilst there are many reasons why agents should want control 
over their own lives, many interests that will be served by their possession of this 
control, the power of consent is not normatively significant because it directly serves 
these interests. Rather, our control interests must be mediated through the relational 
requirement. I argue that this process yields preemptive control rights against 
interference in certain spheres, and also grounds an ability to waive (at least many 
of) these rights by giving consent. According to the relational theory of consent, 
consent is normatively significant because it allows agents to interact in useful and 
valuable ways whilst standing in a relation of mutual recognition. More specifically, 
the power of consent allows agents to interact whilst recognising one another as 




Before proceeding, it may be helpful to briefly recap on what exactly I take consent 
to consist in, and what I take to be the central desiderata for a theory of consent’s 
normative significance.  
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A gives consent to B when A acts with the intention of waiving a right he has 
against B.1 When A’s consent is valid B is no longer under the directed duty to act or 
refrain from acting in a certain way that is correlative with A’s right. That is to say, 
A gives B consent when A performs an act specifically with the intention of waiving 
B’s duty. In many cases, A’s consent will mean that B is now morally permitted to 
act in some way that was previously impermissible. By this I mean that A’s consent 
will often mean that some action of B’s is morally permissible all things considered. 
For example, if A gives B consent to borrow his car this will generally make it 
permissible for B to borrow A’s car. However, A’s consent does not ensure this all 
things considered conclusion. B may owe further duties to A, or to third parties, or 
have other decisive reasons, that mean B still ought not – all things considered – to 
borrow A’s car. So, whilst it is sometimes said that A’s valid consent provides B 
with a moral permission, this moral permission must be understood in the weaker 
sense that A’s valid consent ensures that B is no longer under a (specific) directed 
duty she previously owed to A.  
As I noted in Chapter 1, there are two central questions that a theory of 
consent’s normative significance should answer. First, there is the question of 
consent’s normative force. That is, why (when the relevant conditions are met) does 
an agent succeed in waiving a right of theirs when they perform an action with the 
intention of doing so? Why, for example, should A have the power to waive her 
property right over her car just by saying to B, “Sure, go ahead,” when B asks if she 
can borrow the car? Second, there is the question of consent’s relational significance. 
Why does the power of consent extend over directed, but not non-directed reasons, 
and why should we rely on the power of consent to manage the application of these 
directed reasons?  
With these two central questions in mind, we can list four desiderata for a 
plausible theory of consent’s normative significance. First, we need to be able to 
account for the authoritative nature of consent. Consent is authoritative in the sense 
that where an agent has the power to give or revoke consent then their giving or 
revoking consent will be sufficient to waive or reinstate their right and its correlative 
                                                
1 For the moment I leave open what constitutes an act of consent. I argue in Section 5.3.2 that my 
account of consent’s normative significance gives us reason to prefer a particular answer to this 
question. 
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duty.2 This means that, although the theory I advance is an interest-based theory, an 
agent’s consent is (if voluntary and suitably informed)3 sufficient to waive her right 
whether or not the consented to action will serve or track her underlying interests. 
A second desideratum is related. We are working on the assumption that 
consent is a normative power, such that an agent is able to affect the reasons for 
action that other agents have (in this case, via the rights and duties that obtain) just 
by performing an act with the intention of doing so. Since I aim to defend an 
interest-based theory of consent, we need a viable response to what Owens calls the 
problem of normative power, viz., how it is that an agent is able to affect the reasons 
for action that others have by declaration, without acting in any way so as to first 
affect her underlying interests. To better see the nature of this problem consider an 
example. If A has interests sufficient to ground a property right in her car, how is she 
able to affect the application of this right by mere declaration, since her declaration 
alone will be insufficient to affect what is in her interests. We have already seen that 
one plausible answer to this problem, which makes reference to the affect A’s 
choices will have on his interests, is inconsistent with consent’s authoritative nature, 
since A may consent to B’s taking his car without also choosing that she does so. 
Third, the theory should, if possible, track our pre-theoretical understanding 
of why consent is valuable. Philosophers and non-philosophers alike have often 
assumed that consent’s normative significance is explained by the fact that it is 
necessary to possess this power in order to live autonomously, or to ensure that an 
individual has the ability to choose what happens in important spheres of his or her 
own life. However, in Chapter 2 we saw that some common versions of this theory 
cannot satisfy the first two desiderata. In Chapter 3, we saw that David Owens’s 
theory of consent can satisfy the first two desiderata, but only at the cost of denying 
the connection between the power of consent and our interests in living lives that are, 
by and large, under our own control. I think that a preferable theory would meet the 
first two desiderata, whilst retaining the intuitive connection between the power of 
consent and the value for agents of having control over their own lives. 
Finally, we should assess the plausibility of our theory of consent partly in 
terms of its overall explanatory power. Two points are worth drawing explicit 
                                                
2 For ease of exposition I will mostly talk only of giving consent, and not also of revoking consent, 
since the same considerations apply in both cases.  
3 As before, I will assume that an agent’s consent meets these conditions unless otherwise stated. 
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attention to here. First, it will count in favour of the theory if it is clear how the 
explanation of consent’s normative significance offered relates to other familiar 
concepts in our moral thought and moral practices. This will allow us to better 
integrate the theory into an overall moral framework. Second, it will count in favour 
of the theory if the explanation offered provides a foundation for addressing further 
theoretical and practical questions about consent, e.g., what constitutes an act of 
consent, when we should rely upon consent to manage our interactions, what degree 
of voluntariness or information is required to ensure consent’s validity, and so on. In 
Chapter 3 I argued that we have reason to reject Owens’s theory partly in virtue of 
the fact that the explanatory power of the view is limited in both respects. If the 
relational theory to be articulated does better on these two fronts, and meets the other 
desiderata, then I believe this will give us decisive reasons to prefer the relational 
theory. 
 
5.2 The Value of Control 
 
We have many reasons for wanting to have control over our mind, body, and 
environment. By this I mean that we have many reasons for wanting to have control 
over these things in relation to other agents.4 Whilst living in a world with others 
means that we are very likely not to have full control, we highly value the 
boundaries that distinguish our sphere of legitimate control from the spheres of 
others. In what follows, I separate out some of the reasons as to why our possession 
of control in relation to others is valuable; why it is that we have significant interests 
in maintaining control over certain aspects of our own lives. I then suggest that one 
way in which personal control is ensured is through the distribution of rights. 
 
5.2.1 Control Interests  
 
I suggested in Chapter 2 that a plausible account of personal autonomy’s value 
would take the exercise of agency to be necessary for the living of an autonomous 
life. An agent who completely lacks the ability to exercise her agential capacities and 
                                                
4 Presumably, we also have reason to want control over these things in relation to non-agents, e.g., 
rocks, or weather patterns, but that is of no consequence here. 
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bring about different states of affairs – to cause X or Y instead of Z, for example – 
cannot be thought of as autonomous. If this is correct it follows that agents with the 
capacity for autonomy will have significant non-instrumental control interests, since 
their ability to live an autonomous life will depend on their ability to exercise their 
agential powers in the pursuit of their own goals, projects, and relationships.5 For 
example, if I do not have control over whether or not I go on holiday, or read a the 
entire works of Plato, or practice the piano, or form a friendship with Ted, then I do 
not live autonomously in these aspects of my life.6 To live autonomously in these 
respects, these choices must be open to me, such that their occurrence or non-
occurrence is (some relevant sense to be defined) traceable to the exercise of my 
agency.    
These autonomy-based control interests play an important role in the 
justification of many of the most familiar moral rights. However, there is good 
reason to doubt that the only control interests agents possess are also autonomy 
interests; that our possession of control is only valuable to the extent that it promotes 
or protects our ability to live an autonomous life. For example, Andrei Marmor 
argues that we have a right to privacy grounded in an interest in having a reasonable 
amount of control over how we present ourselves to others, an interest that he 
maintains is not reducible to any interest in autonomy.7 For Marmor, this interest 
reflects the fact that, without some significant degree of control over how we present 
ourselves to others and the information they have about us, we would (i) find it 
difficult to form and maintain a variety of personal relationships, which depend for 
their very existence on the different kinds of information we share in different 
contexts and with different people, (ii) be subject to an undesirable degree of honesty 
and intimacy that will have undesirable personal and social costs, and (iii) be subject 
to an objectionable degree of personal scrutiny and criticism.8 As Marmor explains,  
                                                
5 Raz might suggest that this claim is too strong since, on his view, the degree to which personal 
autonomy is valuable depends not only on facts about individual agents and their capacities, but also 
on further facts about the social conditions within which agents live. I think that, whilst we require a 
variety of social structures in order to facilitate the living of a valuable autonomous life, we have 
reason to prefer autonomy-enhancing societies to societies that do not support the living of 
autonomous lives. However, I cannot argue for this view here.  
6 Of course, this is not to say that these activities will be entirely devoid of value if they are not 
optional. For instance, I will learn a great deal reading Plato, whether or not I read Plato because I 
choose to. 
7 Andrei Marmor, “What is the Right to Privacy?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 43, no. 1 (2015), p. 
25. 




[H]aving a reasonable measure of control over ways in which we present 
ourselves to others is an important aspect of our well-being. It enables a 
whole range of choices about the constitution of one’s social 
environment, without which life would be either too stifling or too 
alienated. People need to be able to determine, at least to some extent, the 
amount and the kind of personal distance they maintain with others.9 
 
For Marmor, then, having a reasonable amount of control over the way in 
which we present ourselves to others is necessary in order to allow for a range of 
valuable relationships (e.g. friendships, romantic relationships, professional 
relationships, etc.).10 It is crucial that we have control in certain contexts – over what 
is public and what is private, or what is inner and what is outer – so as to be able to 
develop and maintain these relationships, something that, as Marmor is surely right 
to point out, is central to our well-being.   
It has also been persuasively argued, by Andrea Sangiovanni, that without a 
sufficient measure of control over how we present ourselves to others we cannot 
maintain an integrated sense of self.11 Indeed, on Sangiovani’s account, many of the 
most egregious forms of social cruelty – torture, rape, genocide – aim at causing the 
disintegration of an agent’s sense of self, something achieved in large part by 
undermining her control over how she presents herself to others, both 
communicatively and physically. 
So we can see from even this brief survey that we have a family of significant 
non-instrumental control interests. We cannot live autonomous lives, develop and 
maintain a variety of personal relationships, or maintain a unified sense of self, 
without a sufficient measure of control over certain aspects of our minds, bodies, and 
                                                
9 Ibid., pp. 10-1.  
10 I confess to being uncertain about whether Marmor’s identified interest in privacy cannot be 
thought of as part of a more general interest in living autonomously. As the above passage indicates, 
central to Marmor’s understanding of the interest in privacy is the extent to which some degree of 
privacy allows us to shape and develop the kinds of relationships we have with others. As I suggested 
in Chapter 2, however, shaping and developing our own relationships might reasonably be thought of 
as an important part of living an autonomous life. Having said this, privacy may still be thought to be 
in our interests even in contexts where we cannot choose the nature of our own relationships (e.g. 
arranged marriages). It is also unclear whether our interests in avoiding complete honesty, and public 
scrutiny, can be understood as part of a more general interest in autonomy. In any event, even if the 
interest in privacy can be understood as a component of a broader interest in autonomy, Marmor 
convincingly documents a discrete way in which we require control over our relationships and our 
social environment if we are to live flourishing lives. 
11 Andrea Sangiovanni, “Moral Equality, Respect, and Cruelty,” in Humanity Without Dignity: Moral 
Equality, Respect, and Human Rights (Harvard University Press, forthcoming).  
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social environment.12 But of course, our possession of control will often have 
instrumental importance as well. Generally, I will be much more likely to get what I 
want if I have control, since I am in the best position to know what it is that I want. 
Furthermore, as the well-being based accounts of consent we examined in Chapter 2 
rightly pointed out, I will often be in the best position to know what is in my own 
interests, such that equipping me with control in relation to others will often be a 
good way of serving or protecting my interests.  
 This list of our control interests is unlikely to be exhaustive, and there will be 
room for significant debate about the contours of the interests I have outlined as well 
as those I have not. What I hope to have made plausible, however, is the claim that 
we have a variety of significant and weighty control interests, such that our 
possession of control in certain spheres of life is integral to our well-being.  
 
5.2.2 Negative Control 
 
A moment’s reflection suggests that there are many ways in which agents can have 
control in relation to one another. For example, an agent A has a form of control in 
relation to another agent B with regard to some sphere (e.g. A’s house), if A can 
exercise his agential powers in order to, for instance, keep B off his property. We are 
concerned, however, with the normative questions of what level of control agents 
should possess – independently of their physical and mental capacities or abilities – 
in relation to one another, and what this form of interpersonal control should consist 
in. 
 One important way in which we can provide A with control over his own life 
is by recognising that A has claim-rights against interference within certain spheres. 
This form of normative control can be called negative control. An agent has negative 
control just when they have a claim-right against another agent(s) interfering in a 
certain sphere. More precisely, A has negative control in relation to B over some 
sphere S if A has a claim-right against B such that B is under a duty not to interfere 
                                                
12 It is worth comparing the much thinner account of control interests that runs throughout Owens’s 
discussion. See Shaping, pp. 165-68. 
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in S. For example, A has negative control over his body in relation to B if A has a 
claim right against B interfering with his body.13 
 Importantly, A’s possessing negative control in relation to B is a form of 
normative control. That is, A’s claim-right establishes a normative relationship 
between A and B, such that B would be wronging A by violating his right.14 (A’s 
claim-right gives B a directed duty which she owes to A.) To be sure, A’s right may 
not in fact secure him control over the spheres protected by his rights; B may be 
much stronger than A, and generally disinclined to recognise A’s rights. As a result, 
she may easily be able to wrestle physical control over some piece of A’s property, 
for example. Nonetheless, the normative relationship between A and B will remain 
intact, and in such cases B wrongs A by violating his rights. However, on the 
assumption that agents will generally be inclined to respect one another’s rights, A’s 
normative control will translate into A’s having actual control over important aspects 
of his own life. 
To help see the importance of negative control, let’s focus on the example of 
autonomy. Negative control is incredibly important in allowing individuals to live 
autonomous lives. If an agent has negative control over the central aspects of his life 
then he, rather than other agents, can largely determine the shape of his life in these 
                                                
13 To be clear, the idea of negative control is a purely interpersonal form of control. That is, what it 
means to say that an agent has negative control is that they have control in relation to another specific 
agent or agents. This follows from the nature of the claim-rights that demarcate spheres of negative 
control: the claim-rights of an individual serve to place particular agents under correlative (directed) 
duties. Thus, A’s claim right does not serve as an absolute restriction on interference, or imply that A 
is at complete liberty to act as he wishes within sphere S. On the one hand, A may have no claim-right 
in relation to other agents (C, D), such that they have no duty not to interfere. Therefore, whilst A has 
negative control over S in relation to B, he does not have negative control in relation to C and D. On 
the other hand, even if A has negative control in relation to B, C, and D, etc., this does not imply that, 
morally speaking, he has complete control with regard to S. A may, for example, be morally 
compelled to act in certain ways within S, whether because he owes another agent a duty (e.g. he 
promised E she would X), or because there is some general moral demand not owed to any agent in 
particular (e.g. not to eat meat). For a useful discussion of this issue see Gopal Sreenivasan, “Duties 
and Their Direction,” pp. 475-82. Of course, in many of the cases with which we are currently 
dealing, the claim-rights agents possess are held against all other agents, such that A has an expansive 
form of negative control over certain spheres, e.g., over A’s body. This contributes to the idea that, 
with regard to a range of spheres, A has general control and exclusive authority. But this general form 
of control is constructed from the claims A has against, and the correlative duties owed to A by, many 
individual agents. 
14 It should be noted that even in the case of a general right such as the right over one’s body, there 
will nonetheless be occasions on which it is justifiable for another agent to act in a way forbidden by 
the right. For one, most such rights will have a limited (even if very extensive) range of application. If 
A is unconscious and requires medical assistance I do not believe that he has a right against being 
touched by B, although he does have a right that B only touch him in ways necessary to save his life. 
In other cases, A may have a right that B is permitted to infringe because she acts for a non-excluded 
reason. For example, whilst B is usually required to respect A’s property rights, B may break into A’s 
mountain cabin for shelter if she is stuck in a life threatening blizzard. 
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spheres.15 He is provided with an environment in which it is his action, as well as his 
inaction, that primarily determines the shape of his life in that domain. Whilst living 
an autonomous life requires an agent to actively shape his own life, it would be a 
mistake to think that only the positive exercise of agential capacities aimed at 
pursuing some goal or relationship merit protection from interference. In order to 
live an autonomous life agents require some space within which they, and they 
alone, can exercise their authorship. That is to say, in certain spheres agents require a 
form of counterfactual control. Whether or not A goes running, or paints his 
bedroom red, or eats pizza, or reads Plato, or practices the piano, depends entirely on 
A and his decisions about what to do, and B has no standing to interfere, whatever A 
decides. Seana Shiffrin captures this idea well when she says: 
 
At their core, what autonomy rights protect is an agent’s ability to exert 
control over her mind, her body, and some aspect of her environment. 
The central idea is one of an individual’s having a domain that is 
understood to be hers and subject to her unique, exclusive authority. This 
permits her the opportunity to construct (or heavily contribute to) the 
environment she inhabits so that it bears her distinctive mark, is flush 
with her underlying will, and is the product of her authorship.16 
 
Similar claims can be made about the importance of control in relation to our 
interest in developing and maintaining relationships with others, and our interest in 
maintaining an integrated sense of self. Moreover, our instrumental interests in the 
possession of control will also play into the justification of the claim-rights that will 
provide an individual with a sphere of negative control. For ease, let us call the 
claim-rights that are justified, at least in part, by the fact that they provide agents 
with negative control over some sphere control rights.17  
As I argued in the previous chapter, however, rights are not directly justified 
by the fact that they serve or protect an agent’s interests. In order to justify rights we 
have to mediate the interests of agents through the relational requirement, meaning 
we must consider a range of considerations that apply in a variety of possible 
                                                
15 Assuming, that is, that his rights are generally recognised. 
16 Shiffrin, “Harm and its Moral Signifcance,” p. 382. 
17 The fact that rights provide agents with a valuable form of control and discretion plays an important 
role in T. M. Scanlon’s account of rights. See his, “Rights, Goals, and Fairness,” in Theories of 
Rights, ed. Jeremy Waldron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
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scenarios and rely on these in order establish rights that can serve as the basis for 
relations of mutual recognition between agents.  
So, in thinking about which control rights A and B have in relation to one 
another, we must consider (amongst other things) the strength of their control 
interests in different spheres, including their interests in having spheres of 
counterfactual control, the relative interests of the other in being able to act in the 
same spheres, the benefits or risks that would flow from making judgements about 
one another’s interests on a case-by-case basis or reasoning in line with preemptive 
rights, and the value of normative assurance. This final consideration merits special 
attention, since our belief that others recognise general prohibitions on interfering 
with certain aspects of our lives (our body, house, etc.) seems to be of central 
importance in supporting and facilitating our ability to live flourishing lives.18 By 
drawing a set of general conclusions about the weight of the various considerations 
that will likely apply in different circumstances, and then yoking these 
considerations into a single first-order reason that is protected by a second-order 
reason to exclude a number of possibly competing considerations, we are able to 
protect the morally significant interests of agents whilst facilitating relations of 
mutual recognition between them.  
   As I argued in Chapter 4, preemptive rights partly constitute a normative 
framework that we can rely on to interact with one another in various valuable ways, 
whilst allowing others to recognise that we give their interests the appropriate role 
within our deliberations. In the case of control rights, then, we relate to one another 
in an intrinsically valuable way when we recognise one another as having legitimate 
control over certain aspects or spheres of our lives. Relating to one another in this 
way will require us to recognise the preemptive structure of control rights in our 
practical deliberations; the fact that control rights give us a first-order reason not to 
interfere within certain spheres, as well as an exclusionary reason to disregard some 
competing considerations. For example, A’s rights over his body or his property will 
mean that B’s desires to use A’s body or property are excluded from B’s pool of 
available reasons for action. When A and B rely on A’s rights as a fixed-point in 
                                                
18 Cf. Hobbes’s claim that individuals in a state of nature would be motivated to consent to an all-
powerful sovereign out of fear of the way in which others might behave. One way of reading this 
claim is that inhabitants of the state of nature would be motivated to compact with others precisely so 
as to secure a greater degree of normative assurance. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Rev. Ed., ed. 
Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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their interactions they will both be able to understand whether or not B relates to A 
in a morally decent fashion. 
Which control rights do agents possess? I cannot provide a detailed answer to 
this question here since attempting to do so would take us too far afield. All I require 
for my argument, however, is agreement that there are some such rights. Most 
obvious are rights against physical assault, coercion, or manipulation of one’s mind 
and body, but it is also plausible to extend this to rights over property.19 And of 
course, there will be a significant overlap in the control interests protected or 
promoted by such rights, which may help to explain our conviction that certain 
control rights are particularly stringent. Whilst the specification of these rights is 
very general, they will give rise to many more specific rights and duties: for 
example, a right against having a swab taken or being injected, or a right against 
others using one’s computer. We can continue to work with intuitive examples such 
as these. If someone were to argue that there are no spheres or actions that are 
protected by something similar to control rights, then I would take their theory to be 
wholly implausible.20 
Notice that, taken together, control rights can be understood as establishing a 
sphere in which individual agents have legitimate control. This idea is familiar from 
status-based moral theories. However, the way in which this sphere is constructed is 
quite different on my view. According to status-based views, an agent’s sphere of 
control flows directly from the fact that they have a certain status – the status of a 
person, or rational agent, for example. According to the interest-based view I have 
been developing, whilst human agents have moral status – that is, they are morally 
considerable – their sphere of legitimate control must be constructed from the 
various rights they have, rights that are ultimately grounded in their interests, but 
mediated by the relational requirement. We might then think of an agent’s various 
rights as each representing a brick to be used in the construction of the protected 




                                                
19 Here, instrumental considerations are likely to play a more important role. 
20 Of course, they may wish to reject the language of rights. But they will, I assume, have to replace 
the notion of rights with some other concept that plays a similar functional role.  
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5.3.1 The Power of Consent 
 
Clearly, a world in which agents had negative control rights that they were unable to 
waive would be so restrictive as to be alienating. Agents would be unable to 
permissibly engage in the many valuable and necessary forms of activity and 
interaction that we think of as central to the living of a rich and diverse life: having 
sex, playing contact sports, lending a book to a colleague, undergoing a medical 
examination or surgery, and so on. As we saw in Chapter 2, some philosophers, such 
as Seana Shiffrin, have taken this fact to indicate that agents must possess the power 
of consent.21 Yet, as I noted there, the very most this shows is that agents must have 
some means to allow for permissible interaction between them. It does not explain 
why that means should take the form of consent. 
It will help here to distinguish between the question of consent’s normative 
force, which is concerned with the reasons there are for wanting to be able to waive 
our control rights, and the question of consent’s relational significance, which is 
concerned with why we should rely on consent to manage the directed duties that 
hold between us in virtue of our various claim-rights. As to the first, Shiffrin is 
surely on the right track. Without the ability to waive our control rights we could not 
engage in valuable human relationships with others.22 Most obviously, this is 
because we could not permissibly engage in the valuable forms of interaction that 
make up different relationships (e.g., touching, sharing, etc.). Moreover, the fact that 
we have waived certain rights may also play a constitutive role in shaping some 
relationships, by marking out particular relationships as the kind in which another 
can, for example, borrow one’s property without asking, or in which we agree to 
have shared control over certain matters, as when we establish a joint bank 
account.23 
However, a sole focus on our need to waive rights in order to engage in 
valuable relationships is somewhat misleading. Sometimes I will simply require 
                                                
21 Shiffrin, “Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism,” pp. 500-02.  
22 This may be too strong. For example, we could engage in a valuable relationship built wholly 
around conversation in public spaces, something that we could permissibly engage in without needing 
to first waive control rights. The central point, however, is that most (if not all) familiar forms of 
valuable relationship would be impossible. Indeed, the conversational relationship would plausibly 
lack certain valuable elements (found, for example, within friendship) in virtue of our inability to 
waive control rights.  
23 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 87-8. 
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assistance from others in ways that would usually be precluded by my control rights. 
If my plumbing brakes, for example, I need to be able to allow a plumber into my 
house in order to fix it. Or, I may wish to get a massage to help with my back pain. 
In these cases, I do not intend to develop or maintain a relationship. I simply require 
assistance. Alternatively, I may sometimes wish to waive my right so that you are no 
longer under a duty to me, such that you are free to deliberate about what to do 
without having to factor in the duty, and this may be so even if I have a preference 
for which choice you make. Imagine that you ask if you can borrow my car with the 
intention of skipping class. I may prefer that you come to class with me, but give you 
permission to borrow the car because I think that you ought to make the decision 
about whether or not to attend yourself.24  
There are then a number of reasons why agents may wish to temporarily 
relinquish the negative control provided by their control rights. Indeed, many of the 
reasons we have for wanting negative control, especially our interests in being able 
to shape our own lives, also explain why we should want to be able to waive our 
control rights. For this reason, it is unsurprising that many have assumed that the 
power of consent must be grounded in the value of personal autonomy. By enabling 
agents to waive their rights we enhance their autonomy by promoting their ability to 
shape their own lives through the pursuit of projects and relationships that would 
otherwise be impermissible. But, as I have said, I may have legitimate control over 
things that matter little from the point of view of my autonomous life (e.g. plumbing, 
private information). Furthermore, we can see clearly now that not all of an agent’s 
reasons for waiving their rights will tie to their desire to bring about their choices, at 
least when one’s choice is understood as one’s preferred state of affairs. I may prefer 
you to come to class, or not to spend our money on Cliff Richard CDs, but the fact I 
gave consent to your borrowing the car, or sharing a bank account, means that you 
will not wrong me by doing so. 
Whilst this provides us with a number of positive reasons as to why we 
should want to be able to waive (at least some of) our control rights, these 
considerations will often also apply to the full range of reasons, rights, and duties 
that both I and others have. As I noted in Chapter 2, for example, my ability to shape 
my own life is not only constrained by the directed duties others owe to me. So, the 
                                                
24 This example is from an unpublished manuscript by Victor Tadros. 
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positive reasons we have for wanting to be able to waive our rights do not yet 
explain why our power of consent is connected to the management of directed duties 
in particular.  
The explanation proceeds in two stages. To begin, notice that where control 
rights provide agents with negative control over certain spheres, the power of 
consent provides them with a form of positive control.25 Control rights ensure 
negative control by holding other agents under a directed duty not to interfere within 
certain spheres. Consent provides positive control by allowing agents to waive these 
duties, thereby making permissible forms of interaction previously impermissible. 
Importantly, however, the power of consent does not provide agents with just any 
means of waiving their rights. Rather, the power of consent equips individuals with 
the highest possible level of normative control by giving them intentional control 
over the duties others owe to them. 
Why should this be? Plausibly, because if agents are to be able to waive 
rights that generally secure them negative control over the most important aspects of 
their lives, then their ability to do so equally needs to provide them with a suitable 
measure of control. If it were easy to give consent accidentally, or if consent could 
be given just by briefly entertaining a preference or desire, it would not equip agents 
with a sufficient measure of control over their own lives. For instance, the mere fact 
that I desire something will not suffice to give me sufficient control, in part because 
my desires may be “brute” desires, with which I do not fully identify.26 Thus, if I 
could consent by entertaining a desire it would be too easy for the private spheres 
protected by control rights to become public spheres. In order to avoid this, 
particularly in those contexts in which agents have weighty control interests (e.g. the 
sexual context, or medical context), we often rely upon explicit intentionally given 
consent, so as to ensure that agents maintain a sufficient measure of control over 
what happens to them. The point is not that B should never be permitted to enter A’s 
house, or to give A an injection, but that A should have a sufficient measure of 
control over whether or not B does so. 
Consent provides this high level of control by providing A with 
counterfactual control over what is permissible within certain spheres which he can 
                                                
25 Franklin G. Miller and Alan Wertheimer, “Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions: Beyond 
Valid Consent,” p.84. 
26 See Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty?” 
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exercise by performing an intentional action, viz., an act of consent.27 Assuming that 
B is sufficiently responsive to the relevant moral reasons, she will not act in certain 
contexts (e.g. in sexual or medical contexts) without A’s consent. Whilst negative 
control rights provide agents with counterfactual control within certain spheres, the 
power of consent allows agents to maintain this valuable form of control whilst 
interacting with others. Since consent can be given or revoked by performing an 
intentional act, this counterfactual normative control can be exercised directly, 
without having to first manipulate the non-normative state of affairs in some way. 
 However, A’s power of consent cannot be explained solely on the grounds 
that it maximises or increases his control over what happens in the spheres protected 
by control rights. Indeed, there may be a number of ways that A could ensure that he 
has a sufficient measure of control over these spheres. For instance, if A was very 
physically strong he could easily prevent others from interfering with him should he 
so wish. In order to establish A’s power of consent, his first-order interests (i.e. the 
reasons he has for wanting to be able to waive his rights, whilst retaining a sufficient 
measure of control) must be mediated through the relational requirement. This 
means thinking not just about how we can promote A’s interests by allowing him to 
waive his rights, but further considering how A is able to waive his rights against B 
in such a way as to allow for a continuing relation of mutual recognition to obtain 
between them.  
That is to say, we are not only concerned with A’s ability to waive his rights 
so as to make it permissible for B to act in certain ways, but also for B to be able to 
interact with A whilst continuing to recognise A’s legitimate control within certain 
spheres, and for A to be able to recognise that B relates to him in this manner. This is 
central to understanding why A should waive his rights by giving B consent and not 
by some other means. If A and B rely on A’s consent in order to manage their 
normative relationship, then not only is A able to permit B to act in certain ways (to 
touch him, or use his property), but B is able to recognise this permission, and thus 
to interact with A whilst continuing to recognise A’s legitimate control. Moreover, if 
B relies on A’s consent, A will be able to recognise that B relates to him in a morally 
decent way, by giving his interests in having control over the central aspects of his 
life the appropriate role in her deliberations, thereby serving A’s relational interests. 
                                                
27 See Section 5.3.3. 
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Finally, B will also believe that A can recognise that she relates to him appropriately, 
such that A and B will have a common belief about the role consent plays in 
managing their normative relationship, thereby allowing them to stand in a valuable 
relation of mutual recognition.  
So, like rights, the power of consent partly constitutes a normative 
framework that provides a means through which agents can interact whilst all the 
time recognising that they relate to one another in a morally decent way. This is 
because A’s consent provides A and B with a fixed point in their interactions 
through which they can manage their normative relationship in a way that is 
consistent with their standing in a relationship of mutual recognition. If A and B 
have a common belief that A has a right against B that B not Φ unless A consents, 
and B refrains from Φ-ing unless he has acquired A’s consent, A and B can continue 
to stand in a relation of mutual recognition. However, if B Φ’s without A’s consent, 
A will have reason to believe that B does not give his interests the appropriate role in 
her deliberations, and B will further be aware that A has this belief. This explains 
why B should be responsive to A’s consent (or non-consent): by doing so, she 
recognises A’s legitimate control over certain aspects of his life, and allows A to 
recognise that she relates to him in this way. As we saw in Chapter 4, we are not 
only concerned with whether other agents act in such a way as to serve or set back 
our interests; we are further concerned with how they relate to us, and whether they 
deliberate about our interests in the appropriate manner. Consider a case in which a 
doctor or prospective sexual partner interferes with us without our consent. We are 
not, first and foremost, concerned with the fact that they (may) have set back our 
interests. Rather we are concerned with the fact that they did not relate to us in the 
appropriate way, by recognising that we should have control over whether or not we 
engage in such interactions. 
We are now in a position to formulate the relational theory of consent’s 
normative significance.  
 
The Relational Theory: Consent has normative significance because it 
provides agents with a means of interacting with one another in valuable 
ways whilst recognising one another’s legitimate control over those 
spheres protected by control rights, thereby allowing agents to interact 
whilst standing in a relationship of mutual recognition. 
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According to the relational theory, then, the power of consent plays a special 
role in managing the directed duties generated by our control rights because it 
enables agents to interact whilst maintaining a sufficient measure of control over 
their own lives, at the same time as recognising that we each have legitimate control 
over the spheres protected by our control rights. Our power of consent does not just 
provide a means through which to achieve our autonomous choices, or even to 
maximise our control over what happens to us, but rather provides a means through 
which we can relate to one another in a morally decent way in light of our significant 
control interests. If we understand our control interests as mediated by the relational 
requirement, then recognising the fact that you cannot enter my house, touch my 
body, or use my private information without my consent, and giving this fact the 
appropriate role within your deliberations, is part of what it means for you to relate 
to me in a morally decent fashion, in order that I be capable of understanding that 
you give my interests the appropriate role within your deliberations. Moreover, 
unless I have given you consent, then other considerations – such as your desires, or 
the greater utility that might be achieved – must be excluded from your practical 
deliberations, since my preemptive control rights will still be in force. 
We can now see why the control view considered in Chapter 2, whilst on the 
right track, only provided us with half of the story. By tying an individual’s power of 
consent exclusively to their interests in having control over their own life the control 
view was unable to explain why the power of consent should play such an important 
role in managing the application of directed duties, or explain how an agent could 
affect her normative relations with others just by intentionally performing the 
relevant action, since her consent would not directly affect her underlying interests. 
The relational theory, by contrast, explains the power of consent by appealing to its 
role in facilitating morally valuable relations between agents who recognise one 
another as possessing morally significant interests in maintaining control over the 
central aspects of their own lives. On this account, consent is normatively significant 
precisely because it allows us to manage directed reasons whilst standing in a 
relation of mutual recognition. Moreover, according to the relational theory, consent 
is not a mechanism for the direct promotion of A’s control interests. Rather, the 
power of consent, like rights, allows A and B to manage their normative relationship 
whilst recognising one another as bearers of morally significant interests. Thus, 
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because neither rights nor the power of consent are directly justified by the fact that 
they will serve individual interests, the fact that consent does not affect those 
interests does not stand in need of explanation. The relational requirement ensures 
that the appropriate response on the part of B when faced with A’s consent or non-
consent is not to reason in terms of A’s first-order interests, but to recognise A’s 
rights, and his consent, as determining which reasons for action she has. (I discuss 
the precise affect A’s consent will have on B’s reasons for action in Section 5.3.4 
below.) 
The relational theory also explains why our recognition of one another’s 
consent is constitutive of valuable modes of interaction. For example, it does not 
only matter to Y that she has wishes to have sex with X, but also that X recognises 
that Y has control over whether he is permitted to engage in sexual relations with 
her, and, therefore, it matters to Y that X be responsive to her consent or dissent. 
Where X is responsive to Y’s consent, and Y is similarly responsive to X’s consent, 
X and Y engage in valuable sexual relations partly in virtue of the fact that they 
mutually recognise one another’s legitimate control over whether they have sex.28 
 
5.3.2 Consent and Degrees of Control 
 
As I have said, the power of consent is partly valuable because it provides agents 
with a high level of control over what happens to them and within their environment, 
by giving them direct control over the duties others owe to them. However, we 
clearly do not believe that the only way in which we can permissibly interact in ways 
that would otherwise violate control rights is if we give one another explicit consent. 
If, for instance, I run onto a football field in full kit, or step onto a crowded subway 
train, I make it permissible for others to touch me, within certain limits (e.g. tackle 
me, jostle awkwardly against my shoulder). But it would be a stretch to describe me 
as consenting to these behaviours. I simply act in these ways because I want to play 
football, or get to my intended destination, and in doing so I temporarily waive some 
of my rights over my body. 
                                                
28 I take it that X’s responsiveness to Y’s consent will always partly constitute a valuable form of 
interaction whatever the nature of the particular interaction between X and Y, in virtue of X’s 
recognition of Y’s legitimate control. Plausibly, however, we recognise this more readily in cases like 
medical and sexual consent because of the stakes involved.   
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The explanation for this is that agents require different levels of control 
depending on the underlying interests that are at stake. The power of consent, by 
giving agents direct control over the duties others owe them, equips individuals with 
the highest possible level of normative control. But in many of the more everyday 
interactions we engage in we do not require such a high degree of control, and more 
informal or implicit forms of interaction are sufficient. 
In fact, we can distinguish four ways in which our actions affect the 
application of our control rights.29 First, we can give explicit consent, as we do when 
we sign a consent form, or say “Sure, go ahead,” in response to a colleague who asks 
to borrow a book. As I will argue in the next section, in order to give explicit consent 
we must communicate a conventionally recognisable token of consent with the 
intention of waiving a claim-right of ours. Second, we can give tacit consent. Tacit 
consent works in much the same way as explicit consent, but one gives tacit consent 
through silence or inaction as opposed to a positive communication of consent.30 
Importantly, as with explicit consent, in order for one’s silence or inaction to 
constitute consent one must undertake these behaviours with the intention of giving 
permission.31 Third, we can explicitly dissent. Explicit dissent, like explicit consent, 
gives agents direct control over the duties others owe them, but it serves to re-
establish or reaffirm those duties rather than waive them. I draw attention to dissent 
here since, in many contexts, an agent’s ability to dissent provides them with an 
additional degree of normative control, over and above positive requirements for 
consent. For example, in the sexual context, and in some forms of medical treatment, 
we retain the ability to re-establish our control right by dissenting at any time.  
Finally, we can waive some aspects of our control rights by manifesting what 
I will call objective choice. Significantly, unlike the three previous categories, an 
                                                
29 In this taxonomy I ignore two further possible forms of consent: (1) hypothetical consent, and (2) 
implied consent. The normative significance of hypothetical consent raises difficult questions that I 
cannot adequately address here, but in general I assume that whatever normative force hypothetical 
consent has must be explained in a different way to my explanation of actual consent, since 
hypothetical consent cannot serve to provide agents with normative control in relation to one another. 
With regard to implied consent, two things should be said. First, implied consent may be confused 
with either tacit consent or what I call objective choice. Insofar as this is true, then implied consent 
represents no further category. Second, agents will often imply that they will give consent if asked, 
but this does not have the same normative consequences as actual consent. If consent is required then 
genuine consent must be given. I am also disregarding other ways in which our actions may indirectly 
affect the application of our control rights, e.g., a culpable attacker who forfeits his rights not to be 
assaulted (in self-defence). 
30 Here I follow A. J. Simmons in Moral Principles and Political Obligations, pp. 79-83. 
31 There are a number of other conditions we might think necessary for tacit consent. See ibid. 
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agent need not act with the intention of waiving a right in order to do so by 
manifesting an objective choice. Rather, one must simply perform an intentional 
action (e.g. running onto a football field, getting onto a crowded subway train), 
where it is reasonable to believe that the agent understands that this will make some 
forms of bodily contact permissible. Notice, however, that what does the normative 
work in cases of objective choice is the fact that an agent acts in a way recognisable 
to others, with the belief that acting in this way will have certain consequences,32 
whilst maintaining control over whether or not she performs the relevant action. That 
is to say, objective choices are normatively significant not because an agent has 
subjectively chosen a particular outcome, but because she has, by performing a 
certain action that she has control over performing, indicated to others that it is 
permissible to behave in certain ways. This is so whether she performs the action 
with the intention of making these behaviours permissible or not. 
 What kind of control is appropriate will depend on the underlying interests at 
stake, interests that will be, primarily, of two kinds. First, there will be, as I have 
already said, more or less significant control interests. For example, I have much 
more significant interests in having control over whether I undergo an operation, or 
engage in sexual relations, than I do in controlling whether I am tackled playing 
football, or whether someone gently brushes against me on the subway. Thus, 
objective choice is likely to suffice in the latter cases, but not the former.  
Second, agents engage in a variety of more or less intimate relationships with 
one another, and the nature of the relationship can also impact upon the kind of 
control that is necessary. In a medical context, where patients and doctors are 
generally strangers, and there is a limited amount of trust between them, more formal 
requirements for consent will be desirable, even with regard to relatively 
straightforward procedures (e.g. standard examinations, vaccinations). In the other 
direction, within intimate relationships more subtle and implicit forms of 
                                                
32 Whilst the issue bears further consideration, I leave open what the precise degree of knowledge or 
understanding, if any, that an agent must have in order for her objective choices to have normative 
significance. It may be that an agent can waive many of her rights by acting in certain ways despite 
not knowing that “this is how we do things around here.” Alternatively, it may be the case that an 
agent will always waive her rights by acting voluntarily if she could easily have found out that this is 
the social norm. Or, perhaps, an agent can be wronged by others because she did not believe acting in 
a certain way (e.g. running onto the football pitch) would have any normative consequences, even if 
others have a full excuse for wronging her given their reasonable beliefs about the agent’s intentions 
in light of the circumstances. For some related discussion see Joseph Raz, “Promises in Morality and 
Law,” Harvard Law Review 95 (1982), pp. 929-932. 
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communication and understanding will often suffice, and, indeed, indicate the health 
of a relationship.33 For instance, friendships and romantic relationships would not be 
the kind of valuable relationships they are if partners and friends were required to get 
explicit consent before every hug.34 If nothing else, the formality of explicit consent 
requirements would be cumbersome, and potentially damaging within a number of 
close and trusting relationships.35 
The general idea then is that in some contexts, given the vulnerability of 
those involved and the significance of the interests at stake, we have good reason to 
crystallise the privileges, claims, and responsibilities, and rely upon more formal 
declarations of consent in order to affect our normative relations. In other kinds of 
interaction, where less is at stake, and/or the parties know each other well, then we 
may wish to rely on less formal kinds of consent or objective choice. This helps to 
make sense of the variability in requirements for consent. In some cases we should 
require a positive token of consent to be given in a clear and obvious manner. In 
others, tacit consent, or the possibility to dissent, may suffice to give agents a 
suitable measure of control. Alternatively, in some contexts, there may be no 
requirement for consent whatsoever, and the fact that an agent undertakes some form 
of intentional action will be sufficient to waive some aspect of their control rights. 
Note, however, that whether or not explicit consent is appropriate or required 
will still depend upon mediating the various interests of agents through the relational 
requirement. That is to say, the reason that our fellow football players or fellow 
subway passengers are not required to get our explicit consent before tackling us or 
brushing against us is not because this is how it makes sense to respond to our first-
order interests, but rather because, in light of these interests, it is appropriate to 
interact with one another in different ways in different contexts. Since explicit 
consent requirements will be demanding, and because our interests in the possession 
of control vary, as well as our interests in developing and maintaining special 
relationships, we have reason to rely on different modes of interaction in different 
contexts. Nevertheless, these different requirements are all generated by the same set 
                                                
33 Ibid., p. 931.  
34 This is reflected in many accounts of sexual consent, where it is usually assumed that initial sexual 
relations require explicit mutual consent, but where these requirements may move toward tacit 
consent or objective choice over time. See, e.g., Archard Sexual Consent, p. 38; Michelle Anderson, 
“Negotiating Sex,” p. 1426. 
35 Shiffrin, “Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism,” p. 514. 
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of underlying interests, and it will still be important that principles that apply in 
different contexts allow for mutual recognition between agents. 
According to the relational theory, then, the power of consent is one 
important part of a broader range of ways in which we manage our normative 
relations with one another. By providing agents with direct control over the duties 
others owe to them, the power of consent equips agents with a sufficient measure of 
control over the most important aspects of their own lives. Sometimes, however, this 
high degree of control is unnecessary, and this explains why there is a range of more 
or less formal ways in which we can alter the application of rights and duties through 
intentional actions. Sometimes, manifesting a choice in action (e.g. running onto a 
football field), will have the same normative effect as consent, even though the 
footballer did not run onto the pitch with the intention of waving some of his rights 
by doing so. Often, some combination of the forms of control I have identified will 
be in play. For instance, some forms of sexual interaction may be permissible on the 
basis of objective choices (e.g. foreplay), whilst individuals retain control by being 
able to explicitly dissent at any time.36 
Thus, we can identify a scale of formality, a range of more or less formal 
ways in which we can waive control rights, with consent at the high end. 
Importantly, however, it is the same set of interests that explain the whole scale. 
Agents should be able to recognise that others relate to them in a morally decent 
fashion, but, depending upon what is at stake, they can do this in different ways – in 
some cases by responding to their intentional actions, in others by directly 
responding to their consent or dissent. 
 
5.3.3 The Ontology of Consent 
 
An important implication of the relational theory is that it gives us good reason to 
prefer a particular view of what constitutes an act of consent, of what is sometimes 
referred to as the “ontology” of consent.37 I will argue that, if the claims I have made 
so far are correct, they support a hybrid view of consent’s ontology, according to 
                                                
36 Ultimately, this may not be an appropriate standard sexual consent, especially given the social 
world within which we live. I postpone discussion of some of these issues until Chapter 6. 
37 In this section I draw on material from my “The Ontology of Consent: A Reply to Alexander,” 
Analytic Philosophy 56, no. 4 (2015). 
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which for an action to qualify as a token of consent it must be performed (i) with the 
intention of waiving a right, and (ii) objectively communicated. 
We can start by distinguishing three views of what constitutes consent. On 
the first objective view, consent is nothing more than a performative act: a 
communication of consent through speech or action, such as a “Yes” or thumbs up. 
On the objective view, it does not matter whether the consenter believes herself to be 
consenting when she says “Yes” or gives the thumbs up. What matters is that she has 
communicated consent. Thus, on the objective view, consent is constituted by 
nothing more than these kinds of communicative acts. On a second hybrid view, both 
a communication of consent and the existence of a certain mental state are required 
in order for an agent to consent. So, in order for an agent to give consent she must 
both say “Yes” and believe that by doing so she is waiving some claim right of hers. 
On the hybrid view, then, consent is constituted by both a communicative token and 
a subjective mental state. On the final subjective view, consent is constituted by 
nothing more than a mental state, such as an intention to waive one’s right, and 
requires no communication. Whilst an agent will need to communicate her consent 
in order to alert other agents to the fact that they have consented, this communication 
is purely informative, alerting other agents to a normative change that has already 
occurred.  
Most philosophers agree that consent must be given intentionally. That is to 
say, in order for a purported token of consent to constitute consent (e.g. saying 
“Yes,” or giving a thumbs up), an agent must intend to waive a claim right of theirs 
by performing the token. If an agent does not have this intention then, whilst others 
may reasonably believe that consent has been given (and therefore be excused if they 
act on what they took to be consent), consent has not in fact been given. 
 Call this the intention requirement. I agree with the intention requirement for 
the following reason. If consent is normatively significant because it provides agents 
with a high degree of control over the most important aspects of their own lives, as I 
have argued, then it is plausible to think that consent must be given intentionally. 
Indeed, it is the intentional nature of consent-giving that gives agents such a high 
level of control over the duties others owe them. If consent could be given 
accidentally (e.g. by saying “Yes” when permission has been sought without 
realising that this request has been made) then agents would lack a sufficient 
measure of control over the central aspects of their lives. 
136 
 
The intention requirement rules out the objective view of consent’s ontology. 
It might be suggested, however, that given the role I have argued consent plays in 
managing the normative relationship between two agents, this is too quick, because 
it privileges the position of the consenter. It might instead be suggested that whether 
A gives consent to B depends upon whether B could reasonably believe that A 
intended to waive a right of his by performing a certain action. However, there are 
two reasons for rejecting this position. First, it seems unintuitive to hold that whether 
A has consented depends on B’s epistemic position. To help see this, imagine that B 
says to A “Can I use your car?” but that A believes B to have said “Would you like 
to go the bar?” When A says, “Yes!” B can reasonably believe that A has given his 
consent to borrow his car. Imagine that, after A has left, B goes to use A’s car and 
that C, who was party to A and B’s initial conversation, intervenes. Further imagine 
that C correctly understood that A took himself to be agreeing to go to the bar, and 
not intending to waive his right over his car, and that C also knows that A would be 
very unlikely to lend B his car, since A believes B is a terrible driver. If C explains 
all of this to B, B can no longer reasonably believe that A intended to waive his right 
over his car. If the question of whether A has consented turns on B’s reasonable 
belief, this would imply that, whilst initially A had consented, C’s intervention 
transforms the situation such that A has no longer given consent.38 
 Second, this view of consent’s ontology is not supported by the relational 
theory I have developed. I have argued that the normative significance of consent is 
partly explained by the fact that we have reason to want to be able to shape our own 
lives by managing our normative relations with others in such a way that still secures 
us a sufficient measure of control over those spheres protected by control rights. If 
this is correct then the fact that A has, for example, intentionally consented to have 
sex with B provides us with a positive reason for holding that A has waived his right 
against B’s having sex with him, because A had a sufficient degree of control over 
whether it would be permissible for B to have sex with him, and by making it 
permissible A means to shape his own life. In contrast to this, the reasonable belief 
principle holds that B is permitted to have sex with A because she reasonably 
believes that A intended to give consent (something I assume A could reasonably 
have known his behaviour would suggest). However, the fact that B reasonably has 
                                                
38 The use of the third-party perspective in assessing such cases is due to Alexander, “The Ontology 
of Consent.” 
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this belief is not, on the account I have offered, a positive reason for holding that A 
has waived his right.39 If anything, it plays a negative justificatory role by suggesting 
that A cannot complain against B’s acting since he should have known that B could 
reasonably believe that he intended to waive a right. But whilst B may have an 
excuse for having sex with A if she reasonably believes that A consented, since the 
positive reason I have alluded to plays an important role in justifying the power of 
consent, I think we have good reason to reject the objective conception of consent’s 
ontology.40  
In the opposite direction, a number of theorists have been tempted by the 
subjective view of consent, arguing that consent is constituted by nothing more than 
a subjective mental state.41 For example, Larry Alexander claims that consent is 
constituted by the mental act “of waiving one’s right to object – or…that of mentally 
accepting without objection another’s crossing one’s moral or legal boundary (the 
boundary that defines one’s rights).”42 Since this mental act is intentional this view 
meets the intention requirement.43  
                                                
39 On the role of positive and negative justifications in accounting for the normative significance of 
voluntary obligations see Raz, “Promises in Morality and Law,” pp. 929-30. 
40 One possibility is that the ontology of consent and the normative significance of consent come 
apart. That is to say, I could be correct to maintain that an agent only gives consent if they 
intentionally waive a right by performing the relevant action, but wrong to deny that B is morally 
permitted to have sex with A if she reasonably believes that A has given consent. Franklin Miller and 
Alan Wertheimer argue that, in at least some cases, this is correct. They discuss a case in which a 
department chair (A) says, “I’m going to appoint C to the position unless anyone objects,” and B, who 
is daydreaming, says nothing, leading A to believe that B has authorised him to appoint C (“Preface 
to a Theory of Consent Transactions,” p. 85). But I suspect that what does the normative work in this 
case is not that A reasonably believes that B has consented, but that B should have been paying 
attention in the meeting. If this is the case then B’s non-consent does not have the normative 
significance that it otherwise would have had. This is consistent with maintaining that if consent is 
normatively relevant the consenter’s intention to waive a right plays a necessary role in making it 
permissible for the consentee to act in a certain way, even if the consentee’s reasonable beliefs might 
give them an excuse for so acting without having acquired bona fide consent. 
41 There are a number of views concerning what exactly this mental state consists in. See Larry 
Alexander, “The Ontology of Consent,” for a good summary and discussion. 
42 Alexander, “The Ontology of Consent,” p. 108. 
43 I suspect that the appeal of the subjective view derives from two sources, neither of which provides 
adequate motivation for the view. First, in line with simple-choice view discussed in Chapter 2, it 
might seem as if by subjectively consenting we affect what is in our interests. If our interests 
determine how it is permissible for others to treat us, then the fact that we have affected those 
interests by giving consent surely affects how others are permitted to treat us. However, as we saw 
from our earlier discussion, it is far from obvious that the intentional giving of permission necessarily 
affects what is in our interests. And whilst some forms of subjective choice may affect what is in our 
interests, choice and consent can diverge, as we saw in discussion the simple-choice view. More 
importantly, as I argued in Chapter 4, it is anyway implausible to think that our rights will directly 
supervene on our underlying interests. The second source of appeal suggests that, insofar as consent is 
understood as an act of will, and an act of will is understood as a subjective mental state or action, 
then it necessarily follows that consent is, first and foremost, a subjective mental state or action (see, 
for an example of this view, Heidi Hurd, “The Moral Magic of Consent,” pp. 124-25). But the first 
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 However, whilst the subjective view meets the intention requirement, it fails 
to meet another requirement I think necessary in light of the role consent plays in 
allowing for relations of mutual recognition, namely, the publicity condition.  
 
Publicity condition: both the consenter and consentee must, in principle, 
have access to the information that determines whether consent has been 
given or revoked.44 
 
There are two main reasons for endorsing the publicity condition. First, in 
order for X and Y mutually recognise the authoritative nature of one another’s 
consent in certain spheres, they will need to be able to form a common belief about 
whether consent has been given or revoked, and thus they will each need access to 
the information that determines whether consent has been given or revoked. Recall 
that X and Y have a common belief in p where: 
 
(i) X and Y believe that p 
(ii) X and Y both believe that the other believes that p 
(iii) X and Y both believe that the other believes that they believe that p. 
 
Returning to the case in which X and Y are sexual partners, and focusing for 
a moment on the consent Y gives to X, for X and Y to have a common belief in Y’s 
consent it must be the cast that  
 
(i) X and Y both believe that Y has given consent  
(ii) X and Y both believes that the other believes that Y has given 
consent, and 
(iii) X and Y both believe that the other believes that they believe that Y 
has given consent.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
premise in this argument – that consent is an act of will – requires further defence, and without further 
defence comes close to begging the question.   
44 See Erin Taylor, “A New Conventionalist Theory of Promising,” pp. 670-73. Taylor develops a 
similar idea to the publicity condition, but for different reasons. Whereas I ground the publicity 
condition in in the normative function of consent, Taylor argues for a similar condition on the basis of 
certain necessary features of norms that are mediated by conventions. 
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Since we are supposing that Y must give consent intentionally, Y will always believe 
that she has given consent when she has given consent. However, if X has no access 
to the information that determines whether or not Y has given consent, X has no 
grounds on which to form a (reasonable) belief regarding whether Y has consented 
(violating (i)). As a result, the presence or absence of Y’s consent cannot play any 
role whatsoever in X’s practical deliberations, and X cannot rely on Y’s consent as a 
means to interact with Y whilst recognising her legitimate control. Moreover, unless 
Y’s consent is public between X and Y, X will have no basis for believing that Y 
believes she has given consent, and Y will have no basis for believing that X 
believes that Y has given consent (violating (ii)). And finally, if Y’s consent is not 
public, neither X nor Y will have grounds for believing that the other believes that 
they believe that Y has given consent (violating (iii)).  
This is important because, as I have argued, it matters to us in our relations 
with others that we are able to recognise the reasons for which others act, and our 
ability to so determines the kinds of relationship we are able to have with them. 
Thus, it is important that the consenter is able to know that the consentee is (or at 
least can be) responsive to her consent. In this case it matters to Y, independently of 
her sexual desires or choices, that X is responsive to her consent or dissent, because 
it matters to Y that X recognise that she has legitimate control over whether he is 
permitted to have sex with her.45 Moreover, it will matter to X that Y is able to 
recognise that he is responsive to her consent or dissent. X therefore needs to access 
to the information that determines whether Y has given consent, and Y needs to be 
able to recognise that X gives her consent the appropriate role within his 
deliberations. For this to be the case the information that determines whether Y has 
given consent needs to be public between them.46 
Second, since the value of mutual recognition derives from the value of X 
and Y each believing that they relate to one another in a morally decent way, by 
giving one another’s interests the appropriate role in their practical deliberations, it 
seems reasonable to think that X and Y should be symmetrically situated with regard 
                                                
45 This is not to say that Y’s sexual desires or choices are irrelevant from X’s perspective, only to say 
that whether X recognises Y’s consent will matter to Y independently of whether she desires to have 
sex with X. 
46 Tom Dougherty argues for the claim that consenter and consentee require a common belief in 
consent in, “Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication.” Whilst our two lines of argument are, I 
think, complementary, Dougherty focuses on the importance of common belief in relationships of 
accountability. See pp. 244-45. 
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to the normative requirements that obtain between them. Once again, the example of 
friendship is instructive. It matters that friends live up to the normative ideal of 
friendship, but for them to do so they not only need to know what this ideal requires 
of them, but also when these requirements apply. It would be unreasonable to blame 
a friend for failing to provide assistance or support if they were completely unaware 
that support was required, and had no reason to believe that it would be, because 
their failure to provide assistance does not reflect the fact that they did not give one’s 
interests the appropriate role in their deliberations. Similarly, it would seem 
unreasonable to hold that agents could make it the case that another will wrong them 
by revoking their consent if the consentee were unable to have knowledge of this 
normative change, in part because the consentee would be guilty of wronging the 
consenter despite always relating to the consenter in a morally decent way, by giving 
their consent the appropriate role within their deliberations. If Y could revoke her 
consent mid-way through having sex with X without X knowing, then X would be in 
an unreasonable position of normative vulnerability.47  
To be clear, the requirement for common belief is not grounded in purely 
epistemic considerations. Rather, the idea is that in order for consent to be able to 
play its normative role, of allowing X and Y to interact whilst standing in a relation 
of mutual recognition, it must be possible for X and Y to have a common belief 
about whether consent has been given or revoked. If this is correct then consent must 
meet the publicity condition, according to which both the consenter and consentee 
must, in principle, have access to the information that determines whether consent 
has been given or revoked.  
The subjective view of consent’s ontology, which claims that consent is 
constituted by nothing more than a subjective mental state, fails to meet the publicity 
condition. This is because, in many instances, the mental states of agents are opaque 
to others. Only an agent themselves generally has direct access to their own mental 
states. Given this, a consentee will usually not have knowledge of the consenter’s 
mental states.48 Furthermore, even if a consentee does have a reasonable belief about 
a consenter’s mental states, it is even less likely that the consenter will be able to 
                                                
47 Following Dougherty, this idea might be case in terms of holding X accountable. See ibid. 
48 I do not mean to suggest that agents always have direct access to their own mental states, or that 
other agent’s never have access to the mental states of others (“It was written all over his face,” we 
might say). I just mean to say that, by and large, it is an agent themselves who has direct access to 
their own mental states.  
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know that the consentee has this belief, or that the consentee is aware that the 
consenter reasonably believes they have a reasonable belief about their mental state.  
Since the mental states of agents are commonly opaque to others, information 
about these mental states is not in principle available to others. Thus the publicity 
condition holds that consent must be objectively communicated in some way by the 
consenter to the consentee(s).49 This is necessary to allow for a common belief about 
whether consent has been given, and enable consent to play its role of managing the 
normative relations between agents in a way that supports a relation of mutual 
recognition between them. Thus, if the relational theory of consent’s normative 
significance is correct, the most plausible view of consent’s ontology is the hybrid 
view, according to which an agent gives consent when they communicate a 
conventionally recognisable token of consent with the intention of waiving a claim-
right.50 
 
5.3.4 Consent, Rights, and Reasons for Action  
 
I have said that A’s power of consent regarding B’s duty not to ϕ gives A normative 
control in relation to B by giving A direct control over B’s duty. This helps to make 
sense of the familiar idea that an agent possesses a certain kind of authority over his 
or her own life.51 With regard to certain matters an agent’s consent should be 
regarded as decisive: if an agent has refused consent to ϕ then it is impermissible to 
ϕ.52 But they also have the power to make it permissible for others to ϕ, by waiving 
these duties. This counterfactual control is an important characteristic of authority. A 
                                                
49 What if we had access to brain scanners that could inform us that others have the relevant mental 
state? I am willing to concede that if this were so it is at least in principle possible that consent could 
be given without communication. However, there is something important to note about this 
possibility. An individual brain scanner that could give us information about others mental states 
would not be sufficient for consent, since this would run afoul of the need for common belief that 
motivates the publicity condition. Rather, we would need a machine that (i) allowed A to know that 
they were giving consent to B by entertaining a certain mental state, (ii) informed B that A were 
entertaining this mental state, and (iii) allowed A to know whether B was in fact using the brain 
scanner or not, such that B is in fact responsive or non-responsive to A’s consent. That is to say, in 
order for a mental state to constitute consent we would need to be able to have a common belief about 
the mental state in question. 
50 I discuss the importance of conventions in establishing mutually recognisable tokens of consent in 
Section 6.2. 
51 Cf. Raz: “A normative power is tantamount to having an authority when it is a power over others.” 
Practical Reason and Norms, p. 101. 
52 I say that an agent has “refused consent” rather than just “not consented” to try and capture the fact 
that some rights can be waived in ways other than by consent (e.g. via objective choice).  
142 
 
practical authority has the power, by their mere say-so, to make it the case that the 
there is reason to ϕ or ψ, independently of the reasons that normally count in favour 
of either ϕ-ing or ψ-ing.53 Similarly, an agent has the power, by their mere say-so, to 
make ϕ permissible (or impermissible).54 Significantly, however, on the account that 
I am offering, it is not the case that agent’s simply possess this authority in virtue of 
having a certain status. Rather, the recognition of this authority by others is 
constitutive of an intrinsically valuable form of relationship.55 
In this sense consent can be usefully contrasted with an order given by a 
practical authority (such as a military officer). If an authority gives an order then this 
gives those under her command a first-order reason to do as commanded, and an 
exclusionary reason not to act on a range of countervailing considerations. For 
example, a commander’s order to clean the barracks should be taken as a first-order 
reason to clean the barracks, as well as an exclusionary reason not to weigh the order 
against other reasons such as the troops laziness, or their preference for drinking tea. 
Consent shares the same features, but operates in the opposite direction. That B has 
not given A consent to enter her house gives A a first-order reason not to enter B’s 
house, which is protected by an exclusionary reason not to weigh this lack of consent 
against a range of other reasons. In other words, if B has not given consent then A 
simply has to recognise the exclusionary structure of B’s control right.56 
  The authoritative nature of consent, then, is connected to the exclusionary 
structure of control rights. That an agent has not given consent generally means that 
her control right continues to operate as a protected reason: a first-order reason not to 
interfere coupled with an exclusionary reason not to weigh this first-order reason 
against a number of competing considerations. By giving consent she can waive this 
right, and therefore prevent it from operating as a protected reason. Yet it remains 
                                                
53 See, generally, Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Chs. 2 and 3. 
54 This is something of a simplification. See below. 
55 By comparison, it seems likely that many standard forms of authority relation (e.g. the military, the 
state) are only instrumentally valuable: recognising the authority of the state, for example, and 
thereby seeing the states directives as exclusionary reasons as well as first-order reasons, allows us to 
achieve certain valuable ends otherwise impossible (or at least very difficult) to achieve, such as large 
scale social coordination. In such cases, were we better able to secure the end by ignoring the 
protected reasons, it seems that this is what we should do. 
56 We must be somewhat careful about how far we carry this analogy with practical authority 
however, since authorities usually have the power to impose new duties on agent’s by their say-so, 
whereas the power of consent only gives agents the power to manage existing duties. This is not to 
say that the power of consent should not be thought of as a form of authority, only that it differs from 
other familiar kinds of authority. On this point see John Gardner, “Justifications under Authority,” p. 
11. 
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unclear exactly what effect A’s consent will have on B’s reasons for action. It will, 
we assume, make B’s ϕ-ing justifiable (all things being equal). But is not clear 
exactly how this is so.57 
 Before continuing, it is worth clarifying that B may have many reasons 
regarding ϕ, including further duties, not grounded in the particular duty she has to A 
not to ϕ. Imagine, for example, that ϕ is engaging in sexual relations. Clearly, B has 
a duty not to have sexual relations with A without A’s consent. But if B is married to 
C she may well have a duty to C (or at least strong reasons) not to have sexual 
relations with A. So, even if A consents, B may still be required not to have sex with 
A, because by doing so she wrongs C, and A’s consent can do nothing to change this 
fact. Thus, A’s consent does not entail an all things considered permission on B’s 
part. However, we are not currently concerned with these all things considered 
judgements. Rather, we wish to know how A’s consent affects B’s directed reasons 
regarding ϕ with respect to A. That is, we are concerned with the normative relation 
that obtains between A and B (with regard to ϕ), and not with the more general 
question of what reasons B has to ϕ or not ϕ. Of course, an overall moral assessment 
of B’s action will require asking this broader question, but in order to carry out this 
assessment we will need to know how A’s consent makes a difference to the reasons 
B has.  
Michelle Dempsey considers three ways in which A’s consent may affect B’s 
reasons for action.58 First, consent might cancel some of the reasons B has for not X-
ing. To use Dempsey’s example, imagine that X-ing is punching A. If A’s consent 
cancels some of B’s reasons then she cancels some of the reasons that normally 
ground a requirement not to punch A, e.g., A’s interests in not experiencing pain. 
Second, consent might exclude some of the reasons B has to refrain from X-ing. So, 
whilst A’s pain still constitutes a reason against B’s punching A, B is required to 
                                                
57 One complication concerns whether or not a consentee acts permissibly if they act without 
reasonably believing they have the consenter’s consent. Imagine, for example, that A waives her right 
over her car by giving B consent, but that, even though B does not hear A, she goes ahead and takes 
the car anyway. Whilst I think that it is clear that A has given consent in such an example (that is, we 
do not require uptake for a token of consent to actually constitute consent), it is a further question 
whether B wrongs A, and if so, what the nature of this wrong is. This question is connected to the 
issue of whether an agent’s intentions can bear on the permissibility of their actions. For a widely 
cited argument that intentions do not bear on permissibility directly, see Scanlon, Moral Dimensions. 
For a contrary view see Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm, Ch. 7. For present purposes, I remain 
agnostic on this issue. 
58 Michelle Dempsey, “Victimless Conduct and the Volenti Maxim: How Consent Works,” Criminal 
Law and Philosophy 7 (2013), pp. 18-22. 
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exclude these reasons from her deliberations.59 Third, A’s consent may make it 
permissible for B to exclude some of the reasons that bear on punching A, although 
B is not required to exclude these reasons (as is the case on the second option). 
Following Raz, Dempsey labels this third option an exclusionary permission.60 If 
A’s consent functions as an exclusionary permission, then when deliberating about 
whether or not to punch A, B can either exclude or include the reasons grounded in 
A’s interests in avoiding pain. 
Dempsey rejects the first two views in favour of the third. I agree that we 
should reject the first two views, but I do not believe we should accept the third as a 
general account of consent’s effect on reasons. That is because whilst consent may 
operate as an exclusionary permission, it need not do so. To see this, we need to 
introduce a fourth possibility not discussed by Dempsey, according to which consent 
functions as a cancelling permission. A cancelling permission serves to cancel a 
protected reason. In the case of A’s right not to be punched by B, if consent 
functions as a cancelling permission then A’s consent cancels the protected reason 
constituted by A’s right. That is to say, if A consents to B’s punching her she cancels 
both the first-order reason against punching her and the exclusionary reason not to 
weigh this reason against other considerations, such as B’s sadistic pleasure. So, a 
cancelling permission does not cancel any of the first-order reasons for or against 
some action, but rather cancels a right or duty. Thus, if A consents it does not 
follows that there are no longer any reasons against punching A. It is only to say that 
there are no reasons against punching A grounded in A’s right. Thus, A’s interests, 
in not experiencing pain etc., still serve as reasons for B, but she is now able to 
consider and weigh these first-order reasons directly, something A’s right prevented 
her from doing. In other words, where A’s right previously pre-empts B’s ability to 
consider and weigh A’s first-order interests, A’s consent makes it permissible for B 
to weigh these interests in her deliberations. Assume, for example, that the pleasure 
                                                
59 Whilst I agree with Dempsey in rejecting this permission, I also have sympathy with the fact that 
she is drawn to the position (p. 20), since it chimes with anti-paternalist intuitions. Since, on this 
view, a consentee is essentially under a duty not to consider some of the consenter’s interests, she 
cannot weigh the agent’s own good in deliberating about what to do, and thus she cannot treat her 
paternalistically. In the end, however, I believe that paternalism is only morally impermissible when 
an agent has a right against some form of conduct that is being overridden by judgements about their 
good. It may sometimes be morally undesirable not to act because of such judgements, when the agent 
has requested some action, but the requestee is under no obligation to so act, and can reasonably 
weigh the requester’s good in her decision about what to do.  
60 See Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, pp. 89-91. 
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B will feel when she punches A constitutes a reason in favour of punching her. If A 
consents, B can now weigh these positive reasons for punching A against the reasons 
not to punch A grounded in A’s interests.  
Whilst this is not the end of the story, I think that consent functions, first and 
foremost, as a cancelling permission and not an exclusionary permission.61 This is 
because if A’s consent only functions as an exclusionary permission, and not a 
cancelling permission, then A’s consent to B ϕ-ing will generally be unable to make 
B’s ϕ-ing permissible. Return to the example of A’s consenting to B’s punching her. 
A’s right against being punched usually serves to provide B with a first-order reason 
not to punch A, and an exclusionary reason not to weigh this reason against some 
considerations in favour of punching A (e.g. B’s pleasure). If A’s consent is an 
exclusionary permission, as Dempsey maintains, then A essentially allows B to 
disregard some of the reasons against punching her. But what good will this do? The 
reasons against B’s punching A are indirectly protected by A’s right, and that right is 
still in place. That is to say, B would now be confronted by the following reasons: a 
first-order reason not to punch A coupled with an exclusionary reason not to weigh 
this against some competing considerations, and a permission to exclude some first-
order reasons against punching A. So, even with the exclusionary permission in 
place, B is still faced with A’s right, and so she still has a first-order reason not to 
punch A, and a reason not to consider certain competing reasons for punching A. 
Simply put, even if B now has permission to exclude some of the reasons against 
punching A, she still also has a reason to exclude some of the reasons in favour of 
punching A.62 Indeed, if the function of A’s right is to protect her interests by pre-
empting B’s deliberations, and it does this by silencing some of the reasons in favour 
of punching A, then A’s interests are still indirectly protected by her right even if A 
gives B an exclusionary permission. Thus, A’s consent is unlikely to render B’s 
punching A permissible, since B cannot justify her action with reference to reasons 
in favour of punching A such as her desire.  
This is because an exclusionary permission does not entail a cancelling 
permission. That is, an exclusionary permission does not entail the cancelation of a 
protected reason. To see this we need only consider the case of medical consent. If a 
                                                
61 Cf. John Gardner, “Justifications under Authority,” pp. 15-16. 
62 This is so even if we assume that A’s consent somehow weakens her right, by removing some of 
the interests that justify its strength by allowing B to exclude them. 
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patient gives consent, they do not give the doctor the option of excluding their 
interests from their deliberations about what to do. Instead, the doctor is required to 
think carefully about what would, on balance, be best for the patient. This just goes 
to show that, whilst the patient’s right pre-empts the considerations that can inform 
the doctor’s practical deliberations, her consent can make it permissible to include 
these considerations, without giving the doctor the further option to exclude some of 
the patient’s interests.63  
Dempsey is misled, I believe, by a failure to consider the way in which rights 
operate as protected reasons, and the fact that consent serves, in the first instance, to 
manage these protected reasons, rather than to add a new kind of second-order 
reason – an exclusionary permission – into the mix. Thus, she is wrong to say that, 
“absent [A’s] consent, [B] is required to keep in play on [her] rational horizons 
reasons grounded in [A’s] well-being”.64 Rather, A’s right is precisely supposed to 
pre-empt B’s consideration of these interests. A can make it permissible for B to 
deliberate about her interests, as well as other reasons that might bear on her 
punching A, but in order to do that A needs to cancel the protected reason 
constituted by her right. In order for consent to play this role, consent must function 
as a cancelling permission. 
However, I think there is something right in what Dempsey says, and this is 
because whilst consent should be thought of as a cancelling permission, I believe 
that in some cases consent does function as an exclusionary permission also. If 
consent were only a cancelling permission then, when consent was given to ϕ, agents 
would have to consider all of the first-order reasons relevant to whether or not to ϕ. 
In many cases of consent this would still render a course of action impermissible 
since it would be against the balance of reasons. B’s punching A is a case in point. It 
seems reasonable to think that the reasons grounded in A’s interests in not 
experiencing pain are of greater weight than the reasons grounded in B’s pleasure in 
punching A. (We can assume that they are.) Nonetheless, we think A can make it 
permissible for B to punch her.65 Plausibly, this is because by giving consent A can, 
                                                
63 The counter-example might be thought unable to make the point since the doctor only has to 
continue to consider the patient’s interests because he has a fiduciary duty to her. However, whatever 
the reason for considering the patient’s interests, the example makes the conceptual point that a 
cancelling permission need not entail an exclusionary permission. 
64 Dempsey, “Victimless Conduct and the Volenti Maxim,” p. 21. 
65 There is a question looming here about the extent to which an agent can consent to actions harmful 
to her interests. For the moment, I simply rely on the thought that, even if there is some limit to the 
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as well as cancelling her right, also give B permission to further exclude some of the 
first-order reasons she has, including those interests grounded in A’s well-being. The 
point is that this exclusionary permission is only likely to serve much use if the right 
has already been cancelled, in other words, if consent operates primarily as a 
cancelling permission. As the doctor-patient example demonstrates, consent need not 
always operate as an exclusionary permission also.66 
 So far I have said that consent primarily functions as a cancelling permission, 
whilst sometimes also as an exclusionary permission. Things are further complicated 
by the fact that in giving consent an agent will often communicate a preference or 
choice. For example, A might consent to B’s coming to her party because she wants 
B to attend (she had simply forgotten to invite B before she asked). In such cases, 
A’s consent does not only cancel her right, but indirectly contributes to B’s first-
order reasons for action as well. Notice that A’s consent, on its own, does not give B 
any first-order reasons to attend.67 Why should she attend just because she has 
permission to attend? The answer is that she should not, but rather that she should 
attend because A wants her to attend, B wants to see A and other people at the party, 
there will be good music, etc. Whilst  consent often serves to indicate the presence of 
one of these reasons, i.e., A’s desire or preference that B attends, it need not.68 A 
may simply consent to B’s coming out of politeness, even whilst making it perfectly 
                                                                                                                                     
kinds of harms agents can consent to, they can certainly give valid consent to some actions that will 
constitute harms to them. For discussion see Victor Tadros, “Consent to Harm,” and Seana Shiffrin, 
“Harm and its Moral Significance.” 
66 Can consent operate as an exclusionary permission without also operating as a cancelling 
permission? I am somewhat uncertain on this point, for the following reason. As I suggest in the text, 
an exclusionary permission is generally going to be useless unless coupled with a cancelling 
permission. But there is a question about whether this uselessness is a purely practical matter, or 
renders the possibility conceptually incoherent. Like I said, A’s interests – the very interests that an 
exclusionary permission would allow B to exclude – continue to be indirectly protected by her right. 
So, we might think that an exclusionary permission could never make a difference to B without also 
constituting a cancelling permission. However, above (note 62) I highlighted the possibility that an 
exclusionary permission may weaken A’s right, by excluding some of the interests that justify that 
right from playing that justificatory role. If this is correct then, even if some considerations are still 
excluded from B’s deliberations (e.g. B’s pleasure), there may be further non-excluded considerations 
that can now defeat the right, but only because the right is less weighty in light of the exclusionary 
permission. The resolution of this issue will, I suspect, depend on issues (such as how to draw the 
exclusionary scope of a right) that I cannot deal with here.   
67 Gardner, “Justifications under Authority,” p. 14. 
68 Owens, Shaping, p. 180. Notice that B would have the reason grounded in A’s preference whether 
or not it was communicated to her by A. If a third-party C reassured B that A wanted her to come, 
then this would indicate the existence of the reason to B in just the same way. (Indeed, B would have 
this reason whether or not anyone communicated it to her, as long as A had the relevant preference.) 
But of course C cannot consent to B’s attending; only A can do that. 
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clear to B that she would rather she did not come.69 In such cases B has permission 
to attend the party, but at least one first-order reason for doing so – A’s desire for B 
to attend – is lacking. Still, if she decides to go anyway (to see other friends etc.) she 
will not wrong A in so doing. Of course, in the majority of cases agents only consent 
to something they want to happen, and this explains why consent usually serves to 
make another’s action permissible: because consent cancels the right and alerts the 
consentee to a positive reason to act.70  
The precise way in which consent functions will depend heavily on the 
context, and I doubt anything general can be said about when consent constitutes an 
exclusionary permission or choice (or both), as well as a cancelling permission. 
However, with this conceptual framework in place, we are now in a position to see 
why the power of consent is a normative power. By giving consent we can, to use 
Owens words, “change what someone is obliged to by intentionally communicating 
the intention of hereby so doing”.71 We do so by cancelling a protected reason, and 
thereby waiving a right, meaning that the consentee no longer owes us a duty.72 This 
is the way in which consent gives agents normative control over the duties others 
owe to them. There will still be many first-order reasons bearing on whether or not 
they should perform the consented to action – and nothing about our consent can 
directly affect those reasons (even if it can indicate their existence) – but the 




We now have a working theory of consent. According to the relational theory, 
consent has normative significance because it provides agents with a means of 
interacting with one another in valuable ways whilst recognising one another’s 
legitimate control over those spheres protected by control rights, thereby allowing 
agents to interact whilst standing in a relationship of mutual recognition. Thus, 
                                                
69 Ibid., p. 174. 
70 The consentee will also generally want to perform the consented to action also (why would she 
otherwise seek consent), giving her another positive reason, but again this need not be so. A doctor 
may dislike carrying out a particular procedure, but nonetheless have other positive reasons for doing 
so (e.g. the patient’s health) if she has the patient’s consent. 
71 Owens, Shaping, p. 4. 
72 See Raz, The Authority of Law, p. 18 who defines a normative power as the ability to change 
protected reasons. 
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according to the relational theory, the answers to the two questions concerning 
consent’s normative significance from which we started – the question of consent’s 
normative force, and the question of consent’s relational significance – are closely 
related: both A and B have reasons to want to be able to interact with one another 
whilst recognising each other as giving the other’s control interests the appropriate 
role within their deliberations. On the relational theory, then, consent’s purpose is 
precisely to allow A and B to manage their normative relationship whilst standing in 
a concrete relation of mutual recognition. 
With this picture in place we can now turn to assess how well the relational 
theory satisfies the desiderata I set out at the beginning of the chapter. Consider first 
the question of consent’s authoritative nature; the fact that where an agent has the 
power to give or revoke consent, their giving or revoking consent will be sufficient 
to waive or reinstate their right. Of particular concern for an interest-based theory is 
whether it can explain why consent should be authoritative even in those cases where 
consent (or non-consent) does not track the underlying interests of the consenter. 
It is worth first noting that, as I argued at the beginning of the chapter, many 
of our significant control interests are non-instrumental, such that often what is of 
significance is just that we have control over the ways others relate to and interact 
with us. Since the power of consent provides us with this control, it will at least very 
often be the case that our consent tracks our underlying interests. But the more 
important point is that, according to the relational theory, the normative significance 
of consent is not justified directly by the fact that it serves or protects our interests. If 
it were so justified then it is true that in any case where our consent (or non-consent) 
and interests diverged consent would not have normative force.  But on the relational 
view, in order to justify both control rights and the power of consent, agents’ control 
interests must be mediated through the relational requirement, the requirement that 
the moral requirements that obtain between us must allow for a relation of mutual 
recognition. So, according to the relational theory, our consent is normatively 
significant because it provides agents with a means of managing their normative 
relationships whilst relating to one another in a particularly valuable way, by 
recognising one another as bearers of interests worthy of protection. This explains 
why consent is authoritative. Only by regarding one another’s consent as 
authoritative can we relate to one another in this valuable way. 
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Furthermore, since consent is often required before other agents can act 
permissibly, the power of consent has a further kind of authority, which, as I 
suggested in the previous section, is tied to the preemptive structure of control rights. 
Since an agent’s control rights give others reason not to act in certain ways (by 
interfering in certain spheres), as well as giving them reasons to exclude a range of 
other considerations, then consenters have counterfactual normative control over 
whether others are permitted to act in certain ways. This ability to affect others 
reasons for action in one or other direction is a hallmark of practical authority.  
Next, consider the problem of normative power: how is it possible for an 
agent to affect the application of her rights and their correlative duties simply by 
communicating an intention to do so, despite the fact that this declaration will not 
affect what is in her interests? In my view, this problem rests on the mistaken claim 
that the connection between an agent’s interests and her rights is direct; that the 
rights an agent possesses at time T supervene on the interests she has at T. If this 
were correct then it would be true that an agent’s consent could not affect which 
rights she has unless her consent somehow also affected her interests, something that 
seems implausible. However, as I argued in Chapter 4, we should not conceive of the 
relationship between interests and rights in this way. Whilst thinking about the rights 
that agents have, and their ability to waive these rights by giving consent, requires 
thinking about the interests that agents have in different scenarios, these interests 
must be mediated through the relational requirement so as to allow for mutual 
recognition between agents. The outcome will be a set of general principles 
concerning which rights agents’ have, and when they are able to waive these rights 
by giving consent. 
Third, does the relational theory track our pre-theoretical understanding of 
why consent is valuable? As we saw in Chapter 3, Owens’s theory of consent 
satisfied the first two desiderata, but disconnected the power of consent from an 
intuitive sense of why consent has value for us, by claiming that the wrong of acting 
without consent is a bare wronging grounded in a non-reducible permissive interest. 
In contrast, the relational theory maintains the intuitive connection between the 
power of consent and the importance for agents of being able to determine, by their 
say so, what happens to them and within their environment. Moreover, whilst 
denying that the power of consent is exclusively explained by the value of 
autonomy, the relational theory can make sense of why it has seemed to so many that 
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the power of consent must be explained in this way, since many of the interests 
central to justifying both control rights and the power of consent are autonomy 
interests, and our ability to give and revoke consent clearly plays a crucial role in 
allowing agents to shape their own lives whilst relating to one another in a morally 
decent fashion.     
 At this point it is worth considering a response that might be suggested by 
Owens: since the relational theory rests on the idea that normative phenomena such 
as rights and duties play some non-instrumental role in structuring a valuable form of 
relationship, he might suggest that the relational theory is actually a version of his 
own view. For instance, it might be suggested that my claim that two agents stand in 
an intrinsically valuable relationship when they recognise one another as having 
legitimate control over certain domains is essentially the claim that agents have 
permissive interests, that it is valuable for them that certain things are socially 
recognised as wrongs unless they consent to them. 
Two things should be noted at this juncture. First, as I understand Owens, he 
is suggesting that the fact that it is socially recognised that B wrongs A by ϕ-ing 
unless she has A’s consent is good for A in itself, independently of the nature of the 
relationship that obtain between A and B. That is, A has an interest in its being 
generally recognised within his community that others cannot ϕ without his 
permission, and the general recognition of that fact will serve A’s well-being. This is 
importantly distinct from the idea that B relates to A in an intrinsically valuable way 
when she recognises that she cannot ϕ without A’s consent, because in doing so she 
recognises A as a bearer of morally significant interests worthy of protection. At the 
centre of the relational theory is the claim that certain forms of relationships are 
valuable, including relationships in which we are able to recognise that we relate to 
one another in a morally decent way, and that we thus have reason to engage in these 
forms of relationship, where this requires us to recognise and deliberate about one 
another’s interests in a certain manner. On Owens’ theory, by contrast, the 
recognition of various normative phenomena is good in itself, independently of its 
contribution to structuring valuable relationships of this kind, since agents have 
interests in these phenomena.  
Another way to put this is in terms of the bridging problem. Whilst Owens 
bridges the gap between interests and an intuitive account of wrongs by postulating 
normative interests, the relational theory bridges the gap by highlighting the value of 
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our relating to one another in a certain way in light of familiar non-normative 
interests, in autonomy, special relationships, and so on. So, whilst the moral 
significance of our deliberations and actions is not reducible to the protection of our 
interests on the latter view, we need not invoke the idea of permissive interests in 
order to explain the power of consent. 
Owens might respond to this by saying that there was always supposed to be 
some connection between normative and non-normative interests, and, since the 
relational view doesn't make normative phenomena entirely instrumental, this is one 
possible version of exactly the kind of connection he had envisaged.73 For instance, 
it is valuable that ϕ count as a wronging unless A consents because of his underlying 
control interests, but A’s interest in ϕ constituting a wronging is not reducible to his 
interests in having control over ϕ, and is, thus, a permissive interest. However, and 
this is the second point, even if we were to accept this formulation, notice that the 
relational theory does two things that permissive interest view does not. First, the 
relational theory provides us with a deeper explanation of why it should matter to us 
that certain things in particular are socially recognised as wrongs, viz., because we 
have significant interests in having control over the central aspects of our own lives. 
Second, the relational theory provides a deeper explanation of why the moral 
significance of our actions is not reducible to the protection and promotion of those 
interests: because, in light of these interests, it matters to us that we relate to one 
another in a way that allows us to recognise that we each give one another’s interests 
the appropriate role in our deliberations. If this is on the right track then claiming, as 
Owens does, that consent is normatively significant because it is in our interests that 
certain acts constitute wrongings unless we consent to them does not only fail to 
provide us with a full explanation, but is, in fact, somewhat misleading, since it 
essentially provides only half the story whilst claiming to give a full explanation of 
the power of consent. The mere fact that the explanation for the power of consent is 
not reducible to our control interests does not show that they do not play a central 
role in the proper explanation, as the permissive interest view suggests. 
The deeper explanation offered by the relational theory is also important 
when it comes to the final desideratum of explanatory power. Earlier I claimed that 
the explanatory power of the theory had two particularly important aspects, first, 
                                                
73 Cf. Shaping, p. 182. 
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whether it was clear how the theory might be integrated into a more general moral 
theory, and second, the extent to which the theory provided a foundation for 
addressing further theoretical and practical questions. As to the first, it is clear 
enough how the relational theory fits into a more general moral outlook, since it is 
grounded in a familiar account of morally significant interests, and is compatible 
with a number of prominent theories about how these interests ground moral claims. 
It simply introduces the relational requirement as a further relevant consideration 
when thinking about the justification of moral rights and powers. Regarding the 
second, we have already seen one important way in which the relational theory can 
elucidate further issues in our discussion of the ontology of consent. In the next 
chapter I will further draw on the relational theory in order to assess existing 
practices of sexual consent. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
I have argued that the normative significance of consent is explained by the fact it 
provides agents with a means of interacting with one another in valuable ways whilst 
recognising one another’s legitimate control over those spheres protected by control 
rights, thereby allowing agents to interact whilst standing in a relationship of mutual 
recognition. On the relational theory, consent is not justified by the fact that it serves 
or protects our control interests directly, but by the fact that it protects these interests 
indirectly whilst allowing for relations of mutual recognition. Ultimately, the power 
of consent provides a tool through which agents can manage their normative 
relationships, such that they can interact in useful and valuable ways whilst 
recognising one another’s legitimate control over the central aspects of their own 
lives. When they do so they relate in an intrinsically valuable way, by recognising 
one another as bearer’s of interests worthy of protection. This provides us with an 
explanation of consent’s normative significance that avoids the pitfalls of the direct 
theories considered in Chapter 2, but without the need to postulate permissive 
interests. Moreover, it supports our considered intuition that agents have a sphere of 
control or authority, within which their consent or dissent is decisive, without having 






Consent, Gender, and Social Justice 
 
Consent is widely regarded as a necessary condition for permissible sexual relations. 
But some theorists have argued that consent cannot provide a means to manage 
morally decent sexual relations under conditions of patriarchy and gender injustice. 
Most prominent in this regard has been the work of Catherine MacKinnon. “Never is 
it asked,” Mackinnon writes, “whether, under conditions of male supremacy, the 
notion of consent has any real meaning for women.”1 However, many have 
responded to MacKinnon by arguing that her focus on social structures is misplaced 
when applied to the issue of sexual consent. According to these critics, MacKinnon 
conflates two distinct forms of coercion – social coercion and interpersonal coercion 
– and wrongly implies that women cannot give normatively significant consent to 
sex under conditions of pervasive gender inequality.2  
In this chapter I draw upon the positive theory of consent developed in 
Chapter 5 to highlight an important connection between the social conditions within 
which consent operates and the extent to which consent can realise the values that 
underpin its normative significance. Whilst I agree with those who maintain that 
sexual consent does allow for non-wrongful sexual relations between individuals 
under non-ideal social conditions, I also agree with MacKinnon that structural 
inequalities make an important difference to the way in which sexual consent can 
facilitate morally decent and valuable sexual relationships. 
I begin, in Section 6.1, by setting out the nature of the dispute between 
MacKinnon and her opponents. In Section 6.2 I suggest that in order to fully realise 
                                                
1 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 298. n. 8. MacKinnon is certainly not the only feminist 
theorist to have made such claims. I focus on her work here because it is, I think, the most developed 
and powerful articulation of the set of concerns that I wish to consider. 
2 See, generally, David Archard, Sexual Consent, Ch. 6; Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Ch. 8; Robin West, “Sex, Law, and 
Consent,” in The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice, ed. Franklin G. Miller and Alan 
Wertheimer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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the values of individual control and mutual recognition we require appropriate 
conventions of sexual consent. Next, in Section 6.3, I argue for the control thesis, 
according to which existing social conventions of sexual consent, and the 
background conditions against which those conventions operate, fail to provide 
many (mostly women) with a sufficient measure of control over the sexual relations 
they engage in, thus failing to adequately serve and protect their first-order control 
interests. In Section 6.4 I argue for the mutual recognition thesis, which claims that 
the combination of existing conventions and background conditions threatens the 
extent to which sexual consent can be relied upon to ensure relations of mutual 
recognition between agents, in which there is a common understanding that they 
each have legitimate control over whether or not they engage in sexual relations. 
Finally, in Section 6.5, I consider some implications that my argument has for 
current debates concerning legal and moral standards of sexual consent, and argue 
that we have a duty of justice to create appropriate conventions. 
 
6.1 Structural Injustice and Sexual Consent 
 
As a starting point, consider what I take to be a relatively common pre-reflective 
view about the ability of sexual consent to govern morally decent sexual 
relationships, which I will call the standard view. According to the standard view, 
voluntary consent marks the borderline between permissible and impermissible 
sexual relations, so as to protect the sexual autonomy of individuals. So long as all 
the parties engaged in a sexual interaction ensure that they acquire one another’s 
consent, and are sufficiently attentive to the possible revocation of consent, they 
engage in permissible sexual relations. This is true (at least for the most part) 
independently of shared understandings about what constitutes sexual consent, and 
independently of the social circumstances within which sexual relationships occur, 
including the common understandings about the nature of relationships or the 
individuals who make up those relationships (e.g. norms or expectations about men 
and women, marriage, etc.).3 On the standard view, whilst there may be some need 
                                                
3 There may be some exceptions. For example, it might be thought that where there is a significant 
power asymmetry (e.g. relationships between academics and university students, or between doctors 
and patients), the more powerful party will (or at least can) wrong the less powerful party by engaging 
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to reform sexual consent laws, or practices connected to the prosecution of sexual 
offenders, and whilst we should engage in activities such as educating children about 
the importance of acquiring sexual consent, there is no reason to believe that consent 
cannot serve as a basis for decent sexual relations between individuals. Ultimately, 
the relevant level for scrutiny and criticism is at the individual level, and concerns 
whether or not particular individuals are careful to ensure that they have the consent 
of their sexual partners. 
 In the eyes of MacKinnon, the standard view is fundamentally flawed. The 
reason is simple. The standard view fails to take into consideration the significant 
structural inequalities that continue to exist between men and women. This omission 
is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the standard view implies that the 
prevalence of avowedly non-consensual sexual violence is the result of a widespread 
failure on the part of individuals to act in accordance with acceptable moral and legal 
standards, rather than a consequence of a social system of gender inequality, 
violence, and domination. To be clear, the claim is not that individuals bear no 
responsibility for perpetrating sexual violence. Rather, the problem is that the 
standard view allows a community to view acts of sexual violence as aberrant cases 
for which particular individuals are solely responsible. But, for MacKinnon, in order 
to undermine the prevalence of sexual violence we need to challenge the social 
system of inequality that underpins and facilitates high levels of sexual violence in 
the first place. 
 Second, the standard view is mistaken in claiming that sexual consent can 
protect or promote the sexual autonomy of women even when it is given. For 
MacKinnon, pervasive gender inequalities give rise to a variety of coercive 
conditions – including power asymmetries, economic inequalities, constrained 
alternatives, social expectations – that undermine the validity or usefulness of 
“voluntary sexual consent.” Indeed, whilst much sex may look “consensual,” it is 
not, in fact, “wanted”.4 
 
Consent is supposed to be women’s form of control over intercourse, 
different from but equal to the custom of male initiative. Man proposes, 
                                                                                                                                     
in sexual relations with them, even when they acquire what would otherwise be considered to be 
voluntary consent. 
4 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Women Lives, Men’s Laws (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2005), pp. 246-47. 
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woman disposes. Even the ideal is not mutual. Apart from the disparate 
consequences of refusal, this model does not envision a situation the 
woman controls being placed in, or choices she frames. Yet the 
consequences are attributed to her as if the sexes began at arm’s length, 
on equal terrain, as in the contract fiction.5 
 
So, as Robin West has suggested, MacKinnon claims that, “the sharp line 
drawn by liberals between consensual and non-consensual sex falsifies the degree of 
coercion imposed upon women by men in our ordinary sexual lives.”6 And until 
these broader coercive conditions are recognised as relevant, sexual consent cannot 
provide an adequate means to manage sexual relationships in the way envisaged by a 
proponent of the standard view. 
 
[U]ntil inequality is directly addressed by the law of sexual assault, 
nothing adequate will be done about it. You cannot solve a problem you 
do not name. For the same reason, legal reform through consent alone or 
force alone, while improvements, will intrinsically fall short unless the 
concepts are fundamentally recast in terms of inequality.7 
 
On MacKinnon’s view then, at their best current standards of sexual consent 
fail to adequately promote or protect the sexual autonomy of women because they do 
not to take into account the pervasive gender inequalities entrenched within society; 
at their worst, they serve to conceal the reality of force that further entrenches the 
political system of injustice and domination which gives rise to those inequalities in 
the first place.8 What would need to change before we could adopt the standard 
view? For MacKinnon, we would need to realise substantive gender equality: “If the 
sexes were equal, women would not be sexually subjected. Sexual force would be 
exceptional, consent to sex could be commonly real, and sexually violated women 
would be believed.”9 
Note that MacKinnon is unclear about the precise nature of the effect that 
structural conditions of inequality are supposed to have upon sexual consent. In 
                                                
5 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 174. 
6 Robin West, “Sex, Law, and Consent,” p. 225. 
7 MacKinnon, Women Lives, Men’s Laws, p. 246. 
8 Catherine A. MacKinnon, “Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: ‘Pleasure Under Patriarchy,’” 
Ethics 99, no. 2 (1989), pp. 329-30. 
9 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State), p. 215. Italics added. 
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particular, it remains unclear what degree of normative efficacy (if any) sexual 
consent can have within the non-ideal conditions that MacKinnon so vividly 
describes. In fact, this is an ambiguity that runs throughout MacKinnon’s writings on 
the topic, and one that is probably deliberate on her part. MacKinnon’s central point 
is that a view like the standard view is inadequate because it fails to take into 
consideration the broader conditions of gender injustice in which consent operates, 
and that, in order to fundamentally remould the nature of relations between men and 
women, it is here that our attention should be focused. As will become clear as we 
go on, however, clarifying this ambiguity is important if we are to benefit from 
MacKinnon’s insights.  
MacKinnon’s view has met with much opposition. One dominant strand of 
criticism maintains that, by focusing upon structural conditions of inequality, 
MacKinnon fails to pay sufficient attention to the agency of individuals (both 
women and men). In so doing, it is argued, MacKinnon wrongly implies that (i) 
women are unable to give any kind of meaningful consent to sex under conditions of 
gender inequality;10 (ii) that there are no significant differences between the 
experiences of those who take themselves to be having consensual rather than non-
consensual sex;11 and (iii) that individual men who acquire sexual consent from their 
partners are still likely to be culpable for serious wrongdoing because of the social 
and economic structures within which they act.12 Moreover, in his book Consent to 
Sexual Relations, Alan Wertheimer argues that principles of valid consent must be 
applicable to the non-ideal circumstances in which people live, including those of 
injustice: 
 
I do not doubt that women sometimes agree to sexual relations that they 
would reject under different or more just or equal background conditions. 
But we do not enhance their welfare or their autonomy by denying the 
transformative power of their consent.13  
 
Let us call this cluster of responses the liberal response. They are tied 
together by the common idea that sexual consent can, when given, allow for non-
                                                
10 Archard, Sexual Consent, Ch. 6. 
11 West, “Sex, Law, and Consent.” 
12 Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations, p. 188. 
13 Ibid., pp. 191-92. 
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wrongful sexual relationships even under non-ideal social conditions. This is not to 
say that we should have no concerns regarding the nature of sexual relationships in 
patriarchal conditions. But it is to say that when B gives voluntary consent to sex 
with A then A does not wrong B by engaging in sexual acts, irrespective of the 
background social conditions. To claim that A wrongs B conflates two importantly 
different forms of coercion: interpersonal coercion, on the one hand, and what we 
might call structural or social coercion, on the other.14   
I take it that, so understood, this claim is correct. There is surely an important 
difference between non-consensual sexual assault, and consensual sexual interaction, 
even where the latter occurs against the backdrop of pervasive and problematic 
gender norms and inequalities.15 MacKinnon may be right to insist that we should 
subscribe to a more expansive view about the kinds of coercive pressure an 
individual can bring to bear, for example, in the form of psychological abuse, or via 
their occupation of positions of power, and thus allow that A will wrong B in more 
contexts than is currently recognised, because by acting in these ways they vitiate 
any consent they receive. But what is not true is that A can wrong B just because B 
consent’s to sex takes place against the background of structural inequalities for 
which A is, at best, only indirectly and partially responsible for. We might say, then, 
that where A subjects B to his will (something he may do through a variety of 
means) he undermines the voluntariness of any consent B might give, and thus 
seriously wrongs her by engaging in sexual acts. But where A does not subject B to 
his will, B’s consent, if given, will be voluntary in the relevant sense, and thus 
present A with a genuine moral permission. 
Yet, as we saw in Chapter 5, the normative significance of consent is not 
exhausted by the fact that it provides agents with a means of non-wrongfully 
interacting with one another. Beyond this, consent plays an important role in 
managing the directed duties that obtain in virtue of our control rights. Specifically, 
it allows agents to interact in valuable ways by ensuring that they have a sufficient 
measure of control over the central aspects of their lives, whilst also enabling them 
to stand in relations of mutual recognition with one another. With these underlying 
                                                
14 See West “Sex, Law, and Consent.” 
15 It is worth noting that MacKinnon is often misrepresented by her critics. Whilst MacKinnon 
certainly claims that current practices of sexual consent are inadequate in light of pervasive gender 
inequality, she does not explicitly claim that sexual consent is in no way normatively significant – 
that there is no normative difference between consensual and non-consensual sexual relations. 
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values in mind, MacKinnon’s claims retain an intuitive force. Surely the structural 
conditions of gender injustice do make a difference to the degree of control 
possessed by individuals, and the extent to which agents can mutually recognise one 
another as possessing legitimate control over their sexual lives. In what follows I 
will argue that this is indeed the case.  
 
6.2 Consent and Conventions 
 
In what follows, I take MacKinnon’s claims about the significance of social 
structures seriously by assessing one way in which those structures – in particular, 
conventions of sexual consent and the background conditions against which those 
conventions operate – affect the way in which sexual consent is able to realise the 
values that underpin its normative significance. Before turning to defend the control 
thesis and the mutual recognition thesis, let me first say something about the 
relationship between conventions and consent. I think that in order for consent to 
play the role in managing interpersonal relations that I have argued it plays we need 
appropriate conventions of consent.16 The reason for this, simply put, is that we rely 
on conventions of consent in order to establish the shared normative framework that 
allows for relations of mutual recognition, and the valuable form of normative 
assurance that derives from these relations. As I argued in Chapter 5, agents require 
fixed-points in their interactions at which they can understand one another as 
consenting or dissenting, so as to be capable of forming common beliefs about 
consent’s authority within certain domains, and thus relate to one another as bearers 
of morally significant control interests. 
 Moreover, conventions are necessary in order to resolve linguistic and 
normative indeterminacies that would otherwise undermine the role consent can play 
in managing our moral relations. Linguistic indeterminacy amounts to the fact that, 
as Larry Alexander notes, “there is no canonical form of words or actions that count 
as consent.”17 So whilst a “Sure,” a nod of the head, or a signature on a consent 
form, might all constitute consent, there is no reason why these forms of 
                                                
16 I employ the term convention here in a way that I hope is familiar and intuitive. 
17 Larry Alexander, “The Ontology of Consent,” p. 103. 
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communication, and not others, should necessarily represent instances of consent.18 
This is so even if agents have the general idea that some forms of action are only 
permissible if another has given them permission. Without some further 
understanding of the way in which permission is given, both consenter and consentee 
will struggle to navigate their interaction in the way in which they believe they 
should. 
 Normative indeterminacy has somewhat deeper roots. There are two kinds of 
case I have in mind. First, there are cases in which it is indeterminate whether an 
agent possesses the power of consent or not. For example, what is the appropriate 
age for an individual to come to have the power of sexual consent? In the UK it is 
currently 16 by law. This seems more appropriate than 12 (which was the case 
historically), but it is less obvious why it should be 16, and not 15, or 17. Second, 
there is indeterminacy about how consent should be given (and revoked) in 
particular circumstances; that is, indeterminacy regarding what would count as a 
good way of giving consent in a certain context. For example, what is the 
appropriate standard of sexual consent: a wink, a nod, a verbal declaration, a 
signature, or none of the above? In both kinds of case I assume that there are reasons 
that count for and against various possible resolutions to these indeterminacies, 
without there being any single correct solution. For instance, as I argued in Chapter 
5, it is plausible to think that consent should be more or less formal depending on the 
first-order control interests at stake, and the nature of the relationship between 
consenter and consentee. However, whilst these considerations give us reasons in 
favour of more or less formal consent requirements, they will not provide definite or 
precise answers to the question of how consent should be given.  
 Social and legal conventions can resolve linguistic and normative 
indeterminacies, and institute a shared normative framework, by establishing fixed 
points: junctures within interactions at which it is widely understood that an agent 
must give consent in order for it to be permissible to proceed (e.g. prior to a medical 
examination), and, furthermore, specify actions or forms of words that will constitute 
consent in particular contexts (e.g. a thumbs up, a “Yes,” a signature). Socialisation 
into the practice equips individuals with knowledge of these fixed points, and how to 
traverse them. It is an open question whether a particular set of conventions will 
                                                
18 Of course, given the permission granting role played by consent, the linguistic tokens that play this 
role are likely to relate to other parts of a language that concern permission. 
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represent a good solution to the problems I have identified. Whether those 
conventions are good or bad solutions will depend on whether they resolve linguistic 
and normative indeterminacies, and establish commonly recognised fixed-points, in 
a way that is sufficiently responsive both to agents’ control interests and relational 
interests. I assume that where these conventions represent good solutions to the 
underlying problems they can provide us with new reasons for action, because they 
mediate between “abstract moral ideals and their concrete realization in our social 
interactions.”19 
Some might object to the idea that conventions of consent are in fact 
necessary in the way I am suggesting. For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson writes 
that “there is no more reason to think that a background of social understandings is 
required if consent is to be given than there is to think that a background of social 
understandings is required if a word is to be given [a promise made].”20 Moreover, to 
many, the suggestion that sexual consent is conventional may strike as odd. Surely it 
is simply wrong to have sex with someone unless we have his or her consent.  
I suspect that these responses conflate the moral value of consensual 
interactions with the preconditions for the realisation of that value. I am not claiming 
that the moral wrong of non-consensual sex is “merely conventional” in the sense 
that it is just something people around here happen to think is morally wrong. 
Rather, I doubt that agents could rely on consent in order to provide them with a 
sufficient measure of control, and allow for relations of mutual recognition, absent a 
fairly rich framework of linguistic and normative conventions.21 The idea that human 
beings could always have understood one another as bearers of certain rights that 
could be waived through the giving of consent seems patently false. Whilst I assume 
that, from the point at which human beings could be considered to be moral agents, 
our relations with one another have always been normatively laden – in that there are 
reasons for us to act or not act in certain ways with regard to one another – we have 
not always been equipped to deal with the imprecise normative boundaries that exist. 
It is precisely through developing conventions and practices, including conventions 
                                                
19 Marmor, Social Conventions, p. 149. 
20 The Realm of Rights, p. 350. 
21 Cf. Owens, Shaping, p. 152. Note that this does not imply that if, absent general conventions, A 
were to understand herself as giving consent to B by Φ-ing, and if B also understood that A means to 
give consent by Φ-ing (and so on and so forth), that A’s consent would not have normative force. 
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of consent, that we have been able to resolve indeterminacies and realise a wide 
range of moral values. 
 
6.3 The Control Thesis 
 
I now wish to argue that our existing conventions of sexual consent, and the 
background conditions against which they operate, fail to provide many individuals 
(especially women) with a sufficient measure of control over their sexual relations 
with others (the control thesis); and that these conventions also fail to facilitate 
relations of mutual recognition between agents (the mutual recognition thesis). I 
begin in this next section by arguing for the control thesis. 
According to the control thesis, under current social conditions our 
conventions of sexual consent do not provide women with a sufficient measure of 
control over their sexual relationships and interactions, thus failing to protect and 
promote the first-order control interests that partly explain consent’s normative 
significance.22 Whilst there are a number of ways in which the control thesis might 
be true, here I will simply focus on two such ways.23 First, I will argue that women 
lack a sufficient measure of control over their sexual interactions because the 
conventions themselves are inadequate. In particular, the conventions are such that a 
consenter (or dissenter) is often unable to secure uptake from the consentee. Second, 
I will argue that the background social and political conditions under which we live 
                                                
22 Whilst I focus on the way in which existing social conditions undermine the degree of control 
women have over their sexual relations, I do not mean to suggest that this situation will not have 
detrimental effects on men, whether as consenter’s or consentee’s. Furthermore, whilst I focus on 
sexual relations between men and women, I do not intend to suggest that these are the only sexual 
relationships that have value. Moreover, I suspect that the problems I identify will also exist within 
many non-heterosexual relationships, but I cannot adequately address this broader set of issues here.  
23 Further evidence for the control thesis, though I cannot explore this in any detail here, can be found 
in the ways in which existing social conditions lead women to consent to sex that is not truly desired 
or wanted. Assuming that one reason for thinking individuals have control interests is because they 
have interests in being able to maintain a sufficient degree of conformity between their evaluative 
attitudes and what happens to their bodies and within their environment, if it is true that social 
conditions consistently compel women to consent to sex that is not wanted then this suggests the 
possibility of significant consensual harms. This is another theme that runs through MacKinnon’s 
writing. (See, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 244-47.) Taking up this issue in a fascinating paper, Robin West 
argues that whilst we should be much more attentive to the harms that are caused by this kind of sex, 
and the background conditions that produce them, consent still serves as an appropriate marker 
between criminal and non-criminal sex, and that MacKinnon and other radical feminists are wrong to 
conflate these forms of sexual interaction with coercive rape. See her “Sex, Law, and Consent.” 
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undermine the efficacy of our conventions in providing individuals with a sufficient 
measure of control. 
 
6.3.1 Ambiguity and Uptake 
 
Conventions of sexual consent, in order to be adequate, should require that every 
individual only engage in sexual acts with the consent of their sexual partner(s), 
where consent is understood as a clear sign of positive willingness to engage in 
particular sexual acts.24 Until very recently, conventions of sexual consent were 
clearly insufficient, as was manifest in the law. For example, the marital rape 
exemption was only formally removed from the law in the UK in 1991. So, until this 
point, the legal conventions of consent in the UK held that a wife did not have the 
power of sexual dissent. Fairly obviously, this fails to provide married women with a 
sufficient degree of control over their sexual lives. Other legal examples include the 
idea that in order to be understood as dissenting a woman had to “resist to the 
utmost.” 
To be sure, current legal and non-legal conventions of sexual consent are a 
significant improvement on what they once were. However, I wish to argue that 
those conventions are still problematic because the consenter will often struggle to 
secure uptake of their consent or, more importantly, dissent, from the consentee. As 
Carolyn Shafer and Marilyn Frye note,  
 
Because of the conventional nature of the act of consent, one can 
effectively consent or withhold consent only where others are prone to 
consider one’s wishes – that is, where one’s act of giving consent can 
secure uptake. […] Obviously, the range of one’s actual, effective power 
of consent may or may not coincide with the range within which, 
morally, one ought to have the power of consent, for one’s effective 
power of consent depends upon the acknowledgement of others.25 
 
                                                
24 I am then, for the moment, relying on a weaker understanding of consent than the one I have been 
using up until now, according to which consent constitutes the intentional waiving of a right. I have 
more to say about this below.  
25 Marilyn Frye and Carolyn M. Shafer, “Rape and Respect,” in Feminism and Philosophy, ed. Mary 
Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Elliston, and Jane English (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1977), pp. 335-36. 
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What reasons are there for holding that acts of giving and withholding sexual 
consent do not secure uptake? To begin, current conventions of sexual consent still 
allow for a significant degree of ambiguity, ambiguity that disproportionately affects 
women because, according to the standard pattern of sexual interaction (or the 
“sexual script”) men initiate sexual interactions and women either consent or dissent 
to them.26 I will say that a convention is ambiguous when participants to the 
convention could regularly come to different judgements about when conventional 
norms apply. In the case of consent, a convention of consent is ambiguous when the 
participants of the convention could regularly come to different judgements about 
when consent has been given or revoked. If a convention of consent is ambiguous 
then it cannot serve its purpose. Consent functions by providing agents with a fixed 
point in their interactions at which they all understand that ϕ-ing or ψ-ing constitutes 
the giving or revocation of consent. If it is ambiguous to A and B whether the other 
has or has not given consent, they cannot rely on one another’s consent to (i) 
maintain sufficient control, and (ii) recognise one another’s legitimate control.  
Are there reasons for thinking that existing conventions of sexual consent are 
ambiguous? Alan Wertheimer “suspect[s] that there are very few cases in which 
there is genuine ambiguity whether [an individual] has tokened consent”.27 However, 
the empirical evidence suggests otherwise. For example, a survey of recent college 
students by The Washington Post found that at least 40 percent of the sample agreed 
that undressing, getting a condom, or nodding in agreement constituted consent to 
further sexual activity, whilst another 40 percent disagreed,28 implying serious 
divergence in beliefs about what constitutes sexual consent.29 Furthermore, there is a 
significant difference between men and women regarding how they give or interpret 
                                                
26 Kristen N. Jozcowski et al., “Gender Differences in Heterosexual College Students’ 
Conceptualizations and Indicators of Sexual Consent,” The Journal of Sex Research 51, no. 8 (2014), 
pp. 905-06.  
27 Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations, p. 153, emphasis in original. 
28 Nick Anderson and Peyton M. Craighill, “College students remain deeply divided about what 
consent actually means,” Washington Post, June 14, 2015, accessed November 28, 2015, 
www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/americas-students-are-deeply-divided-on-the-meaning-of-
consent-during-sex/2015/06/11/bbd303e0-04ba-11e5-a428-c984eb077d4e_story.html. 
29 See also the BBC study of 16-18 year olds, “Do people understand what rape is?” November 4, 
2015, accessed November 28, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34470205. Participants 
were shown a specially designed drama concerning a sexual interaction and asked to judge whether it 
was consensual. Despite the fact that one of the drama’s protagonists communicated no obvious signs 
of consent or willingness, there was significant disagreement, and confusion, about whether consent 
had been given.  
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sexual consent.30 According to a recent study, “men were more likely than women to 
rely on nonverbal cues to communicate and interpret consent and nonconsent, and 
women were more likely than men to rely on verbal cues to communicate and 
interpret consent.”31 As the studies authors note, this raises the possibility of 
miscommunication and ambiguity.32 Moreover, there is a lot of evidence that men 
frequently misperceive the behaviour of women. Michelle Anderson summarises 
recent findings in social psychology by saying, 
 
Men are more likely to misinterpret a woman's consumption of alcohol as 
conveying sexual intent. Men misinterpret women's friendly body 
language as indicative of sexual intent. When assessing interpersonal 
distance, eye contact, and casual touch, men rate women as more 
seductive and more promiscuous than women rate other women and 
themselves. Men are more prone to interpret flirting as indicative of 
sexual intent, whereas women tend to view flirting as "relational 
development.” In short, the literature documents the male tendency to see 
female sexual consent where there is none.33  
 
This evidence suggests that there is a significant degree of ambiguity within 
our existing conventions of sexual consent. Furthermore, there is also 
misunderstanding (or under appreciation) of the legal standards that obtain. Indeed, 
in response to the degree of sexual violence on college campuses, a number of 
American universities have recently adopted codes of conduct that specifically 
define sexual consent as something that must be communicated “unambiguously,” 
implying a need to remould sexual conventions, and to move away from more 
ambiguous modes of sexual communication.34  
A further reason for holding that current conventions of sexual consent are 
potentially ambiguous is that many acts that are taken to communicate sexual 
consent are not strictly speaking acts of consent at all. I have been working on the 
assumption that to consent one must perform a token of consent with the intention of 
                                                
30 I do not mean that this difference is natural or necessary, only that this is what empirical research 
has found. 
31 Kristen N. Jozcowski et al., “Gender Differences in Heterosexual College Students’ 
Conceptualizations and Indicators of Sexual Consent,” p. 913. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Michelle J. Anderson, “Negotiating Sex,” p. 1417, emphasis added. See also Archard, Sexual 
Consent, p. 156, n. 20, and accompanying text; and Jozcowski et al., “Gender Differences,” p. 913. 
34 Quoted in Tom Dougherty, “Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication,” p. 225. 
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waiving a right. But it seems fairly obvious that many of the acts that are cited as 
indicators of non-verbal consent (e.g. enthusiastic undressing, getting a condom, 
foreplay), are not undertaken with the intention of waiving a right.35 This does not 
imply that all such sexual relations are impermissible. In accordance with the 
typology I outlined in Chapter 5, agents can make a series of objective choices that 
ensure the permissibility of their sexual interaction (assuming there is a possibility 
for explicit dissent). However, one reason for relying on explicit consent rather than 
on objective choice is precisely because it will be less ambiguous.  
So there is good reason to think that existing conventions of sexual consent 
are ambiguous, such that there is an insufficient degree of shared understanding 
regarding which acts constitute sexual consent (or, perhaps, which acts constitute 
objective choices that can reasonably be taken to give permission to some sexual 
acts). If this is correct there is good reason to think that existing conventions of 
sexual consent fail to provide women with a sufficient measure of control over their 
sexual interactions, both because acts not aimed at giving consent are taken to do so, 
and acts of dissent are not understood as such. In order to provide a sufficient 
measure of control, acts of sexual consent (or objective choice) must be 
unambiguous: it must be transparent between the parties whether they intend to 
make it permissible to engage in sexual relations.36 
There are, moreover, a number of more pernicious factors that plausibly 
undermine a women’s ability to secure uptake when she consents or dissents. For 
one, it is often still expected that women will initially dissent to sexual relations, 
because they are being “coy,” and that men should continue to pursue a sexual 
encounter even in the face of explicit refusal.37 Furthermore, Rae Langton has 
argued in her influential article, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” that the 
widespread use of pornography has influenced the felicity conditions for acts of 
consent and dissent in the sexual sphere, such that attempted acts of dissent are not 
even recognised as such.38 
 
                                                
35 See also my discussion in Section 3.2.3.  
36 See also, Dougherty, “Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication.” 
37 Jozcowski et al., “Gender Differences,” p. 905. 
38 Here Langton is drawing on J. L. Austin’s famous Speech Act Theory. All that matters for our 
purposes is the idea that “felicity conditions” are just those conditions that must hold for an utterance 
to constitute an act of consent or dissent. 
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Pornography might legitimate rape, and thus silence refusal, by doing 
something other than eroticizing refusal itself. It may simply leave no 
space for the refusal move in its depictions of sex…Here the refusal 
move is not itself eroticized as in the pornography considered earlier: it is 
absent altogether. Consent is the only thing a woman can do with her 
words in this game. Someone learning the rules of the game from this 
kind of pornography might not even recognize an attempted refusal.39 
 
If Langton is right,40 this draws our attention to an important problem with 
conventions of sexual consent: acts of non-consent or refusal will not be merely 
ambiguous, but cannot be recognised as acts of dissent at all. Clearly, where that is 
the case, women will not have a sufficient measure of control over their sexual 
relations.  
 
6.3.2 Background Social Conditions and the Legitimation of Force  
 
So far I have argued that existing conventions of sexual consent are insufficient 
because women consenters cannot always secure uptake from male consentees. This 
fact, I have suggested, gives us reason to accept the control thesis. I now turn to the 
way in which background social and political conditions further undermine the 
efficacy of our conventions of sexual consent.  
To begin, let me clarify what I mean by “background social and political 
conditions.” These conditions are constituted by many different elements and might 
be thought of, in the most general terms, as the social, political, and moral 
environment in which we live. To list some (but by no means all) of these elements, 
they include: laws, political institutions, political practices, social norms, economic 
prosperity, employment trends, news media, social media, professional standards, 
artwork (e.g. music, films, novels, and jokes), fashion, and academic writing. 
                                                
39 Rae Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 4 
(1993), p. 324. 
40 Alexander Bird persuasively argues that Langton’s claims about refusal rest on an incorrect 
premise: that uptake is required for the speech act of refusal (in “Illocutionary Silencing,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quaterly 83 (2002)). Bird argues that in fact refusal can occur even if it is not 
recognised as such. However, as Bird notes, this is a matter of speech act theory. Whether or not 
uptake is required for refusal or not, the important point is that some forms of pornography support an 
environment in which non-consent is not recognised as such, and that this undermines the degree of 
control women have over their sexual interactions.     
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It is the fact that these background conditions support and constitute a system 
in which men and women are socially, economically, and politically unequal, that 
motivates MacKinnon’s claims that sexual consent, considered in isolation, cannot 
succeed as a means of managing sexual relations. Whilst it is unclear what the 
upshot of this is for MacKinnon, I am working with the assumption that consent (of 
a certain kind) can, at least in the majority of cases, make sexual relations 
permissible. But I want to argue that one way of understanding the idea that 
background conditions nonetheless threaten or undermine the usefulness of sexual 
consent is through the claim that background conditions prevent women from having 
a sufficient measure of control over their sexual interactions. Here I will focus on the 
way in which the background conditions within which we live eroticise and 
legitimatise the use of force and coercion in the sexual sphere. 
The idea that relations of force and coercion are constitutive of the sexual 
sphere is a theme that runs throughout MacKinnon’s work. Indeed, MacKinnon 
claims that, “forced sex as sexuality is not exceptional in relations between the sexes 
but constitutes the social meaning of gender.”41 Whether this general claim can be 
vindicated is not a question I can address here. But it is not implausible to claim that 
sexual force is, at least currently, both eroticised and legitimatised by dominant 
social and political norms. One way in which this is so is through the widespread use 
of forms of pornography that, in MacKinnon’s words, “sexualizes rape, battery, 
sexual harassment, prostitution…[and]…thereby celebrates, promotes, authorizes, 
and legitimizes them.”42 Indeed, Langton argues that, as well as silencing women by 
making it impossible for their dissent to secure uptake, pornography legitimates rape 
“by sexualizing the use of force in response to refusal that is recognized as refusal. 
Such pornography eroticizes refusal itself, presenting the overpowering of a 
woman’s will as exciting.”43 
To be sure, it is very hard to establish causal connections between the 
widespread use of pornography and the high incidence of sexual assault and rape.44 
But whatever the precise combination of social forces that explain them, there 
certainly exist widespread attitudes and beliefs, in both men and women, that imply 
                                                
41 Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, p. 178. 
42 “Frances Biddle’s Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech,” in Feminism Unmodified: 
Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), p.171. 
43 Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” p. 323. 
44 Although see ibid., p. 306. 
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the permissibility of the use of sexual force. For example, in a 2014 study, “Denying 
Rape but Endorsing Forceful Intercourse,” the authors found that whilst 31.7% of 
survey respondents claimed to have some intentions to force women to have sexual 
intercourse, only 13.6% claimed to have any intentions to rape a woman, suggesting 
that 18.1% of respondents did not believe that their force would vitiate consent.45 In 
2009, an Ipsos Mori poll found that 36 percent of respondents thought women 
should be held partly or wholly responsible if she is sexually assaulted or raped 
whilst drunk, and that 43 percent thought she should be held wholly or partly 
responsible if she was flirting heavily with a man beforehand.46 Furthermore, as I 
noted above, it is commonly believed that women will “token” resistance, and that 
men should continue to pursue sex in the face of such resistance.47 Finally, it is 
widely believed that only “certain kinds” of women are raped, that rapes are most 
likely to be perpetrated by strangers in alien environments, and that men are 
naturally sexually aggressive and cannot help themselves.48 
What unifies these beliefs is the thought that it is sometimes permissible to 
use sexual force even when women dissent. Moreover, evidence suggests that this 
belief is not only held by men. In one study of college-aged women, 45.69% of 
female participants (from a sample of 302) were classed as “unacknowledged 
victims,” who “endorsed experiencing a sexual assault but did not label it as such, 
instead choosing some other descriptor (i.e., a “serious miscommunication,” “not 
victimized,” or a victim of a crime other than sexual assault).”49 
It is surely no coincidence that against this backdrop, it is still the case that 
only 6 percent of reported rapes end in conviction in the UK,50 and only 2 out of 
every 100 rapes that occur in the US (including unreported rapes) lead to a 
                                                
45 Sarah R. Edwards, Kathryn Bradshaw, and Verlin Hinsz “Denying Rape But Endorsing Forceful 
Intercourse: Exploring Differences Among Responders,” Violence and Gender 1, no. 4 (2014), p. 
190. 
46 Ipsos Mori, “Violence against women opinion polling,” February 2009, accessed November 28, 
2015, http://www.huiselijkgeweld.nl/doc/english/violence-against-women-poll_2009.pdf. 
47 See Jozkowski et al., “Gender Differences,” for comment and further references. 
48 See Susan Griffin, “Rape: The All American Crime,” in Feminism and Philosophy, ed. Mary 
Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Elliston, and Jane English (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1977). 
49 Colleen Cleere and Steven Jay Lynn, “Acknowledge Versus Unacknowledged Sexual Assault 
Among College Women,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 28, no. 12 (2013), pp. 2597, 2598. 
50 Statistic from “Facts and Statistics on Gender Inequality,” UK Feminista, accessed November 29, 
2015, http://ukfeminista.org.uk/take-action/facts-and-statistics-on-gender-inequality/. 
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conviction;51 that 26 percent of sexual offences that are reported are not recorded as 
crimes;52 and that whilst the number of reported rapes has increased in recent years, 
the conviction rate has remained relatively static.53 What matters for present 
purposes is that these institutional failures affect the degree of control women have 
over their sexual relations, in part because they reaffirm problematic beliefs, and in 
part because they foster an environment in which men can rape with impunity. As 
Claudia Card observes, “One reason men rape is they can. They usually get away 
with it. That could change with less peer tolerance.”54 This has led some to claim, 
not unreasonably I think, that the state functions as a male protection racket for 
sexual violence.55 
I do not think, in the face of the empirical evidence I have offered, that one 
can easily deny the connection between the prevalence of sexual violence and the 
social and political environment within which we live. If this is correct, then the 
control thesis is true twice over: first, because of the ambiguity that exists within 
existing conventions of sexual consent, and second, because the background 
conditions against which those conventions operate further undermine their efficacy 
by failing to ensure that “No Means No.” What is more, the first problem will be 
compounded by the second. So even assuming that the liberal response is right to 
maintain that consent can allow for non-wrongful sexual relations in non-ideal social 
conditions, it does not follow that the requirement for sexual consent alone can 
adequately protect and promote women’s interests in having control over the sexual 
relations they engage in.   
 
6.4 The Mutual Recognition Thesis 
 
                                                
51 Statistic from “Reporting Rates,” Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network, accessed November 
29, 2015, https://rainn.org/get-information/statistics/reporting-rates. 
52 HMIC, “Crime Recording: Making the Victim Count,” November, 2014, access on November 29, 
2015, www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/crime-recording-making-the-
victim-count.pdf.    
53 Liz Kelly, Jo Lovett, and Linda Regan, “A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape Cases,” 
Home Office Research Study 293, November 2005, p. x, accessed November 29, 2015, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hors29
3.pdf. 
54 Claudia Card, “Recognizing Terrorism,” The Journal of Ethics 11, no. 1 (2007), p. 15. 
55 Susan Rae Peterson, “Coercion and Rape: The State As a Male Protection Racket,” in Feminism 
and Philosophy, ed. Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Elliston, and Jane English (Totowa, New 
Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977). 
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I now turn to the mutual recognition thesis. According to this thesis, existing 
conventions of sexual consent and the background conditions against which they 
operate, fail to serve our relational interests. Specifically, under current conditions 
agents will struggle to stand in relations of mutual recognition, in which there is a 
common understanding that we relate to one another as having legitimate control 
over whether or not we engage in sexual relations. Note, that whilst the control thesis 
predominantly extends to women, the mutual recognition thesis will hold for all 
agents. I want to suggest that the mutual recognition thesis is true in two related, but 
distinguishable, ways. First, existing conventions and background conditions 
threaten concrete relations of mutual recognition between particular agents. Second, 
existing conventions and background social conditions threaten general social 
relations of mutual recognition within a community. 
 Many of the reasons why existing conventions of sexual consent threaten the 
possibility of relations of mutual recognition between particular individuals flow 
directly from the reasons that support the truth of the control thesis. For example, if I 
am right to claim that existing conventions of consent are ambiguous, such that 
agents regularly come to different judgements regarding whether consent has been 
given or revoked, this ambiguity will forestall the possibility of the common beliefs 
between two agents that are necessary for them to stand in a relationship of mutual 
recognition.  
 Problems of ambiguity and misunderstanding are likely to be mitigated in on-
going sexual relationships in which individuals come to know one another, and so 
are better able to communicate with one another, both explicitly, and through other 
more subtle and nuanced means of communication (e.g. indirect verbal cues, 
physical cues, regularities in behaviour, etc.). Yet I think it would be a mistake to 
conclude that under these circumstances those who are party to an established 
relationship face no difficulties in standing in a relationship of mutual recognition. 
After all, relations of what we might call, somewhat artificially, “sexual mutual 
recognition,” do not only require that agents have common beliefs about whether 
sexual consent has in fact been given or revoked on any particular occasion. It also 
requires a continuing common belief about the fact that the parties each regard one 
another’s sexual consent as authoritative, that it is impermissible to have sex with 
one another another unless we have mutual consent. Here, the background social 
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conditions within which we live are likely to threaten the possibility of this common 
belief.      
Whilst I suspect many might wish to deny this, it is easy to idealise the nature 
of romantic sexual relationships. The reality is that “64 percent of the women who 
reported being raped, physically assaulted, and/or stalked since age 18 were 
victimized by a current or former husband, cohabiting partner, boyfriend, or date.”56 
Women (and to a lesser degree men) are well aware of these facts, often through 
personal experience or the experiences of friends and family. So, even within a 
relationship in which we can assume each party regards the other’s sexual consent as 
authoritative, these external social realties may well make a difference to the degree 
of confidence that each of the parties has concerning whether this is the case, or their 
confidence in whether the other believes that they regard their sexual consent as 
authoritative. The effects of the social backdrop upon our beliefs may be subtle and 
inarticulable, but that does not prevent them from determining the nature of the 
relationships we are able to have.  
I do not mean to say that men and women cannot develop decent and 
valuable sexual and romantic relationships in spite of the social and political world 
within which they live. The point is rather that the parties to a relationship can never 
fully insulate themselves against the background conditions within which they live. 
Individuals within particular relationships cannot escape the fact that they live in a 
social world where women do not have a sufficient measure of control over their 
sexual relations with others, are often not regarded as having legitimate control over 
their sexual relationships, and in which political and social institutions do not 
provide adequate protection or redress in the face of these problems. 
Turn now to the broader issue of relations of mutual recognition between the 
members of a community. As I have already suggested, women and men both 
understand the social reality of unequal and insufficient sexual control. As Susan 
Griffin notes, “I have never been free of the fear of rape. From a very early age I, 
like most women, have thought of rape as part of my natural environment – 
something to be feared and prayed against like fire or lightning.”57 So, even if we 
                                                
56 P. Tjaden, and N. Thoennes, “Full Report of the Prevalence, Incidence, and Consequences of 
Violence Against Women: Findings From the National Violence Against Women Survey,” U.S. 
Department of Justice Research Report, November 2000, accessed November 28, 2015, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf. 
57 Griffin, “Rape: The All-American Crime,” p. 313.  
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believe that our partner regards our sexual consent as authoritative, it does not follow 
that we believe that all of the members of our community regard our sexual consent 
as authoritative. Not only will this undermine agents’ ability to stand in relations of 
mutual recognition with those who they do not know, and with whom they may wish 
to develop special relationships, but it also undercuts the value of the normative 
assurance that derives from believing that others (or at least the vast majority of 
others) recognise one’s sexual consent as authoritative.     
With regard to normative assurance, coercively backed legal institutions 
obviously play an important role, and it might be suggested that I am 
overemphasising the lack of assurance that individuals have. However, even 
disregarding the institutional failures that I have already alluded to, coercive laws 
alone are not able to provide the kind of assurance necessary to foster the valuable 
relationships and interactions that the power of consent facilitates. If, for instance, 
we rightly believed that the only reason the members of our society generally respect 
our rights is because of the routinely enforced coercive laws of the state, then we 
would struggle, I would suggest, to engage in valuable relationships with them. We 
would not be so much “relating as equal autonomous agents” as “begrudgingly 
acting in accordance with others’ legally protected rights.” So, whilst the law can 
play an important role, it will also be of great significance that members of a society 
internalise the right norms about how they ought to relate to one another.58 An on-
going commitment to recognise one another’s legitimate control over certain spheres 
on the part of the majority of societies members will translate into a wide, if implicit, 
understanding that this is how we do in fact relate to one another, thereby providing 
the necessary assurance required to further foster valuable relations of mutual 
recognition.  
  
6.5 New Conventions, New Standards 
 
If the control thesis and the mutual recognition thesis are true, should we continue to 
rely on sexual consent as a marker for permissible and impermissible sexual 
relations? I am inclined to think that we should, although much more needs to be 
said about the relevant standard of sexual consent. However, I am prepared to cede 
                                                
58 Cf. Daniel Viehoff, “Democratic Equality and Political Authority,” p. 359. 
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that there may be other models of sexual interaction that better serve the values of 
individual control and mutual recognition. For example, in “Negotiating Sex” 
Michelle Anderson contrasts two consent-based models of rape law reform (the 
“No” and “Yes” models) with her own preferred “negotiation model,” according to 
which individuals must engage in “consultation, reciprocal communication, and the 
exchange of views before a person initiates sexual penetration.”59  
Whilst I cannot consider the details of Anderson’s view here, it is, however, 
worth noting that even accepting the negotiation model, consent is still likely to play 
a central role within the overall framework. For one, as Anderson notes, once sexual 
penetration has occurred there must remain the live option of dissent. Furthermore, 
we might think that even if we agree with Anderson that some form of negotiation is 
necessary, we should see this as a precondition for valid consent as opposed to a 
straightforward replacement for consent. Compare medical consent. We generally 
believe that before a patient can give valid consent a doctor and patient need to have 
a discussion about the kind of treatment that will be given, how this will be 
delivered, alternative treatment options, and so on, at least in cases of serious and 
invasive medical treatment.   
Rather than making any particular prescriptions, however, I want to make 
three general points that I think should be borne in mind when approaching this 
debate. First, it is important to remember that our practice of sexual consent is 
conventional; that it exists and is transmitted over time because we accept and rely 
on these conventions. As such, the way in which we rely on consent to manage our 
sexual relations is ultimately up to us, and depends on the political, legal, and 
individual decisions we make. Of course, no one individual can transform the 
conventions alone. But collectively we can shape and remould the conventions as we 
judge appropriate. This matters because, through socialisation into the conventions, 
they often come to seem natural to us – as fixed and necessary. Moreover, there still 
exists a widespread belief that sexual assault and rape are the result of men’s 
“natural” inclination toward sexual aggression. Yet we can control how we manage 
our sexual relationships, and we should not be put off straight away because 
proposed revisions to our conventions appear strange or unrealistic.    
                                                
59 “Negotiating Sex,” p. 1421. 
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Second, when thinking about which conventions of consent we should 
institute, we must think about what kinds of conventions would best promote the 
values in question under the non-ideal conditions within which we live. These may 
be quite different from the conventions of consent that would be desirable under 
conditions of equality and justice. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that existing 
conventions would not, with some moderations, be sufficient in ideal conditions. For 
example, the relatively informal nature of consent giving in many sexual interactions 
– or the fact that what often does the normative work is objective choice – may be 
desirable, given the intimate nature of the relations and relationships in question. But 
that does not give us reason only to tinker at the margins given our social reality. 
Indeed, we may have to institute more formalistic conventions of consent than would 
otherwise be desirable or necessary, in order to ensure that women have a sufficient 
measure of control over their sexual interactions, and that we are able to stand in 
relations of mutual recognition. 
Finally, as I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter, conventions of 
consent will only be able to fully realise the underlying values at stake when they 
exist within appropriate social and political conditions. This is both because those 
conditions inevitably influence the conventions themselves, and because, even where 
they do not, they affect the efficacy of those conventions. So, whilst there is good 
reason to think about the conventions of consent we should institute, in order for 
sexual consent to allow agents to relate as equal autonomous agents we will need to 
tackle the background conditions of inequality and injustice. This is, I think, one 
reason why MacKinnon focuses on the importance of structural conditions of 
inequality in the context of sexual consent, and, furthermore, a reason why those 
who disregard the importance of those conditions, such as Wertheimer and Archard, 
do so too quickly. Whilst they are right that we can engage in non-wrongful sexual 
relations under non-ideal conditions, it does not follow that we can properly achieve 
the valuable form of relationship that consent allows for under just any social 
conditions. In MacKinnon’s words, “Autonomy in sex cannot exist without equality 
of the sexes.”60 
 Whatever they turn out to be, creating and maintaining appropriate 
conventions of sexual consent, and background conditions that enable those 
                                                
60 Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws, p. 247. 
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conventions to operate properly, is, I believe, a duty of social justice. On what 
grounds should we think this is a duty of justice? It cannot be assumed that the fact it 
would be morally desirable to have better conventions operating under conditions of 
equality entails that we have a duty of justice to institute such conventions. However, 
such an argument is not hard to come by. To start with, whether or not women have 
a sufficient measure of control over their sexual relations is clearly a matter of social 
justice, at least on many prominent understandings. For instance, according to John 
Rawls’s influential account, “the subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or 
more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental 
rights and duties.”61 Or, according to Iris Marion Young, the institutional context 
which is relevant to judgements of justice, includes 
 
any structures or practices, the rules and norms that guide them, and the 
language and symbols that mediate social interactions within them, in 
institutions of state, family, and civil society, as well as the workplace. 
These are relevant to judgments of justice and injustice insofar as they 
condition people’s ability to participate in determining their actions and 
their ability to develop and exercise their capacities.62  
 
I think rights of sexual control clearly qualify as a matter of justice on both 
Rawls’s and Young’s account. First off, a right to sexual control is clearly a 
“fundamental right” in Rawls’s terms. Moreover, the conventional nature of 
requirements of consent, the fact that these conventions are shaped in significant 
ways by political and legal institutions, and the further fact that those institutions 
also support and determine relations of social, economic, and political inequality that 
impair the efficacy of those conventions all support the claim that the existence and 
efficacy of those conventions is a matter of social justice. If we conceive of as a just 
state as one in which citizens’ stand in relations of fairness and equality, with an 
equal ability to live a flourishing autonomous life, then unequal and insufficient 
control over one’s sexual relations constitutes a serious injustice.  
                                                
61 A Theory of Justice, p. 6. 
62 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990), p. 22. 
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 The next premise is simple: where possible, agents have a duty to create and 
maintain just institutions (or, more generally, just social conditions).63 There are a 
number of possible grounds for this duty, but I assume here that it is uncontroversial. 
Taken together with the claim that the failure of existing conventions of sexual 
consent amounts to an injustice, this give us the following conclusion: we have a 
duty of justice to create and maintain conventions of sexual consent, as well as the 
background conditions that can support them, that equip all agents with a sufficient 
measure of control over their sexual interactions, and allow them to recognise one 




In this chapter I have argued the structural conditions of gender injustice undermine 
the ability of sexual consent to fully realise the values that underpin its normative 
significance. In particular, I have argued that existing conventions of sexual consent, 
operating against existing social and political background conditions, do not provide 
women with a sufficient measure of control over their sexual relations, and threaten 
the possibility of valuable relations of mutual recognition between agents. Thus, 
whilst consent can allow for permissible sexual relationships under non-ideal social 
conditions, MacKinnon is right to maintain that unequal structural conditions make 
an important difference to the nature of the relationships that can obtain under those 
conditions. I finished by arguing that we have a duty of justice to institute 
appropriate conventions of consent as well as the background conditions that will 
support them. In recent years progress has certainly been made on both fronts, but 
there is still a long way to go.  
                                                
63 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 293-94. 






In Chapter 1 I set out two questions to which a theory of consent’s normative 
significance should provide an answer. First, the question of consent’s normative 
force asks why an agent’s consent has normative force, such that when they give 
valid consent they waive a right of theirs? Second, the question of consent’s 
relational significance asks why the power of consent plays such an important role in 
the management of directed duties?  
Throughout the thesis I have attempted to answer these questions in a way 
that is consistent with an interest-based account of moral rights. I began, in Chapters 
2 and 3, by rejecting a number of possible answers. In Chapter 2 I rejected four 
theories of consent according to which the power of consent is justified by the fact 
that it directly serves or protects our interests. I argued that these theories all faced a 
common objection: they were unable to account for what I have described as the 
authoritative nature of consent, the fact that an agent’s consent often has normative 
significance independently of whether their consent (or lack of consent) will serve or 
set back their interests. 
In Chapter 3 I considered one of the few detailed philosophical accounts of 
consent’s normative significance to have been developed, David Owens’s permissive 
interests view. According to Owens, our power of consent is grounded in our 
possession of permissive interests, interests in certain acts being wrong unless we 
consent to them. Whilst Owens provides an intriguing alternative to the simple 
interest-based theories considered in Chapter 2, I argued that we have good reason to 
reject Owens’s position. Specifically, I argued that Owens does not give us a 
convincing account of why the power of consent has value for us, that his theory has 
limited explanatory power, and that reflection on a paradigm case of consent – 
sexual consent – suggests that we do not in fact have permissive interests. 
Having rejected these accounts I began the task of constructing an alternative 
theory of consent. In Chapter 4 I suggested that in order to think about the normative 
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significance of consent it would help to first think about the role played by rights, 
that we then waive by giving consent, in structuring our moral relations with one 
another. I argued that rights should not be thought of as significant only insofar as 
they serve and protect our first-order interests (in friendship, shelter, intellectual 
stimulation, adequate nutrition, and so on), but also because they serve our relational 
interests, by establishing a normative framework that allows agents to recognise that 
others give their interest the appropriate role within their practical deliberations. I 
further argued that two agents stand in a distinctly valuable relationship with one 
another when they each understand that they relate to one another in a morally 
decent way, a relation that I called mutual recognition. Moreover, I claimed that 
standing in relations of mutual recognition provides agents with a valuable form of 
normative assurance, an assurance that derives from the role that the framework of 
rights plays in allowing for relations of mutual expectation and accountability. I 
relied on these claims to support the proposal that that the first-order interests that 
justify rights must be mediated through the “relational requirement,” according to 
which the moral requirements justified by interests must allow for relations of 
mutual recognition between agents. 
I then argued, in Chapter 5, for the relational theory of consent. I began by 
arguing that in light of a variety of significant control interests we have control rights 
over the central aspects of our own lives, such that others are under duties not to 
interfere in these spheres (principally our minds, bodies, and property). Importantly, 
in line with the account of rights developed in Chapter 4, these rights have a 
preemptive structure, so as to help facilitate relations of mutual recognition between 
agents. I then argued that we have a variety of reasons to want to be able to waive 
these rights, so as to be able to interact with others in a range of valuable ways. 
Importantly, however, we want to be able to waive these rights whilst (i) maintaining 
a sufficient measure of control over the central aspects of our own lives, and (ii) 
continuing to stand in relations of mutual recognition with one another. I claimed 
that the power of consent plays this role, because tokens of consent, like rights, 
serves as a fixed-point in our interactions that we can rely on to manage our 
normative relations whilst recognising that we relate to one another in a morally 
decent way, thereby indirectly protecting our first-order control interests. According 
to the relational theory, then, the answers to the two questions from which we began 
are intimately connected. Consent has normative force because it allows agents to 
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interact in valuable ways; and it has relational significance because it allows agents 
to interact in these ways whilst maintaining a sufficient measure of control over their 
own lives, and mutually recognising that they each have legitimate control over these 
domains. 
The example of sexual consent illustrates the relational theory of consent 
nicely. Agents have weighty interests in having control over whom they engage in 
sexual relationships with. They also have relational interests in being able to 
recognise that others give their first-order interests the appropriate role within their 
practical deliberations. These interests ground negative control rights that hold others 
under a duty not to have sex with them. Clearly, however, individuals also have 
interests in being able to engage in sexual relations with one another. By relying on 
consent to manage the permissibility of their sexual relations, two agents are able to 
maintain a sufficient measure of control over the sexual relationships they engage in, 
whilst also recognising one another as having legitimate control over whether or not 
they have sex, and thus standing in the valuable relationship of mutual recognition. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I considered some implications the relational theory has 
for an on-going debate about the role sexual consent can play in managing decent 
sexual relations in a world still marked by pervasive gender inequality and gender 
injustice. Here I claimed that in order to serve both our first-order control interests 
and our second-order relational interests we require appropriate conventions of 
consent. I then argued that existing conventions of sexual consent, operating against 
background conditions of inequality, are inadequate. Specifically I argued for the 
control thesis, according to which existing conventions of sexual consent prevent 
women from having a sufficient measure of control over their sexual relations; and 
the mutual recognition thesis, according to which current conventions of sexual 
consent, and the broader social background against those conventions operate, 
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